Constitutional Change in Turks and Caicos Islands: Territorial Particularities and Regional Commonalities

By Peter Clegg, 30 November 2024
Parliament of Turks and Caicos Islands (photo credit: https://www.facebook.com/tcihouseofassembly/)
Parliament of Turks and Caicos Islands (photo credit: https://www.facebook.com/tcihouseofassembly/)

Recent changes to the Turks and Caicos Islands’ Constitution aim to strengthen the institutional and security framework, and lay the groundwork for future reforms, including the possibility of independence. While these changes mark a maturation of the political system and mirror similar developments in neighboring British Overseas Territories, opportunities for further reform are limited unless the Turks and Caicos Islands pursues independence, or the UK grants complete internal self-government—neither of which is likely soon  writes Peter Clegg

The recently approved amendments to the Turks and Caicos Islands (TCI) Constitution are significant, not only for this British Overseas Territory (BOT), but also illustrate a larger process of constitutional reform being undertaken in neighbouring territories that are agitating for greater autonomy from the United Kingdom (UK). It has been almost twenty years since the UK instituted a wide-scale constitutional review process for its eleven inhabited territories. Since then, there has been more piecemeal constitutional change, led by BOTs in the Caribbean. For the TCI, the recent changes should be placed within a particular context, which relates to its recovery from a period of poor governance and current concerns over security and crime. However, there are interesting parallels with neighbouring BOTs, which this article also considers.

Constitutional reform has been an issue for both main political parties in the TCI for a decade. The two parties have been eager to regain greater autonomy for TCI after the 2011 Constitution, which was 15 pages longer than the 2006 Constitution and increased checks and balances, including an enforceable commitment to good governance principles and a stronger role for the UK-appointed Governor. The context was a significant breakdown in good governance under then Premier Michael Misick and the Progressive National Party (PNP) from 2006-2009. This resulted in a highly critical commission of inquiry report, with the UK later suspending parts of the constitution. After the constitution of 2011 was agreed, there were efforts in 2015 and 2018 to make changes, but these were unsuccessful. In the former case, because the UK felt it was too soon to make changes, and in the latter, because there was a lack of consensus between the PNP and People’s Democratic Movement (PDM) on the proposed reforms. In recent years, standards of governance have improved, rebuilding trust between the TCI and UK governments, and the PNP and PDM have worked together, allowing an agreement to be reached.

2024 Amendments: Balancing Autonomy and UK Oversight

And so it proved in October when a series of constitutional amendments were agreed between the TCI and UK governments, encapsulated within The Turks and Caicos Islands Constitution (Amendment) Order 2024. These important amendments can be divided into three categories.

First, there are changes to enrich the democratic process and strengthen and clarify the role of the Cabinet. For example, ‘House of Assembly’ is renamed ‘Parliament’, the four presently appointed members of the 21-member legislature (one appointed by the Government; one by the Opposition; and two by the Governor) are replaced by elected members, and the maximum parliamentary term is raised from four to five years. Elsewhere, the autonomous and exclusive capacity of Cabinet is clearly articulated: ‘For the avoidance of doubt … the Cabinet possesses autonomous and exclusive capacity in domestic affairs’, although the Governor and UK Secretary of State retain certain responsibilities, for instance in relation to defence. There are also provisions that allow the Governor to delegate certain external affairs matters to local ministers, such as relations with the Caribbean Community. Other changes include an independent body for the regulation of financial services (removing regulation from the Governor’s special responsibilities), and the creation of a Cabinet Office and Cabinet Secretary. Interestingly, one of the few sources of disagreement between the PNP and PDM related to the Cabinet Secretary. The PDM felt it should be a political appointment, so their interests would align with the Premier; however, this would have gone against the UK model of the civil service, whereby the Cabinet Secretary is an apolitical appointment. Overall, these changes aim to enhance democracy and rebalance the constitutional relationship between the Governor and Cabinet. In short, they represent a maturation of the TCI’s political system.

Institutional and Security Reforms

The second set of changes relates to the broader institutional and administrative structure of the TCI, with a particular focus on security. For example, the National Security Council’s standing has been strengthened through inclusion in the Constitution, to ‘advise the Governor on matters relating to internal security, with the exception of operational and staffing matters.’ Similarly, the TCI Regiment (a reserve military force, created in 2020) has been added to the Constitution. Further, new bodies have been created, including a Police and Defence Service Commission, to offer guidance on police and law enforcement issues. Strengthening and widening the voice on security and criminal matters are undoubtedly important, but there are risks that the remit, for example, of the National Security Council and the Police and Defence Service Commission may become entangled, especially as the Governor chairs both bodies and the level of expertise in a small territory such as the TCI is limited.

Premier Washington Misick has been critical of the level of UK support, saying it has been “lacklustre” and that more “tangible help” is needed . . .

