In the World of Constitution-Building in 2024 and 2025 Forecast

2024 was dubbed the year of the global elections “Super-Cycle”, with voters going to the polls in 74 national elections around the world—representing approximately 3.7 billion people. Economic challenges, cost-of-living crises, and insecurity dominated many political campaigns, with the elections delivering a blow to incumbents and to centrist parties. The results revealed widespread public dissatisfaction with the status quo and confirmed the rising appeal of populist, often far-right, political agendas during a time of low trust in government.

The resulting shifts in power also served as catalysts for constitutional reform. In some contexts, constitutional amendments were pursued as part of "designing resistance" against democratic backsliding, such as reforms to safeguard the independence of the judiciary and guarantee the alternation of power. In other contexts, these shifts advanced illiberal trends through identity-based populist reforms, weakening accountability mechanisms, and dismantling checks and balances.

The Constitution-Building Programme of the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International IDEA) followed these developments closely on ConstitutionNet, the knowledge-sharing hub for the constitution-building community. Through our Voices from the Field series, ConstitutionNet invited local constitutional experts to analyse the process and content of reforms in their respective countries, from Lao PDR to Vanuatu, expanding our coverage to approximately 137 countries since Voices was launched in 2013. In addition, our regular news digests brought over 300 pieces of constitutional news to our readers, to ensure comprehensive updates on the world of constitution-building in 2024.

The following sections review some notable trends and developments in 2024, before flagging “what to watch” in 2025.

Security Risks: Post-Coup Constitution-Making and Militarization in Africa and the Americas

During the global elections “Super-Cycle”, 19 countries in Africa were slated to hold presidential or general elections. This resulted in some bright spots for democracy: in October 2024, Botswana marked a peaceful transition of power after almost six decades of one-party rule. In Senegal, the outgoing President’s attempts to postpone the presidential election triggered a constitutional crisis that was met with mass protests and Constitutional Council ruling rejecting the postponement. As a result, in March 2024 the election took place, culminating in a peaceful transfer of power to the new president from the opposition party.

Several countries impacted by the wave of coups in Central and West Africa in previous years were also scheduled to hold elections in line with their transition timelines. Nevertheless, there were three postponed elections in the coup-affected countries (Burkina Faso, Guinea, Mali), and in Niger no elections have been scheduled. The extension of transition periods and silencing of dissent from political opposition and civil society raises concerns that we are witnessing the protracted derailing of transitions and in some cases the creation of constitutional systems that enable the entrenchment of military leadership post-transition. 

In Burkina Faso, which experienced two coups in 2022, the Transitional Legislature passed constitutional amendments at the very end of 2023. The end of the transition was set for 1 July 2024, but after declaring that “elections are not a priority”, Interim President Ibrahim Traoré announced a five-year extension of the transition period via an amended charter. In Mali, where a new constitution was approved by referendum in 2023, junta leader Colonel Assimi Goïta in November 2024 replaced the civilian prime minister with a military general after the Prime Minister criticized the postponement of elections. This is the second time that the civilian prime minister has been dismissed following disputes with the military leadership and has led to speculation about the timeline for the transition back to civilian rule, which has been extended from two to five years.

Guinea’s transitional authorities unveiled a draft constitution in July 2024 following the 2021 coup, promising a two-year transition to democracy. In early 2025, protests against the missed deadline for returning to civilian rule led to lockdown in parts of the capital, with an opposition leader sentenced to two years imprisonment for “insulting” the head of state. In early 2025, a government spokesperson communicated that the constitutional referendum would take place before the end of June 2025, with elections to follow, but the suppression of dissent and dissolution of dozens of political parties in October 2024 raises concerns about the military regime’s commitment to a democratic transition and political pluralism.

In Gabon a new constitution was approved by referendum in November 2024 following a national dialogue. The new constitution transitions the state from a semi‐presidential to a presidential system, while maintaining a discretionary power of dissolution for the President, mandates that presidential candidates have at least one Gabonese‐born parent, and changes the presidential term to seven years, renewable once. The interim government, chaired by General Nguema, announced presidential elections for April 2025, which should be a milestone in restoring civilian rule. However, a new electoral code passed by the parliament in January 2025 (awaiting Court approval) permits military personnel to run for office, which was previously forbidden, and this would facilitate Nguema's candidacy.

In the Americas, the intertwining of civilian power with militarization took a different form in 2024. Both Mexico and Ecuador enacted constitutional reforms expanding military involvement in civilian policing amid escalating violence linked to drug trafficking and organized crime. In Mexico, the reform was the capstone of President Andrés Manuel López Obrador’s long-term “war on drugs” before leaving office in September 2024 with a 70 per cent approval rating. In Ecuador, the reforms passed as part of an 11-question referendum posed by the new President: voters approved nine security-related reforms, while rejecting proposals related to “economic reactivation”, handing the new President a partial victory.

