Ghana at a Crossroads: Another Attempt at Reforming its Defective Constitution

Ghana has launched a new constitutional reform process, the latest in a series of stalled efforts to address democratic deficits in the 1992 Constitution. An eight-member committee is tasked with proposing amendments by mid-2025. Key reforms may target the concentration of executive power, judicial independence, and decentralization. While the ruling party holds a supermajority, entrenched provisions still require referendums—making broad political and public consensus essential for meaningful change – writes Nicholas Opoku.

Introduction

An eight-member Constitutional Review Committee was inaugurated by newly elected President John Mahama in February 2025, in line with his campaign promise. As a part of its work, the Committee is receiving written submissions and plans to consult stakeholders across the country. Chaired by Professor Henry Kwasi Prempeh, the Committee is mandated to gather stakeholder views and make recommendations aimed specifically at enhancing democratic governance. The Committee is expected to submit to the president proposed amendments to the 1992 Constitution within six months.

The constitutional reform drive has emerged amid recent milestones highlighting Ghana's role as a beacon of multi-party democracy in Africa. Since the Fourth Republic began in 1992, the country has held eight timely multi-party elections, all deemed fair and transparent by observers. Four of these elections have resulted in peaceful power transitions between Ghana’s two main parties. Ghanaian presidents have also consistently upheld presidential term limits. 

Despite electoral successes and alternation of power, Ghana's “permissive” Constitution has allowed political elites—especially major parties and their allies in state institutions—to manipulate policies for their own benefit. This state capture, along with political patronage and corruption, has hindered delivery of public goods, deepened poverty, and led many Ghanaians to view the country's democracy as ineffective.

A fresh attempt at constitutional review

This is not the first time Ghana has sought to reform its constitution. Such efforts were conducted during the regimes of the two principal political parties, the National Democratic Congress (NDC), the current ruling party, and the New Patriotic Party (NPP). Notably, in 2010, an extensive and participatory reform process produced a series of reform proposals, which remain relevant but have not seen the light of day. Indeed, the new Committee is required to draw on the outcomes of the 2010 and subsequent reform efforts.

The constitutional amendment process in the 1992 Constitution is quite stringent, requiring a supermajority in Parliament, and, for entrenched provisions, a referendum requiring 40 per cent turnout and 75 per cent approval. As it is Mahama’s final term, there is little incentive for him to backtrack on reform, and the ruling party has for the first time since 1992 secured a two-thirds majority in Parliament. Nevertheless, the fate of the reform drive will remain daunting, and will depend on securing cross-party consensus, as well as support from key civil society and traditional leaders around proposed reforms.

Recurrent themes: Taming the imperial presidency

Many of the issues that the new Committee will likely grapple with were identified by the 2010 Constitutional Review Commission, which adopted several recommendations in its 2011 report. Notably, the proposed reforms related to the vast powers of presidential appointment, including of members of the judiciary, fourth branch institutions, state owned enterprises (SOEs) and the National Council of State, a body which counsels the President in the performance of the functions of the office. There were also proposals to democratize the mode of selection of local government officials. Another recurrent theme has been the mandate and composition of the National Development Planning Commission (NDPC), a constitutional body appointed by and advising the president on development planning policy and strategy.

Many of these reform proposals are particularly intended to tame what many consider is an ‘imperial presidency’ and the consequent winner-take-all features of the political system.

Many of these reform proposals are particularly intended to tame what many consider is an ‘imperial presidency’ and the consequent winner-take-all features of the political system. Other reforms are related to issues of separation of powers and judicial independence. Notably, the constitutional requirement that a majority of ministers should be appointed from the Parliament and the absence of an upper limit on the number of judges of the Supreme Court have been controversial, with some legal scholars arguing that the latter compromises the institutional and decisional independence of the Court.

The then NDC-led government, where Mahama was serving as vice-president, issued a white paper, accepting some of the CRC’s recommendations, while rejecting others. Nevertheless, the initiator and “champion” of the reform process, the late President John Mills, died in office in July 2012. Mahama, who briefly succeeded Mills and went on to win the 2012 elections, sought but failed to build bi-partisan consensus on numerous proposed amendments to entrenched constitutional provisions. When Mahama lost the 2016 general elections to the New Patriotic Party’s (NPP) Nana Akufo-Addo, the NDC’s constitutional reform agenda was brought to an abrupt end.