Also, resources to enhance security will be a key issue going forward, notwithstanding the revised institutional framework. 2024 has seen the highest number of murders on record; 42 as of mid-November, linked largely to organised crime and gang activity. In November, when visiting the TCI, the UK minister for the Overseas Territories, Stephen Doughty, said the ‘UK is fully committed to the defence and security’ of the territory. Announced at the same time was the deployment of HMS Medway, a Royal Navy warship, to TCI waters, and the UK’s purchase of two new ‘marine assets’ for the Royal Turks and Caicos Islands Police Force Marine Unit. However, Premier Washington Misick has been critical of the level of UK support, saying it has been “lacklustre” and that more “tangible help” is needed. So, despite the strengthened institutional framework, there are other factors such as resourcing and effective TCI/UK cooperation that will be more important and will have to be maintained and perhaps enhanced.

A Roadmap to Independence? Provisions for Future Reforms

The third set of amendments provides avenues for potential future constitutional and political change. First, there is now a constitutional provision for ‘power to provide for a referendum,’ which explicitly includes the possibility of holding a vote on independence. Second, there is a provision for a constitutional commission that can be created to advise on future constitutional development. Both are helpful mechanisms to frame and direct conversations on the future status of the TCI. The issue of independence has been a leitmotif in TCI: from the late 1970s under the founder of PDM, JAGS McCartney, to thirty years later under Michael Misick. However, it was done in an ad hoc and ill-planned way. So, these constitutional amendments should give the TCI a clearer framework if the country wants to pursue independence, although there is little appetite amongst the general population for such a change; they continue to appreciate the safeguards and support the UK offers. It should also be noted that the UK, since the 1980s, has been happy to support independence across the BOTs if that is the will of the people.

These constitutional amendments should give the TCI a clearer framework if the country wants to pursue independence, although there is little appetite amongst the general population for such a change . . . 

So, how would one assess the constitutional amendments and their significance? Both the TCI and UK governments have been effusive about the changes. For example, TCI Deputy Premier Jamell Robinson called them a ‘pivotal moment in governance’ and said that the territory is ‘on the brink of transformative democracy, one that redefines the way we govern and elevates the voices of our citizens.’ Similarly, UK Minister Doughty said ‘it was a significant moment, representing an important milestone in the TCI-UK modern partnership.’ There is clearly some hyperbole, and it will take time to see how the changes are embedded and what tangible improvements result. Further, it is probably fair to argue that the TCI would have had some of these amendments earlier, were it not for the serious breakdown in good governance in the late 2000s and the resultant 2011 Constitution, which strengthened the role of the Governor, amongst other changes. Nevertheless, the most recent amendments are noteworthy with the target of enhancing democracy, strengthening capabilities to address growing security concerns, and establishing the framework for future constitutional reform.

Regional Reforms

It is helpful to note that although the TCI’s constitutional reform process was a purely bilateral one between the TCI and UK governments, there is a broader regional context. Over the last few years, Anguilla and the Cayman Islands have also negotiated constitutional amendments with the UK. Perhaps the greatest similarities are with the Cayman Islands, whose Amendment Order 2020 included provisions to rename the ‘Legislative Assembly’, the ‘Parliament’ and to set out the autonomous and exclusive capacity of Cabinet. Those involved in the TCI review process also looked at the Cayman Islands 2009 Order for inspiration, which included provisions for the use of referendums and the adoption of very similar language around the delegation of responsibility for external affairs. Anguilla, meanwhile, secured several constitutional amendments in 2019. For various historical reasons, Anguilla is less advanced constitutionally than other BOTs in the region, so some of the changes in 2019 were making up for lost ground, such as renaming ‘Chief Minister’ as ‘Premier’. But there were also other changes, for example, abolishing nominated members of the House of Assembly, which have equivalents in the TCI. Then there is the British Virgin Islands, which is pushing for constitutional reform and may well adopt some of the provisions seen elsewhere, but there will be local particularities as was the case in the TCI, Cayman Islands and Anguilla. Another broader regional dimension relates to those countries that are fully sovereign (unlike the BOTs), but keep links with the UK, particularly via the British Monarch as their own Head of State. Since Barbados became a republic in 2021, there has been debate whether other neighbouring English-speaking countries should follow suit, and this has shaped the narrative more generally over reducing ties with the UK.

Conclusion

The last several years have witnessed important, and in the main, measured and well-conducted constitutional reform negotiations between the BOTs and the UK. Notable reforms have been agreed and enacted, with the overarching goal of strengthening democracy and autonomy. The recent amendments to the TCI’s Constitution are no exception and have helped to further rebuild the political integrity of the territory after the serious problems from the previous 15 years. Although there are similarities between the constitutional changes made across the BOTs, there have been differences too, and this is important to remember about the BOTs more generally; they are not the same. A last point is that although the constitutional changes have enhanced local autonomy, the room for further reform is becoming increasingly limited, unless the BOTs decide on independence, or the UK accedes to their complete internal self-government, neither of which is likely soon.

Peter Clegg is professor of politics and the Dean of Social Sciences at the University of the West of England, Bristol. He has written widely on the British Overseas Territories. His present projects focus on status referendums in small states and territories and security and policing in the Sovereign Base Areas.

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Suggested citation: Peter Clegg, ‘Constitutional Change in Turks and Caicos Islands: Territorial Particularities and Regional Commonalities’, ConstitutionNet, International IDEA, 30 November 2024, https://constitutionnet.org/news/voices/constitutional-change-turks-and-caicos-islands-territorial-particularities

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Disclaimer: The views expressed in Voices from the Field contributions are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect International IDEA’s positions.

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