Given historical precedents where military force has shored authoritarian and totalitarian regimes (as seen in Nicaragua’s 2024 constitutional and legislative amendments), caution is warranted in assessing the increased and potentially indefinite militarization of public security. More broadly, the acceptance of former military leaders as civilian heads of government and state portends a shift towards governance viewed primarily through the lens of security. This will likely tend toward centralized systems with hyper-powerful executive branches and without the commensurate institutional checks and mechanisms for democratic accountability.

Judicial Independence in the Spotlight

Free and fair elections are the bedrock of democracy, yet between 2020 and 2024, International IDEA observed that 20 per cent of election outcomes were rejected by a losing candidate or party. These disputes have increasingly led to legal challenges, placing courts’ role as neutral arbiter in the spotlight. Maintaining the independence and integrity of courts is therefore critical, particularly given the oft-used tactic of democratic backsliders—detailed in International IDEA’s Designing Resistance: Democratic Institutions and the Threat of Backsliding—to undermine, weaken, capture, and instrumentalize the judiciary. By doing so, those with autocratic ambitions can manipulate and eventually dismantle free and fair elections without facing legal accountability. For this reason, the motivations for amendments related to prosecutors and police in 2024 (for example in Bulgaria, Hungary, Malta and Slovakia) also merit close attention.

Recognizing the growing threats to judicial independence across Europe, Germany took proactive steps in 2024 to fortify its Federal Constitutional Court. In an admirable show of consensus, the ruling and main opposition parties agreed to constitutionalize protections for the judiciary in the constitution, ensuring that critical aspects of the Court’s status, structure, and the binding effect of its decisions—previously governed by ordinary legislation—could no longer be amended by a simple parliamentary majority. The reform, passed in December 2024, was a direct response to efforts in other European states to undermine judicial independence. Poland was one such example, where over the past decade the populist, right-wing Law and Justice (PiS) Party had systematically weakened and captured the judiciary, including via 2018 constitutional amendments that compromised the integrity of the Supreme Court and the National Council for the Judiciary, the body charged with appointing judges. In 2024, the new Polish government sought to rehabilitate judicial independence, as required by the EU Commission and a ruling by the European Court of Justice. As part of this process, the Law Minister sought an opinion from the Venice Commission, and the government now faces the challenge of reviewing over 2,500 judicial appointments made under the compromised appointment process. However, opposition from the PiS-allied president has effectively stalled progress.  

Elsewhere, 2024 amendments in Mexico have sparked serious debate about political influence over the judiciary. These constitutional reforms mandate direct election of all judges (including Supreme Court justices), a reduction in the number of Supreme Court judges from 11 to nine, 12-year term limits for judges, and the creation of a Judicial Disciplinary Tribunal. The government has defended these reforms as being necessary to combat corruption and counter impunity, but they have led to protests, strikes and criticism by the international community, especially given the pattern of democratic erosion under former president Andrés Manuel López Obrador. A subsequent reform shielding constitutional reforms, including the judicial overhaul, from constitutional review, further curtails and marginalizes  the Court. Concerns about political influence over judicial nominations, appointments and discipline have also surfaced after constitutional amendments in Pakistan and proposed amendments in Italy in 2024.

In Asia, attempts to hobble the highest courts by manipulating appointments and procedural rules created controversy in 2024. In Taiwan, amendments to the Constitutional Court Procedure Act in January 2025 imposed procedural requirements designed to stymie the operations of the Court by changing its quorum and decision-making majorities, with the parliamentary majority simultaneously refusing to appoint new judges. The withholding of judicial nominations for political machinations was also an issue in South Korea in 2024, where three of nine seats were vacant due to political deadlock preventing new appointments after scheduled judicial retirements. Following President Yoon Suk Yeol’s impeachment in December after declaring martial law, Acting President Han Duck-soo declined to appoint three nominees approved by the opposition-led National Assembly, citing a lack of bipartisan agreement. This refusal—which prevented the legal confirmation of the President’s impeachment—led to the Acting President’s own impeachment, with subsequent Acting President Choi Sang-mok appointing two nominees to the Court, withholding the third due to continued disagreement. A similar pattern of obstruction has been evident in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 2024, where an entity parliament’s refusal to fill vacancies on the Constitutional Court has severely curtailed the Court’s ability to fulfil its core mandate.

