Bolivia: a justice system harder to capture, not a Constitution easier to change

Between April and August 2026, three bills proposing partial constitutional reform were submitted to Bolivia’s Plurinational Legislative Assembly (ALP), a process that Article 411 of the Constitution distinguishes from total reform, which requires a Constituent Assembly. All three identify the same problem: a justice system in terminal crisis, marked by politicisation and institutional fragility. However, they differ radically in how they seek to address it. This article argues that, in Bolivia, only a reform that enshrines guarantees of judicial independence in the Constitution, rather than transferring them to ordinary legislation, is feasible. The “deconstitutionalisation” of articles, proposed by the bill that currently has the greatest legislative momentum, would weaken constitutional supremacy and rigidity precisely in a country where the main problem has been the manipulation of the rules of the game by the constituted powers.

A crisis that no longer allows for half-measures

The 2009 Constitution introduced the election of the highest judicial authorities by universal suffrage, with the promise of depoliticising the justice system. After three rounds of elections (2011, 2017 and 2024), the result has been the opposite. In 2011 and 2017, invalid and blank votes outnumbered valid votes; in December 2023, through Plurinational Constitutional Declaration 0049/2023, the Plurinational Constitutional Tribunal (TCP) extended both its own term and those of the highest judicial authorities indefinitely; and the December 2024 elections took place only in part after constitutional rulings suspended the election in several departments. The positions for which no elections were held remain vacant.

International bodies agree on this assessment: the Interdisciplinary Group of Independent Experts (GIEI-Bolivia) described the lack of independence as a structural problem; the UN Special Rapporteur, Diego García-Sayán, recommended in his 2022 report a national debate on the selection of members of the high courts; and the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) called for objective selection criteria and elections within the prescribed timeframe to prevent terms of office from being extended. The change of government in 2025 and the presidential announcement on 9 May 2026 of a partial reform opened a political window for action.

Reforming, deconstitutionalising or redesigning: three competing paths

The first constitutional reform bill, promoted by Deputy Juan Del Granado (Alianza Unidad) and submitted in April 2026, focuses on the selection of members of the high courts through the creation of a nine-member National Nominations Commission drawn from civil society, academia, the press, the legal profession, the judiciary and Indigenous peoples. The Commission would draw up closed shortlists, each comprising three candidates scoring at least 75%; the ALP would appoint the magistrates by a two-thirds majority of its total membership, and the appointments would be submitted to a ratification referendum. It would therefore replace election by popular vote with a merit-based system involving citizen participation. It would also set a minimum judicial budget of 3%, prohibit any extension of terms of office and introduce a system of justices of the peace, with neighbourhood judges handling minor disputes.

The second reform bill was submitted on 13 August by Deputy Carlos Alarcón (Alianza Unidad), together with the President of the Senate, Diego Ávila (PDC, the governing party), and referred on 2 September to the Senate’s Constitution Committee. Through Article 412, it would deconstitutionalise 30 articles: 13 relating to the Judicial Branch, the TCP and the Public Prosecution Service, and 17 relating to the economic regime, so that these could then be regulated, amended or repealed through laws passed by two thirds of the legislators present, without a referendum or review by the TCP. These include central guarantees of independence: magistrates’ fixed terms and the prohibition on their re-election, the procedure for their appointment and the binding nature of TCP rulings. It would also introduce Article 413, which would prohibit the expropriation or nationalisation of domestic or foreign investments and permit international arbitration between the State and investors, currently prohibited by Article 366. The parliamentary groups agreed to use it as the base bill, that is, as the reference text for harmonising the other proposals. Although Alarcón and Del Granado belong to Alianza Unidad, Del Granado’s bill is limited to the justice system and has yet to undergo public consultation. Alarcón’s bill has advanced further because it was submitted jointly with Senator Ávila of the governing party, giving it a timetable that would culminate in a referendum in 2027.

The third reform bill, submitted by the Libertad y República (LIBRE) alliance on 20 August, is the most wide-ranging, affecting 111 constitutional articles. It would replace election of magistrates by popular vote with appointment by parliament by a two-thirds majority of those present, abolish the Agro-Environmental Tribunal and the Council of the Judiciary, empower the Chamber of Deputies to try and suspend magistrates, and leave 28 articles on autonomy blank, to be drafted later in agreement with the regional autonomous governments.

The limit of the model: partial reform is not total reform

Article 411 of the Constitution distinguishes two routes for constitutional reform: total reform, which affects the fundamental foundations of the State, rights, duties and guarantees, and constitutional supremacy, and requires a Constituent Assembly; and partial reform, which can be initiated through a law passed by two thirds of the ALP members present and also requires approval in a referendum. The TCP itself, in DCP 0193/2015, established that any constitutional amendment affecting those core elements falls outside the scope of partial reform.

Changing the method of selecting members of the high courts does not in itself affect the foundations of the State, since it preserves—and even strengthens—judicial independence and the separation of State organs. That is why Del Granado’s bill is the one that is most consistent with Article 411 of the Constitution. Retaining the ratification referendum also prevents the TCP from classifying the bill as total reform.

LIBRE’s proposal, by contrast, poses specific risks: abolishing the Council of the Judiciary alters the structure of the Judicial Branch; eliminating the Agro-Environmental Tribunal weakens the regime of collective and environmental rights; and subjecting magistrates to trial and suspension by a political chamber reopens the door to the very subordination the proposal seeks to combat. Its scope also brings it close to total reform, which is not feasible without a Constituent Assembly.

