Rebuilding and constitutional transition in Madagascar

In recent weeks, Madagascar has been rocked by widespread protests led by the Gen Z, exasperated by corruption and social crisis, which precipitated the fall of President Andry Rajoelina. The intervention of the Army Corps of Administrative and Technical Personnel and Services (CAPSAT) led to the formation of a military transitional government and the suspension of the Constitution, prompting the African Union to immediately suspend the country. In this article, Dr. Juvence F. Ramasy analyzes this pivotal political and constitutional sequence: the ambiguous role of the High Constitutional Court in legalizing the regime change, the tensions between legality and legitimacy, and the promises of a future national overhaul. As multisectoral conferences are being prepared to redefine Madagascar's social pact, the author questions whether this transition marks a genuine democratic break or a continuation of power in other forms.

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Introduction and context

For several weeks now, Madagascar has been experiencing a political and social crisis of rare intensity. It was initially young people—the “Gen Z Madagascar” movement—who, exasperated by repeated water and electricity outages, rising living costs, and a lack of prospects, took to the streets of Antananarivo and other major cities to express their anger. Very quickly, these spontaneous gatherings, fueled by social media, took the form of a vast protest movement against corruption, nepotism, and poor governance. The country, already weakened by years of economic malaise and instability, saw popular discontent turn into a profound political demand. These protests, initially peaceful, intensified over the weeks, leaving at least 22 people dead and many injured, according to the United Nations, while calls for the president's resignation became increasingly urgent.

The African Union immediately suspended Madagascar for “unconstitutional change of government,” while several foreign powers called for a rapid return to democratic order.

On 14 October 14 2025, the situation reached a tipping point. After several days of tension, an elite army unit—the Army Corps of Administrative and Technical Personnel and Services (CAPSAT)—joined the protesters, precipitating the fall of President Andry Rajoelina, who was removed from office by Parliament before fleeing the country. Colonel Michael Randrianirina immediately proclaimed himself head of a transitional government, promising to organize a national overhaul over two years. A few hours after he took power, the Constitution was suspended, as were the main civilian institutions, which were placed under the direct authority of the Transitional Military Council. Although this measure was presented as necessary to “restore order and rebuild the state,” it immediately sparked serious concern both inside and outside the country. The African Union immediately suspended Madagascar for “unconstitutional change of government,” while several foreign powers called for a rapid return to democratic order. These events have plunged the country into a new period of political and social uncertainty and mark a new stage in the country's constitutional history.

Kleptocracy and illiberal democracy

Former president Andry Rajoelina came to power in 2009 following a coup d'état perpetrated by CAPSAT on 17 March. This body had mutinied on 8 March and then aligned itself with Rajoelina. Rajoelina was able to exploit divisions and discontent within the military—favoritism toward the gendarmerie and national police and disregard for hierarchy, rank, and seniority in the granting of command positions—to use the army as a lever in his rise to power. He also capitalized on the authoritarianism of former President Marc Ravalomanana (2002-2009) and the dominance of his Tiko conglomerate, which led civil society and the economic elite to oppose him.

From 2009 to 2013, Rajoelina led a transition marked by criminal governance and the development of an informal economy. He was forced to step down from the presidency under pressure from the African Union and the Southern African Development Community, but was then elected president of the republic in 2018 and re-elected in 2023 following an election boycotted by the opposition and popular protests.

This regime, like its predecessors, was characterized by hegemony in the political and economic spheres. Authoritarian governance was at work, manifested in a profusion of illiberal mechanisms: weak institutionalization of the democratic architecture (including political parties, the judiciary, and the defense and security forces), manipulation and politicization of institutions, political instrumentalization of citizens and the electorate, monopolization of information, disinformation, and systemic corruption resulting in widespread impunity. Added to this was an extroverted development model—the Madagascar Emergence Plan—which was in fact nothing more than a combination of sophisticated projects that led neither to social transformation nor to the realization of the nation's collective rights. Thus, instead of representing a government of growth, it appears to be one of inequality, with poverty in the country stagnating at around 80%.