Constitutional Self-Determination in the Caribbean and Pacific

Conventional wisdom holds that constitution-making typically follows conflict or crisis. However, in recent years, some countries have undertaken constitutional reviews to ensure the vitality of their institutional arrangements and to consider reforms to increase democratic resilience (explored in International IDEA’s Annual Review of Constitution-Building: “Constitutional Review in the Absence of Crisis”). The most significant regional movement in constitutional review has emerged from the Caribbean, where several processes launched in the last three years began to bear fruit. The impetus for these reviews has been to create autochthonous constitutions that complete the decolonial project. Concurrently, British Overseas Territories like the British Virgin Islands are contemplating reforms to implement necessary institutional improvements, and in the case of Turks and Caicos Islands, to consider pathways toward greater autonomy or independence.

A central issue for Caribbean nations transitioning to a republic is the legacy of Westminster model constitutions, which, combined with first-past-the-post electoral systems, have produced ‘democracy of a very limited, exclusionary, majoritarian nature’ characterized by two-party politics, hyper-majorities (sometimes with no elected opposition representation in parliament), and prime ministerial dominance. For instance, in Barbados, the ruling party won every seat in the lower house in the 2022 elections. The Constitutional Reform Commission released its report in December 2024, but did not suggest a change regarding the main features of the Westminster model. With no referendum requirement in Barbados, it will be parliament that decides the future constitutional framework.

In December 2024, Jamaica’s government introduced a bill to transition the country to a republic. This came after a multi-year review process conducted by a Constitutional Reform Committee with bi-partisan, civil society and international expert representation. While the opposition supports a Jamaican head of state, the opposition leader has communicated that support for the overall constitutional reform initiative is contingent on Jamaica’s accession to the Caribbean Court of Justice. The government is keen to continue with the planned phased process—first to become a republic, then concentrate on resolving constitutional issues in the new republican constitution—but with elections expected in the second half of 2025, the progression of the constitution-making process remains uncertain, especially in light of the current political impasse.

In Trinidad and Tobago, which underwent a constitutional review process in 2024, Tobago's efforts to attain greater self-governance faced a setback when a bill aimed at expanding the island’s autonomy was defeated in parliament in December 2024. The proposed legislation sought to increase Tobago's powers to pass legislation on local matters and increase its share of the national budget.

Across the Pacific Ocean, in May 2024, the Autonomous Bougainville Government released the first draft of its proposed independence constitution, a significant milestone following the 2019 referendum where 97.7 per cent of voters elected to separate from Papua New Guinea. This draft, born from the 2001 Bougainville Peace Agreement and developed by the Bougainville Constitutional Planning Commission after extensive public consultations, emphasizes good governance, human rights, and environmental protection. While the Papua New Guinean government has signalled its intention to ratify the referendum results, there are disagreements regarding the timeline and process for Bougainville’s independence. Nevertheless, the Bougainville government views the development of its own constitution as a legitimate step on the political roadmap agreed upon with Papua New Guinea that envisages independence by 2027.

On the Horizon in 2025

At the end of January 2025, the Doomsday Clock ticked forward one second—89 seconds to midnight—judged the closest humanity has been to global catastrophe since 1947. War and increasingly intractable conflicts, mounting economic and geopolitical tensions, the worsening impacts of climate change, collapse of nuclear arms control, and growth of disruptive technologies have led to a growing sense of unease and instability.

The student-led protests in Bangladesh that culminated in the collapse of the authoritarian government in August and the abrupt toppling of the Assad regime in Syria in December underscore both the volatility of the current moment but also the persistence of hope for more democratic, inclusive, and peaceful futures. Meanwhile, countries including Fiji, Ghana, Saint Lucia, Guyana and Haiti have embarked on, or revived, constitutional review processes, sowing the seeds for constitution-making in 2025 and beyond. At the same time, external forces loom large: the push for constitutional changes to increase EU-alignment in countries such as Moldova and North Macedonia could be mirrored by sovereignty- and identity-focused amendments should political dynamics fluctuate further in the European Union. Federalism or decentralization debates—especially in Somalia, Nigeria, and in Bougainville/Papua New Guinea—may regain momentum.

Whether these reforms strengthen or weaken the guardrails of constitutional democracy will depend on many factors, including the involvement and vigilance of civil society, the willingness and ability of political leaders to uphold democratic constitutional values and principles, and, in some cases, the support of the international community. In short, the coming year will test the resilience of our societies and institutions—and remind us that constitutional reforms do not merely reflect the times but also shape them.

International IDEA and the Constitution-Building Team will continue to share regular updates and generate original analyses throughout 2025 as expected (and unexpected) constitutional reform processes unfold.

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Suggested citation: Sharon Pia Hickey, ‘In the World of Constitution-Building in 2024 and 2025 Forecast’, ConstitutionNet, International IDEA, 10 February 2024, https://constitutionnet.org/news/voices/world-constitution-building-2024-and-2025-forecast

If you are interested in contributing a Voices from the Field piece on constitutional change in your country, please contact us at constitutionnet@idea.int