The anti-defection amendment in Barbados: A constitutional wrong turn?

In February 2026, Barbados’ government passed an anti-defection constitutional amendment requiring members of Parliament to vacate their seats if they resign, are expelled, or cross the floor. Framed as protecting voter mandate integrity, the reform effectively elevates party authority over parliamentary independence, consolidating power in party leadership and the Prime Minister. Critics warn it sidesteps broader constitutional reform, risks strategic manipulation of members of Parliament, and underscores the piecemeal nature of Barbados’ constitutional changes amid a Lower House without opposition.

On 24 February 2026, the Barbados Labour Party (BLP) government introduced the Constitution (Amendment) Bill 2026 to establish anti-defection provisions. These provide that parliamentarians would vacate their seats if, having been elected on a party’s ticket, they changed, resigned or were expelled from their party. The amendment passed the House of Assembly on the same day by a vote of 29 in favour and 1 absent and the Senate on 27 February by a vote of 15–3, with the support of independent Senators. 

The amendment comes against the backdrop of Barbados’ Westminster parliamentary system and the failure to reform it, as well as recent elections illustrating ‘democracy of a very limited, exclusionary, majoritarian nature’, at times labelled ‘Westmonster.’ This system results in hyper-majoritarian results, including lopsided Parliaments with little-to-no opposition, hyper-executive dominance, a relatively easily amendable Constitution (as no referendum is required in Barbados), and serves to lock out new political parties. 

It reflects the Barbados government’s piecemeal approach to constitutional reform, having amended the Constitution 11 times since taking office in 2018, instead of the promised comprehensive constitutional reform. Since Barbados was declared a republic on 30 November 2021, the government has recently renewed its promise to introduce a new republican constitution before the sixtieth anniversary of Barbados’ independence on 30 November 2026.

The section 45 anti-defection constitutional amendment

Section 45 of the Barbados Constitution governs the tenure of elected Members of Parliament (MPs) in the House of Assembly. Section 45(1) lists the reasons under which a seat becomes vacant, such as resignation, absenteeism and expulsion, according to the rules of the House. The amendment introduces new grounds for vacating a seat under section 45(1)(h), namely: 'if he, having been a candidate of a political party and elected to the House as a candidate of that political party, resigns from that political party, is expelled by that party or crosses the floor.'

The amendment came against the backdrop that, in the last two general elections (...) an MP who had been elected on the BLP ticket crossed the floor and became the Opposition Leader. 

This constitutes the first piece of legislation introduced in the new parliamentary term, after the BLP government won all the seats in the 11 February 2026 general election for the third consecutive time, leaving the Lower House without parliamentary opposition. The amendment came against the backdrop that, in the last two general elections (2018 and 2022)—where the BLP won all the seats in the House of Assembly—an MP who had been elected on the BLP ticket crossed the floor and became the Opposition Leader. 

Importantly, Prime Minister Mia Mottley, rather than the Attorney General or the Leader of Government Business in the House of Assembly, moved the amendment. The Prime Minister stated that the amendment to section 45 was a 'simple bill' that was 'fundamental for the stability' of Barbados’ democracy as it was about 'mandate integrity.' She emphasised that the amendment only applied to an MP 'elected as a candidate of a political party and who then later either resigns from that party, is expelled by that party or formally crosses the floor to another political alignment,' adding that 'it is fundamentally about protecting the voter’s choice. It does not deal with how [an MP] votes. It does not deal with the fact that members may sometimes dissent from their political parties. It does not silence criticism of either the party or the cabinet in any manner or form.'

As the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International IDEA)/United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) report Constitutional Change in the Commonwealth Caribbean states, ‘The democratic rationale for [anti-defection rules] is clear enough: it prevents Members elected under one party label, and one manifesto, from defecting, contrary to the wishes of their electors, to another party. It recognizes that people vote, in reality, for a party, not for an individual.’ However, the same report warns, ‘Backbenchers may be nullified if strict anti-defection rules are introduced,’ and states that ‘if a member from the governing party speaks out against the Government, they may be seen as having crossed the floor and therefore forfeiting their seat.’ The report goes on to state that ‘if the motivating concern of constitutional reform is to moderate and constrain the worst excesses of executive dominance and hyper-majoritarianism, care needs to be taken to ensure that anti-defection provisions do not undermine the crucial balancing role of Backbench parliamentarians.’ 

