Constitutional Reform in Barbados: The Enduring Influence of Westminster?

As part of the Caribbean wave of constitutional review processes, Barbados has released the final report of its Constitutional Reform Commission. While the Commission’s proposals aim to refine aspects of the current constitutional and political system, they do little to disrupt the system that leads to super-majorities with little to no opposition in Parliament. Advocates for deeper reform question whether such incremental steps can truly dismantle colonial legacies, and whether retaining the Westminster model is ill-suited for decolonial constitutionalism and ultimately decolonial transformation – writes Ronnie Yearwood

Toward the end of 2024, the Constitutional Reform Commission of Barbados released its report and a draft bill for a republican constitution for Barbados. The mandate of the Barbados Constitutional Reform Commission (CRC), appointed in June 2022, was to review the current Barbados Constitution and all related laws to develop a new constitution to ‘meet circumstances of a 21st century Barbados.’ It was therefore a ‘sweeping and boundless’ mandate to ‘consider and propose any matter whatsoever for inclusion, exclusion and modification in the new Republican Constitution for Barbados.’

Having previously examined and critiqued the process of Barbados’ transition to a republic in 2021, and concluding that it did not reflect a ‘‘We The People” constitutional moment, this brief piece examines the proposed content for the new republican constitution, and questions whether the CRC fulfilled its mandate based on its report. The piece concludes that the CRC recommendations (and corresponding draft constitution) will not complete the decolonial project, as some assert; instead, it highlights a missed opportunity to dismantle the Westminster system, failing to place “The People” at the heart of their constitution.

The Constitutional Reform Commission and the Westminster System

The Westminster parliamentary system of government was implanted in Commonwealth Caribbean countries from Britain during colonial rule and retained post-independence, except for Guyana, which has a distinct political system. In practice, the Westminster system in the Caribbean has delivered ‘democracy of a very limited, exclusionary, majoritarian nature.’ Sometimes dubbed “Westmonster”, the key features are (1) hyper-majoritarian elections that can produce lopsided Parliaments with little or no opposition; (2) hyper executive/prime ministerial dominance; (3) two-party politics that lock out new entrants; (4) a unitary state; and (5) constitutions that are relatively easy to amend (if no referendum is required), because first-past-the-post elections lead to parliamentary majorities capable of overcoming entrenchment provisions in the constitution.

Despite the Attorney General of Barbados—whose office had responsibility for the CRC—stressing that there should be ‘no sacred cows’, the CRC report proposes no significant challenge or meaningful change to the Westminster system. As outlined below, the view can be taken that it therefore fails to meet the mandate for a modern Barbados republican constitution.

Prime Ministerial Term Limits

In countries like Barbados, prime ministerial term limits are not standard. The CRC explained that elections or death in office naturally end a Prime Minister’s term, rendering term limits unnecessary. Consequently, the CRC maintained an essential characteristic of the Westminster system, in effect allowing a Prime Minister to hold office indefinitely. This occurs without effective opposition in Parliament, often resulting from the first-past-the-post electoral system, where one party wins a majority or all the seats. As a result, the office of Prime Minister becomes highly personalised, and power concentrated in the hands of one person, concurrently weakening the Prime Minister’s political party as a check on the Prime Minister. These are not merely theoretical discussions. For example, the current Prime Minister of Barbados, after winning two consecutive terms with little to no opposition in the House of Assembly, will be preparing for a third term. Several Caribbean leaders have remained in office for decades, like in St Vincent and the Grenadines, where Prime Minister Gonsalves, termed the “five-star general”, is approaching 25 years in office. Similarly, in Dominica, Prime Minister Skerrit has been in office for just over 20 years. Term limits on the Prime Minister are crucial to prevent excessive concentration of power and to avoid an “elected dictatorship” or new monarchy.

Fixed-term Elections

The CRC recommended maintaining the current system where a Prime Minister can dissolve Parliament and call an election at their discretion. The CRC argued the Constitution should not address the readiness of political parties for elections, but this view appears to dismiss how constitutions regulate political systems, including political parties, and ignores concerns about fairness and governance.