Gen Z(andry): posting, protesting, and getting involved

The instigators of the new state structure are young people from Gen Z, from the capital but also from cities such as Antsiranana, Mahajanga, Toamasina, and Toliara. Their intrusion and voice on the socio-political scene constitute a disruption within a hierarchical society where the lineage ideology of seniority predominates, with a strong place assigned to the razana (ancestors). Gen Z—the Z standing for zandry or “younger sibling” in the sense of “social younger siblings” in Malagasy—has succeeded in this coordinated mobilization through the skillful use of social media (Facebook, Discord, WhatsApp, and TikTok), undermining the state's digital surveillance.

This online policy originated from social demands mainly centered on access to water and electricity, as well as the fight against corruption and freedom of expression. Indeed, the capital and major urban centers face power cuts and load shedding that can last several hours a day, or even several days. According to the World Bank, only 54.4% of the population has access to water and the electrification rate is around 30%, disproportionately affecting rural areas, poor communities, and female-headed households. This situation illustrates the asymmetrical formation of the state and a divide between the rural world (which constitutes the majority of the population) and the urban world.

Faced with unrepresentative institutions, young people from urban areas took to the streets to demand their rights in the face of authorities who had banned all demonstrations. These demonstrations were met with the usual paroxysmal violence of the state through the armed wing of the gendarmerie and its elite unit, the Special Security and Intervention Group, causing more than 20 deaths and over 100 injuries.

Return of the armed forces to the political forefront and constitutional transition

President Andry Rajoelina left the country on 12 October 12 2025. In a speech broadcast on social media, he stated that he had been forced to find a safe place to protect his life, without announcing his resignation. He also said that his flight was the result of an attempted coup by a military faction and called for respect for the constitution. On 14 October, ignoring a decree by Rajoelina to dissolve it, the National Assembly proceeded to impeach him with 130 votes in favor and one blank vote, finding him guilty of abandoning his post. This episode illustrates the high volatility of political loyalties, including within Rajoelina's party, which has 84 deputies. On the same day, Colonel Michael Randrianirina, head of the elite military unit CAPSAT, was sworn in as interim president by the High Constitutional Court (HCC).

While the departure of President Andry Rajoelina responds to one of the demands of Gen Z, CAPSAT's seizure of power represents a coup d'état in line with corrective coups apparently aimed at changing the trajectory of the state. The military legitimized the intervention as a solution to Rajoelina's political, economic, and social mismanagement.

This return of the armed forces is part of a long history dating back to the pre-colonial era of the Kingdom of Madagascar, which resurfaced during the first post-colonial crisis of 1972. This moment introduced a “praetorianization” of politics characterized by the army's entries and (false) exits from power. The army exercised power directly between 1972 and 2001, with the exception of the period from 1993 to 1996 when a civilian, Albert Zafy, was president of the republic. However, it also exercises indirect power, aligning itself with the deep state and emerging when it sees that the political order appears to be faltering.

The seizure of power by CAPSAT soldiers on October 14 was akin to a “good” coup, having received the support of the population and the constitutional authority.

The seizure of power by CAPSAT soldiers on October 14 was akin to a “good” coup, having received the support of the population and the constitutional authority. Indeed, scenes of jubilation accompanied the change of authority. Moreover, according to an Afrobarometer survey conducted at the end of 2024, six out of ten Madagascans (60%) consider it “legitimate for the armed forces to take control of the government when elected leaders abuse their power for their own ends.” Among them, 45% want the army to quickly restore civilian rule.

Intervention of the High Constitutional Court in the political crisis

We are currently in the midst of a process of shaping the state, in which legal tinkering is being used to attempt to give constitutional legitimacy to soldiers in mufti. This situation reflects a veritable theatricalization of constitutionalism, where constitutional engineering is truncated to become nothing more than an instrument of political and social relations, revealing the emptiness of a constitutional culture reduced to the instrumentalization of law by political actors.