Therefore, by including resignation and expulsion from the political party as triggers requiring a by-election to return to the constituents, the amendment is not as simple as the Prime Minister purports. It goes beyond simply addressing the act of crossing the floor to join a different political party after having been elected on the ticket of another political party. 

Anti-defection provisions in the Caribbean 

In the Caribbean, the Belize Constitution (section 59(2)(e)) provides that a member of the House of Representatives vacates their seat if they cross the floor or resign from the political party under which they were elected. In Guyana, the anti-defection provisions of the Constitution (sections 156 (3)(a) and (b)) apply if a National Assembly member chooses not to remain a member of, or joins another, party list under the system of proportional representation. In the Antigua and Barbuda Constitution, section 41(e) states that if a member of the House resigns from his political party to cross the floor, then their seat is vacated unless they sit as an independent. 

The Barbados amendment not only marks a significant departure from the characteristics of regional anti-defection provisions but also represents one of the more far-reaching forms, by including expulsion from the political party as a trigger and making no provision for an MP to sit as an independent. This is not as extreme as, for example, the Bangladesh Constitution (section 70), which includes resignation from the political party and voting against the party in Parliament as triggers. However, the expulsion clause in the Barbados Constitution can potentially have a similar chilling effect to the Bangladesh provision that suppresses backbench debate, because the expulsion of an MP from their party triggering removal from Parliament through a by-election can potentially be strategically orchestrated by a party leader.

The amendment and paramountcy of the party 

It is generally accepted that Parliament regulates its own affairs, determines its composition, and upholds the independence of MPs. The amendment raises concerns because it effectively makes a political party, undefined in the Constitution and unregulated by law, an operative institution governing an MP’s tenure. In doing so, the amendment moves the regulation of Parliament to a political party and, in effect risks elevating the political party constitution above the Barbados Constitution on the issue of expulsion or resignation from the party as triggers for vacating a seat. 

A political party constitution does not directly regulate voters unless they are members of the party, which has the status of a private club or unincorporated association. The expulsion and resignation that trigger a by-election do not come from Parliament itself which, according to the Constitution, provides for such scenarios according to rules of the House, but from the political party. It means that an MP’s seat can be made vacant not because they violated the Barbados Constitution, which governs their role as lawmakers, but because they breached the political party constitution, which applies only to party members and not to the people of Barbados. 

The practical consequence is that party rules become primary determinants of a parliamentary vacancy, subject only to ex post judicial correction, affecting the independence of MPs. 

Furthermore, each political party has a different constitution, meaning that the triggers for expulsion or resignation will differ depending on the party. Additionally, an amendment to the party’s constitution can alter the operation of section 45 without amending the Barbados Constitution, creating a risk of indirect constitutional control through the privately amendable party constitution. The practical consequence is that party rules become primary determinants of a parliamentary vacancy, subject only to ex post judicial correction, affecting the independence of MPs. 

All in all, the amendment seeks to incorporate political parties into the Constitution without clarifying the responsibilities or consequences of doing so. This amendment effectively moves toward a form of party paramountcy or supremacy: the party gains all the benefits and none of the burdens. 

More power to a party leader and Prime Minister 

The amendment gives more power to the executive council of a political party by concentrating authority in the party leader (and by extension, the Prime Minister), because a party can now expel or pressure an MP to resign to trigger a by-election. Parties could also amend their rules to make it easier to expel or pressure MPs to resign. These scenarios create potential for abuse that did not previously exist, giving the party leader or the Prime Minister more influence at a time when checks on power are especially important, as a single party holds all the seats in the Lower House. 

Grounds for expulsion in political party constitutions often appear vague and wide. For example, the BLP constitution states that its national council can expel a member for writing or utterances ‘inimical to the best interest’ of the party. The opposition Democratic Labour Party (DLP) constitution states that membership is voidable if a member offends the objects and philosophy of the party. 