President Akufo-Addo did not seek to pursue comprehensive reforms, instead prioritizing secondary education and other socio-economic policies. Nevertheless, the NPP pursued governance reforms through proposed changes to the mode of selection of the Metropolitan, Municipal and District Chief Executives (MMDCEs) and to allow political parties to sponsor candidates in local government elections. The presidential appointment of local chief executives has been criticized for stymying effective decentralization, local political accountability, and community participation and initiative in local government and development.

Unlike the 2010 process, two separate amendment bills were presented to Parliament. Some civil society organizations strongly backed the government’s proposals. The opposition NDC, however, backtracked on its initial commitment, withdrawing support for the bills in Parliament. A cross section of the public also feared that the participation of political parties in the election of local government officials would mean the process would be captured by political elites. As a result, the NPP thought they did not have popular support to cross the constitutional thresholds for the amendment of an entrenched provision and withdrew the amendment bills from Parliament in December 2019.

In 2023, the Minister for Parliamentary Affairs, Osei Kyei-Mensah-Bonsu, sought to revive the stalled constitutional review project and established a Constitution Review Consultative Committee (CRCC) to review the 2011 report of the Constitution Review Commission and make actionable proposals. President Akufo-Addo subsequently endorsed the project and received the report of the CRCC in December 2024. The reform proposals are less comprehensive, but touch on the main issues as the 2011 report, with some variations.

The successive reform attempts mean that many of the themes are recurrent and, crucially, some of the reforms appear to have broad support among the two main political parties. Notably, there is general consensus that the outsized role of the President in the overall constitutional schema, including control over appointments throughout all levels of the public services and state structure, has retarded the development of independent institutions, hindered credible checks and balances, and cultivated patronage politics. The obligatory appointment of a majority of Ministers among parliamentarians has also been identified as the primary reason for Parliament’s inability to play its executive oversight role.

The unlimited and unregulated size of the membership of Parliament, Ministers, and the Supreme Court creates perverse incentives and pressures for unrestrained and unsustainable growth in the size of all three branches . . .

Further, the unlimited and unregulated size of the membership of Parliament, Ministers, and the Supreme Court creates perverse incentives and pressures for unrestrained and unsustainable growth in the size of all three branches.  In the case of the Supreme Court, the absence of a ceiling incentivizes court packing.

Additionally, poor corporate governance in state-owned enterprises, notably non-competitive, non-transparent appointment and removal of board and officers by the President based on non-objective criteria, continues to distort fiduciary accountability and entity performance. SOEs have over the years become conduits for partisan political patronage, undermining performance goals. The appointment of members of Parliament to boards of SOEs also distorts the oversight role of members of Parliament and interferes with management prerogatives.

There may also be a push for mechanisms to enhance public participation in policy-making. Notably, the absence of a constitutional mechanism for citizens to initiate constitutional amendments leaves the political class as gatekeepers of even formal debates on constitutional reform.

Prospects

The early start of the constitutional reform process soon after the inauguration of the new President and the short term of the new Committee mean that specific reform proposals can emerge quickly, enhancing the chances of formal debate and even approval. Nevertheless, the constitutional amendment process in Ghana is daunting. While provisions that do not require referendum have a high chance of approval since the NDC holds the required supermajority, there is no guarantee that this would be easy. Under the constitution, members of Parliament vote on constitutional amendments through a secret ballot, creating possibilities where party whips may not be able to require consistent votes.

Crucially, most of the critical provisions require a referendum, necessitating broad political and public consensus.

Crucially, most of the critical provisions require a referendum, necessitating broad political and public consensus. This may require longer periods of inter-party dialogue and popular mobilization, including securing support, or at least averting strong opposition from influential civil society organizations and traditional leaders.

Furthermore, time is of the essence. The closer the 2028 elections approach, gaining bi-partisan support and broad public backing may prove more elusive. In this context, reform proposals may necessarily be less robust than reform enthusiasts may wish to see. Accordingly, even if successful, the comprehensive reform process might only lead to incremental changes, rather than result in an effectively new constitution. 

Nicholas Opoku is a Ghanaian lawyer with experience in strategic litigation, constitutional and legislative reform, and has consulted for several multilateral and civil society organizations.

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Suggested citation: Nicholas Opoku, ‘Ghana at a Crossroads: Another Attempt at Reforming its Defective Constitution’, ConstitutionNet, International IDEA, 28 March 2025, https://constitutionnet.org/news/voices/ghana-crossroads-another-attempt-reforming-its-defective-constitution

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