Fixed-term elections can also potentially reduce prime ministerial dominance and influence—holding the sword of Damocles—over parliamentary colleagues, opposition, and the electorate.

The Deputy Chair of the CRC, Government Senator Gregory Nicholls, wrote a dissenting opinion in the CRC report, noting that fixed-term elections bring certainty to the political process by removing the unfair advantage of snap elections or extension beyond the five-year parliamentary period. Fixed-term elections can also potentially reduce prime ministerial dominance and influence—holding the sword of Damocles—over parliamentary colleagues, opposition, and the electorate. However, fixed terms should be implemented as part of broader reforms. As concluded in a recent International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International IDEA) and United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) report, ‘Reformers need to think carefully about how all the parts of any proposed constitutional amendment will work together—dissolution rules, Government formation and removal rules, and the electoral system.’

First-past-the-post Electoral System

The CRC report, spanning over 350 pages, mentions “first-past-the-post” just three times, and suggests that the system should remain. The report does not expressly discuss the merits or de-merits of the first-past-the-post electoral system, which can produce super-majority governments, with minimal or no opposition in the House of Assembly. However, the CRC does address proposed alternatives and ultimately rejects national Members of Parliament (MPs) (because of loss of direct link with their constituencies; potential to diminish local MP status; and unequal work burden of the different classes of MPs); and proportional representation (citing entrenchment of party leadership; complication and confusion for voters; and potential split ticket voting).

[T]he issue of having no opposition representation in the House of Assembly is significant and not merely theoretical . . . 

At this stage, reform suggestions from the CRC on the pressing issue of first-past-the-post would have been welcomed, rather than recommendations to retain the status quo, because the issue of having no opposition representation in the House of Assembly is significant and not merely theoretical: in both the 2018 and 2022 elections, the Barbados Labour Party won every seat under the first-past-the-post system.

Opposition Leader and Opposition Senators

Parliamentary opposition has a vital role in scrutinizing government actions and promoting accountability. Accordingly, many Westminster-model constitutions in the Caribbean recognize the position of Leader of the Opposition to bolster checks and balances both within and outside of Parliament. The Leader of the Opposition may also have constitutionalized responsibilities such as chairing the Public Accounts Committee, making key appointments to independent institutions like the electoral commission, and having the right to be consulted on key appointments.

In 2018 and 2022, with no elected opposition in Parliament, until a sitting Barbados Labour Party MP crossed the floor to become Opposition Leader, some of the functions of that office, such as selection of opposition senators, were carried out by the Head of State. Therefore, the CRC’s attempt at reform was welcomed but nevertheless fell short. The CRC suggested that, in the absence of an Opposition Leader, these functions would be exercised by the opposition political party with the highest number of votes from the previous election. But this does not address the fundamental problem that the current electoral system has the potential to create ‘hyper-majoritarian politics in which the winning party can accumulate near-unlimited power’ with minimal checks and balances, particularly in jurisdictions like Barbados where constitutional amendments do not require referendums.

Moreover, it seems inconsistent and illegitimate to consult with a political party to appoint parliamentary offices such as the Public Accounts Committee—traditionally requiring the Opposition Leader to chair—when there is no Opposition Leader in Parliament from that same political party. This would sidestep the need for an elected opposition voice within the legislature.

Additionally, the CRC left the total number of Senators unchanged at 21 but recommended an increase of Opposition Senators from two to four. The increase, though welcomed in giving the Opposition more voices in the Upper Chamber, comes at the expense of a decrease in Independent Senators appointed by the President (from seven to five). This change potentially lessens civil society presence in the Senate. The number of Government Senators appointed by the Prime Minister remains at twelve. Consequently, the CRC's recommendations do not in any way affect the Government's ability to pass laws, as it retains the current system where the Government has more than enough votes for a simple majority, and within striking distance of a two-thirds majority for constitutional amendments.

Other Reforms

Even where the CRC proposed moderate changes—such as the creation of a Constitutional Office Commission to somewhat regulate the Prime Minister’s appointment powers—it faced resistance, tellingly from the CRC Chairman, retired Justice Blackman. The new Constitutional Office Commission, consisting of the Prime Minister, Opposition Leader, Attorney-General and others appointed on the advice of the Prime Minister, Opposition Leader and President, would be, according to the CRC, a mechanism for ‘consensual decision-making’ in the appointment of several key constitutional office holders.