The party in public law

Under the amendment, expulsion or resignation from the party transfers internal party governance into the public sphere and the Barbados Constitution. When an MP is expelled or resigns from a political party, the process is governed not by the Barbados Constitution but by the constitution of political parties. 

Although parties remain undefined, the Constitution now provides reference to the party’s constitution, bringing them into the orbit of public law.

However, the flipside is that the amendment may transform acts of the political party, a private voluntary association, into constitutionally consequential acts, thereby subjecting them to public law. Although parties remain undefined, the Constitution now provides reference to the party’s constitution, bringing them into the orbit of public law. If an MP is expelled, or resigns from their party, this would trigger constitutional consequences that could potentially be subjected to the Administrative Justice Act.

Shifting the burden 

The framing of the amendment is problematic as it places the burden on the MP to respond to an ‘allegation’ that they have resigned or have been expelled. Where a political party in Parliament announces that an MP has resigned or been expelled, the amendment provides that: ‘if the effect is that the member has resigned or has been expelled from the party, and he does not within 14 days after the declaration institute legal proceedings to challenge the allegation that he has resigned or has been expelled by the party, he shall vacate his seat at the end of the period of 14 days.’

Having an MP instituting legal proceedings effectively forces the courts to recognise political parties as public bodies for certain actions, as otherwise an MP facing an allegation may have no other means to challenge the action, especially as the amendment does not appear to provide for an appeal, instead stating ‘a decision upholding the resignation or expulsion, the decision being one that is not open to appeal or in respect of which the time allowed for an appeal has expired without an appeal being filed.’ 

Public reactions

Legal experts, political scientists, and the Barbados Bar Association have criticised the amendment as problematic, concurring that it effectively places political parties within the constitutional framework even though the Constitution itself does not formally recognise, nor regulate political parties. They have also warned that the provisions could be abused through the strategic expulsion of MPs for partisan advantage and that the reform reflects a lack of holistic constitutional reform to address the regulation of political parties in Barbados. 

Views hinging on the integrity of the Prime Minister are deeply flawed as they imply that Barbados should be governed by the assumed nature of its Prime Minister rather than the Constitution and rule of law principles. Also, arguments that critics of the amendment should simply test it in court are equally problematic because courts should not be the primary forum for resolving issues that could be addressed through clearer legislative design.  

Conclusion

The amendment was passed in just three days with no public consultation, placing Barbados’ piecemeal constitutional reform project further under the knife of political expediency. It also underscores the need for a decolonial constitutional approach that places the people, rather than a party, at the centre of the Constitution. If the long-awaited new republican constitution bill is finally tabled in Parliament in the coming months, it will raise questions as to why the anti-defection amendment was considered necessary now. This raises the question whether the timing is connected to the Prime Minister’s desire to solidify party paramountcy and prevent floor-crossing similar to that of 2018 and 2022, which had created an official opposition in Parliament. 

To address some of the concerns outlined above, the government could consider the following: narrowing the amendment to focus strictly on crossing the floor to join another political party, remove the additional triggers of expulsion and resignation, allowing  MPs to cross and sit as independents, placing the MPs’ agency at the centre rather than the party leader’s control in Parliament, and defining and regulating political parties under public law.

About the Author

Dr Ronnie Yearwood (ronnie.yearwood@uwi.edu) is Senior Lecturer and Deputy Dean (Academic & Student Affairs) at the Faculty of Law, University of the West Indies (Cave Hill).

Suggested Citation

Ronnie Yearwood, ‘The anti-defection amendment in Barbados: A constitutional wrong turn?', ConstitutionNet, International IDEA, 24 March 2026, https://constitutionnet.org/news/voices/anti-defection-amendment-barbados-constitutional-wrong-turn   

Further Reading

• Updates on constitutional developments in Barbados.
• Ronnie Yearwood, Constitutional Reform in Barbados: The Enduring Influence of Westminster? (2025).
• International IDEA and UNDP, Constitutional Change in the Commonwealth Caribbean.

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