The most sensitive case is the deconstitutionalisation envisaged in the Alarcón–Ávila bill. Its explanatory memorandum cites as a precedent the French Constitution of 1875, which left the organisation of the branches of government to ordinary legislation. But that text was flexible, whereas the Bolivian Constitution is rigid because amending it requires qualified majorities and a popular vote in a referendum. Thus, the new Article 412 proposed in the bill would not reform the Constitution but create a parallel procedure allowing a constituted power to alter, through legislation, matters that the constituent power reserved for itself.

Pros and cons

Deconstitutionalisation offers speed and flexibility, since it allows subsequent legislative reforms without a referendum; that is precisely its main weakness. In Bolivia, the lack of judicial independence is not due to an overly rigid Constitution, but to the fact that the constituted powers have manipulated its rules to suit political circumstances. The TCP itself acted as a de facto reformer when it permitted the indefinite re-election of the president and other elected authorities (SCP 0084/2017) and indefinitely extended both its own term and those of the high courts (DCP 0049/2023). SCP 0084/2017 disapplied the limits in Articles 156, 168, 285.II and 288 of the Constitution, invoking a supposed human right to re-election despite the result of the 2016 constitutional referendum, an argument that the Inter-American Court of Human Rights rejected in Advisory Opinion OC-28/21. Lowering the hierarchical status of the rules governing the justice system would magnify that risk, because legislation could then achieve, without a referendum or constitutional review, what currently requires a strained interpretation by the TCP.

Del Granado’s approach of amending the constitutional text directly is slower and requires consensus, but keeps these guarantees beyond the reach of the majority of the day: the minimum budget, the prohibition on extensions of terms and the selection body could not be changed without a referendum. The bill nevertheless has two weaknesses. First, it includes the abolition of the Office of the Attorney General of the State (Articles 229 to 231), a matter unrelated to judicial reform that unnecessarily broadens the bill’s scope and increases the resistance it faces. Second, under the proposed selection system, if the ALP does not appoint the magistrates within 30 working days, the National Nominations Commission—an unelected body—would make the appointments itself.

A political juncture fraught with obstacles

Any reform also faces four obstacles. First, Article 140.III of the Constitution prohibits initiating reform during a state of emergency, and the state of emergency declared by Supreme Decree 5636 was extended by the Executive until 17 December through Supreme Decree 5707, which the ALP approved by an absolute majority. Second, the TCP operates with four magistrates and lacks the quorum (five out of nine) needed for prior review of the reform procedure, which is mandatory before the referendum (Article 202.10). Third, Article 411.II requires two thirds of the ALP members present, that is, 111 votes with full attendance. Of the 166 seats, President Rodrigo Paz’s PDC has 65, LIBRE 51 and Alianza Unidad 33; thus, the PDC and Alianza Unidad, which are promoting the Alarcón–Ávila bill, hold only 98 seats between them, so any reform depends on LIBRE, which is defending its own bill.

Finally, the referendum may become a plebiscite on the government. In February 2023, Ecuadorian citizens rejected the eight constitutional amendments proposed by President Guillermo Lasso, in what analysts called a plebiscitary defeat: people voted against the president rather than on the substance of the referendum. As broad reforms tend to be judged as a whole, combining the justice system with the opening up of natural resources, as the Alarcón–Ávila and LIBRE bills do, offers an identity-based rallying point against the entire reform.

Conclusion and next steps

Of the three bills, Del Granado’s is the most compatible with Bolivia’s constitutional model and current circumstances, since it strengthens constitutional supremacy rather than diluting it. However, its centrepiece is also its greatest vulnerability. The National Nominations Commission depends on universities, press organisations, bar associations, judges’ associations and Indigenous leaders being able to appoint independent members. In Bolivia, almost all these sectors are institutionally weak and have a long history of partisan co-optation, so there is a high risk that the Commission will be politically captured from the outset and reproduce, under the guise of merit-based selection, the same allocation of quotas it seeks to eradicate. Guatemala is a clear example of how nominations commissions, despite their constitutional status, can be captured by professional associations and faculties. Therefore, transferring selection to those sectors does not eliminate politicisation, but merely shifts it.

The next step should therefore be to separate judicial reform from reform of the economic model and hold a dedicated referendum on judicial reform. For this approach to be viable, the National Nominations Commission must be protected against capture. Its members should be selected through open, merit-based competitions and demonstrate that they have not been affiliated with a political party in recent years; their assessments should be made public, based on objective criteria established in advance, open to challenge by citizens and subject to international observation. Only a reform of this kind has a realistic chance of being approved. No constitutional engineering can replace the political will to respect judicial independence, but good design can raise the cost of violating it. Bolivia does not need a constitution that is easier to change, but a justice system that is harder to capture.

About the Author

Soraya Santiago Salame is a Bolivian lawyer with a PhD from the University of Salamanca, where she also pursued postdoctoral studies in judicial independence and transitional justice. She is the author of studies on constitutional law and judicial independence.

Suggested Citation

Soraya Santiago Salame, ‘Bolivia: a justice system harder to capture, not a Constitution easier to change', ConstitutionNet, International IDEA, 2 November 2026, https://constitutionnet.org/news/voices/bolivia-justice-system-harder-capture-not-constitution-easier-change 

Further Reading

• Updates on constitutional developments in Bolivia.
• International IDEA, Primer on Judicial Tenure, Removal, Immunity and Accountability.
• International IDEA, Primer on Judicial Appointments.
• International IDEA, A Practical Guide to Constitution Building: The Design of the Judicial Branch.