The CRC Chairman in his dissenting opinion opposed the Constitutional Office Commission on grounds of added bureaucracy and in the belief that limitations on the powers of a Prime Minister should only arise from the successful passage of a no-confidence resolution, and not otherwise. However, the Prime Minister still reserves the power to dissolve Parliament and call an election under the shadow of a no-confidence vote. The 1991 elections called by then Prime Minister of Barbados, Erskine Sandiford, illustrate this point.

Overall, the CRC maintained the current Westminster system without addressing recent political issues such as hyper-majorities, the absence of a Leader of the Opposition, an imbalanced Parliament, and perceived dominance by the Prime Minister and one party. The CRC report also retained the bicameral system with an elected House of Assembly and an unelected Senate. While the draft constitution bill proposed protecting members of the Electoral and Boundaries Commission from suit for any acts taken in good faith in performing their duties, it recommended in its report protecting the Auditor-General—who checks government spending and exposes corruption and mismanagement—only through legislation. Additionally, it failed to provide the Auditor-General with financial security and constitutionally guaranteed independence. The issue of overseas voting was also treated with scant regard, in circumstances where there is much fanfare around engaging the diaspora.

Concluding Thoughts: Limitations of Spirit

This is Barbados’ third Constitutional Reform Commission, prompting the question: how do we view its recommendations? It may be suggested that the CRC was clear-eyed and politically savvy, taking an incrementalist approach. Understanding that constitutional reform could fail entirely, it may have deemed some reform better than none. However, as discussed above, the CRC appeared to recommend no major changes. Moreover, no referendum is required for a constitutional amendment in Barbados, and with a government holding the majority of the seats, the two-thirds constitutional majority to amend the constitution is easily met. Therefore, the CRC report proposals are perhaps best viewed as a failure of imagination, encapsulating C.L.R. James’ argument that the colonial experience, and the resulting Afro-Saxonism, produced limitations on the spirit, vision and self-respect of the (former) colonised people. A citizen speaking at a CRC townhall “lambasted” the CRC report as reflecting 'antiquated colonial thinking' and 'no innovative, creative thinking'. The failings of the CRC report are, in these words, a shortfall in national intellectualism and imagination. At a moment when many Barbadians yearn for transformative change, there is a prevailing sense of Durkheim’s anomie, indicating societal breakdown. Challenges such as corruption, poverty, clientelism, crime, debt, degrading infrastructure, youth apathy, and widespread social malaise all contribute to this frustration.

The anticipated moment to address the challenges of Westminster, colonialism and neo-colonialism was not realised.

The continuation of the Westminster system that the CRC proposes can be understood as a form of (neo)colonial liberalism. Under the guise of liberalism, the Westminster system continues inclusive of a human rights agenda, limited government, and relatively free voting, underlined by clientelism, super-majorities supported by a first-past-the post electoral system, excessive Prime Ministerial power and one-party dominance. The anticipated moment to address the challenges of Westminster, colonialism and neo-colonialism was not realised.

It is ultimately the Parliament, not the People, that will decide on constitutional reforms, as the Barbados Constitution does not require referendums or other forms of direct public participation. But by not offering an innovative report, the CRC has allowed Parliament to avoid meaningful reform without the blame, essentially giving Parliament a free pass. A “We The People” moment for a new republican constitution requires deeper democracy: one that places the people at the heart of their polity, rather than surrendering their sovereignty at elections.

Ronnie Yearwood (ronnie.yearwood@cavehill.uwi.edu) is a lecturer in law at the University of the West Indies Cave Hill. His research interests revolve around politics and law, focusing on Caribbean politics, constitutionalism, and political economy.

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Suggested citation: Ronnie Yearwood, ‘Constitutional Reform in Barbados: The Enduring Influence of Westminster?’, ConstitutionNet, International IDEA, 30 January 2025, https://constitutionnet.org/news/voices/constitutional-reform-barbados-enduring-influence-westminster

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