Indeed, on 12 October 12, in this context of a vacant presidential office, the vice president of the National Assembly referred the matter to the High Constitutional Court (HCC) in order to obtain an opinion on the legality of certain decisions of the executive branch deemed contrary to the Constitution and on how to resolve the political crisis. This referral was intended, in particular, to clarify the respective powers of state institutions and to provide a framework for government action in the face of parliamentary challenges, in a context where institutional dialogue seemed to have reached an impasse.

However, the referral to the HCC by the vice president of the National Assembly was not provided for in the 2010 Constitution, which, according to Article 119, reserves this right solely to the heads of institutions and any decentralized local government body to give its opinion on the constitutionality of a draft act or the interpretation of a constitutional provision. The Vice President's action therefore falls outside the formal framework provided for by the Constitution.

These two decisions show that the HCC has overstepped its mandate, setting itself up as a mediating authority, or even a “government of judges.”

In its decision No. 10-HCC/D3 of 14 October 14 2025, on this request, the HCC dismissed the question of admissibility in order to invoke its “power to regulate state institutions.” This power, which has no explicit constitutional or legal basis, is based solely on the case law of decision No. 18-HCC/D3 of 25 May 25 2018, handed down in the context of a request for the removal of President Hery Rajaonarimampianina from office in the context of a pre-election crisis. This 2018 decision enabled Andry Rajoelina's party (which holds a majority in the National Assembly) to propose Christian Ntsay as Prime Minister, who was appointed on 4 June 2018, and to establish a consensus government on 11 June to organize early presidential elections. In its decision of 14 October 2025, faced with political deadlock, the HCC entrusted power to the competent military authority, represented by Colonel Michaël Randrianirina, to exercise the functions of head of state. These two decisions show that the HCC has overstepped its mandate, setting itself up as a mediating authority, or even a “government of judges.”

To qualify and establish the vacancy of the presidential office under Article 52 of the Constitution, the HCC referred to a “passive abandonment” of power, based on the fact that the President of the Republic was not, or could not be, on Malagasy territory. Indeed, the latter was reportedly exfiltrated by a French military aircraft on October 12. Once this vacancy was established, the functions of the head of state were exercised by the president of the Senate. However, on October 12, General Richard Ravalomanana was removed from his position as President of the Senate at the request of the members of the standing committee, in favor of a collegial leadership provided by Senator Jean André Ndremanjary for day-to-day affairs, until the election of a new president.

However, according to Article 7, paragraph 13, of the Senate's rules of procedure, a two-thirds vote of the senators is required to remove members of the permanent bureau from office. The political situation therefore prevailed over the law, as in all regime changes in Madagascar. Thus, in the case of the vacancy of the position of President of the Senate, the functions of head of state were exercised collegially by the government, composed of the Prime Minister, Major General Ruphin Zafisambo (appointed on 6 October), and the ministers in charge of the armed forces, public security, and the gendarmerie. The HCC considered that this government was also unable to ensure the normal functioning of the nation and therefore concluded that the military authority, embodied by Colonel Michaël Randrianirina, was best placed to exercise the function of head of state. In doing so, the HCC legalized a coup d'état, in line with previous decisions in 1972, 1975, 2002, and 2009.

The inauguration of Colonel Michaël Randrianirina

Colonel Michaël Randrianirina was inaugurated as president of the Refoundation of Madagascar on 17 October in the presence of the civil and political societies, the armed forces, and international representatives, despite Madagascar's suspension by the African Union. This international recognition is the result of lobbying efforts and, above all, the fact that parliamentary institutions and the HCC have been maintained, contrary to the initial promises made when power was seized.

It can also be explained by strategic competition in the Indo-Pacific, where Madagascar has an advantageous geostrategic position, and by prior contacts established with Russia, the first country to meet with the new authorities. Since then, regular diplomatic meetings have been organized to reassure partners about the measures aimed at rebuilding the Malagasy state ahead of any electoral process, which should take place in two years at the latest.

Rebuilding or passive revolution?

Madagascar is at a tipping point. This period could mark a time of rebuilding, involving reforms in the way the country is governed. However, the appointment of civilian Herintsalama Rajaonarivelo as Prime Minister on 20 October has raised concerns due to his alleged ties to the former ruling elites. A former member of the board of directors of Madarail, linked to Andry Rajoelina, he embodies the persistent influence of the deep state. The composition of the new government, formed on 28 October, reinforces this impression: it recycles several figures from the entourages of former presidents Marc Ravalomanana and Hery Rajaonarimampianina and former associates of Rajoelina. Alongside them are new political figures such as Lucie Vololoniaina (known as Lily Rafaralahy), Minister of Tourism and Handicrafts, municipal councilor of Antananarivo and one of the leaders of the Tsy manaiky lembenana (don't let yourself be pushed around) movement alongside Alban Babà Rakotoarisoa and Clémence Raharinirina, and the 25 September citizen movement. But this government mainly includes controversial figures who are criticized by Gen Z, which was not consulted.

The movement initiated by Gen Z could turn out to be a “passive revolution”: despite the intrusion of new elites into the political arena and the enactment of new rules allowing the transition from one regime to another, the system remains unchanged. The old political order remains in place in the deep state through the alliance of the armed forces and the economic elite. However, in his inauguration speech on 17 October, Colonel Randrianirina laid the foundations for a new beginning: a break with the past and reform of the state; good governance, accountability, and tolerance; a policy of austerity; collaboration and cooperation with all international partners; and the organization of multisectoral conferences in the medium term. These conferences should bring together all the country's active forces, particularly the actors of the popular movement, in order to draft a new constitution and new electoral laws.

The multisectoral conferences seem to be inspired by the fihaonambem-pirenena (national forum) organized in 1992 by the FFKM, the Christian Council of Churches, for the drafting of the 1992 Constitution. This was a multilateral constitutional process and a symbol of the reinvention of democracy, similar to the national conferences in Benin. The multisectoral conference and the constitutional transition are intended to be an inclusive consensus, with the main decisions negotiated with all stakeholders, including those from the former regime. Former South African President Thabo Mbeki and his foundation were called upon to lead the discussions, given his experience and the desire for a neutral authority. Mbeki also facilitated Madagascar's reintegration into the African Union in 2003. These discussions will take place in close collaboration with the Minister of State to the Presidency in charge of Rebuilding, Ms. Lobo Hanitrinianina Razafimanantsoa. Consequently, the outcome of these meetings will give an indication of the actual direction of this rebuilding process.

For this constitutional transition to be democratic, it must be based on a balance between the resurgence of constitutionalism and the flexibility that is essential in this period of political and constitutional upheaval.

The ongoing constitutional transition should lay the foundations for a genuine overhaul, breaking with the cycle of non-inclusive constituent processes such as the one that led to the adoption of the 2010 Constitution, which was limited to a small circle in the absence of a constituent assembly, leading to the fragility of post-transitional constitutions. For this constitutional transition to be democratic, it must be based on a balance between the resurgence of constitutionalism and the flexibility that is essential in this period of political and constitutional upheaval. The new constitution should not be a partisan constitution akin to a political issue in the quest for legitimacy, but rather part of the adoption of a new social pact by the population. Social issues must therefore take precedence over partisan issues if Madagascar is to build a stable and inclusive democratic state.

Dr. Juvence F. Ramasy is a lecturer in political science at the University of Toamasina, Madagascar. He has written several academic articles on the state, elites, the military, democratization and autocratization processes, and international relations in the Indian Ocean region. He has just published “Le façonnement de l'État en postcolonie indianocéanique. L'hybridité malgache” (The Shaping of the State in the Indian Ocean Postcolony: Malagasy Hybridity) with Sépia in June 2025.

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Suggested citation: Juvence F. Ramasy, ‘Rebuilding and constitutional transition in Madagascar’, ConstitutionNet, International IDEA, 3 Novembre 2025, https://constitutionnet.org/news/voices/rebuilding-and-constitutional-transition-madagascar

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