Zambia: The Endless Search for a New Constitution
In October 2025, Zambia’s government established a 25-member Technical Committee to revive stalled constitutional reform efforts after civil society pressure and a controversial Constitutional Court ruling declared earlier executive-led proposals unconstitutional for lack of public participation. The move, announced amid legal uncertainty and deep divisions within civil society, has reignited debate over the legitimacy and scope of the reform process, which remains narrowly focused on electoral provisions ahead of the 2026 elections. Drawing on the turbulent history of constitutional change in Zambia, O'Brien Kaaba examines how contested court intervention, a fragmented opposition, and a government determined to push ahead have shaped a reform process that may once again fall short of addressing the country’s deeper democratic and institutional challenges.
On 2 October 2025, Zambia established a Technical Committee to revive constitutional reform efforts after pressure from civil society and controversial intervention from the Constitutional Court had scuttled earlier executive-led reform proposals as non-participatory and therefore unconstitutional. The announcement of the Committee has been contentious due to concerns around its legal standing and crucially around its substantive reach.
President Hakainde Hichilema’s United Party for National Development (UPND) was elected to office in 2021, with a promise to comprehensively reform the constitution and make it more democratic. The promise is nothing new: it is one that was made by every new President in Zambia. However, as has often happened, the interest dissipates once the newly elected government settles down. While the Hichilema government originally seemed to have lost interest in constitutional reforms, in March 2025, both the President and the Minister of Justice announced plans to amend the Constitution. Considering that this happened just about a year before the upcoming 2026 general elections, the reactions were polarised. This article sets out the larger context of the proposed reforms, the reactions of key stakeholders, and the likely direction of the constitution reform process.
Context
Since the adoption of its first constitution in 1964, Zambia has had more than 10 constitutional reforms, attempts at reforms, and constitutional amendments. The reforms that were adopted before 1991 tended to generally be illiberal and consolidated power in the hands of the ruling party and the government. Post-1991 reforms, on the other hand, have, except for a few, generally focused on liberalising politics and participation in the electoral process. The country, however, has never had a comprehensive reform process that sought to restructure state power and institutions. As a result, there has and continues to be a push for fundamental constitutional reforms, mainly coming from civil society, academia, and the political opposition.
The most worrying proposals (...) were the introduction of seemingly arbitrary provisions on parliamentary constituency delimitation, creating concerns around potential gerrymandering.
It is in this context that, in March 2025,the UPND government announced constitutional reforms. However, contrary to what had been promised, the proposed reforms were narrow and focused mainly on the electoral process. This led to both a sigh of relief and new concerns among the public. The relief was that, although there had been earlier speculations that the proposed reforms might undermine constitutional norms considered key in the Zambian context—such as the fixed electoral date, the position of the presidential running mate, and the requirement that a president be elected by more than 50 percent of the vote—these were eventually excluded from the scope of the proposed reforms. The most worrying proposals, however, were the introduction of seemingly arbitrary provisions on parliamentary constituency delimitation, creating concerns around potential gerrymandering. Other provisions, such as a proposed increase in the guaranteed parliamentary seats for women, the youth and persons with disabilities, although well-intentioned, were poorly designed, and would have posed implementation challenges. What is more, the proposed mixed member representation system to allow for increased numbers of women in the legislature was not clearly spelt out and the actual number of reserved seats would have been insignificant in practice (30 seats against a proposed total of 256).
In May 2025, the government acted on these proposals by introducing the Constitution of Zambia (Amendment) Bill, No. 7 of 2025 (popularly known as Bill 7), containing the above-mentioned proposed reforms. The Bill received significant opposition from civil society, opposition political parties and academia. Although most of it was vague and revolved around using the constitution amendment process to gain an unfair electoral advantage, civil society specifically criticised the consequential increment in parliamentary constituencies—proposing to add 100 Members of Parliament—fearing it would increase the cost of running the Parliament without making it more inclusive in terms of gender and youth representation. Following consultative meetings between the President and civil society representatives, it was agreed that the processes should be halted and government should appoint a technical working group to undertake consultations on the constitution reform process. In June 2025, the President therefore announced the halting of the Bill and mandated the Minister of Justice to conduct wide consultations on the way forward.
Meanwhile, as soon as the government announced the constitution making process in March 2025, and before Bill 7 was issued, then opposition Members of Parliament Munir Zulu and Celestine Mukandila challenged the constitutionality of the executive-led constitution making process before the Constitutional Court of Zambia (case of Munir Zulu and Celestine Mukandila v Attorney General 2025/CCZ/009), arguing that the Constitution could not be amended without transparent processes and full participation by the Zambian people.
Muddling the waters
The Constitutional Court in the Munir Zulu case rendered its judgment two days after the President deferred Bill 7, ruling that the government’s amendment process was unconstitutional. While in the past, courts have resisted intervening in constitution making processes, this time, the Constitutional Court held that any constitutional amendments must be conducted through a participatory process led by an independent committee of experts.
The reasoning, however, did not appear coherent and lacked a strong legal basis beyond the general constitutional clauses on public participation and on the duty of citizens to protect the Constitution. In fact, the constitutional amendment clause only requires a two-thirds majority in Parliament for amendments to pass, as well as a referendum if the amendment alters the Bill of Rights or the entrenchment clause itself, but does not prescribe pre-bill public participation as part of the process.
(...) [W]hile the Court clothed itself with jurisdiction to review pre-Bill processes, it deprived itself from any jurisdiction once proposals crystalise into a Bill.
Adding to the uncertainty of the Court decision was the fact that it refused to reverse its earlier judgment in which it held that it had no jurisdiction to review the substantive content of constitutional Bills, once introduced. This created a legal discrepancy: while the Court clothed itself with jurisdiction to review pre-Bill processes, it deprived itself from any jurisdiction once proposals crystalise into a Bill.
Picking up the pieces
It is in this context that the President announced the appointment of the 25-member Technical Committee to undertake public consultations within three weeks and draft proposed amendments to the Constitution. The members of the Technical Committee include 6 women and 19 men: lawyers, academics, religious leaders, members of civil society and traditional leaders. The Committee’s terms of reference largely revolve around electoral reforms.
The Committee’s appointment was not widely applauded. Although some welcomed it and praised the government for seemingly respecting the decision of the Constitutional Court and constituting a diverse committee, others condemned it for a variety of reasons, including that the members were appointed in their individual capacities and not in their capacity as institutional representatives. Civil society organisations seemed split on the appointment. Some welcomed it and participated actively by making submissions before the Committee. Others took a hardline position and rejected its legitimacy and urged members of the public to boycott the process. A few went the extreme way and considered the Committee illegal.
The Committee, however, proceeded to hear submissions and at the end of the first week of consultations, announced that it had received more than 5,000 submissions, suggesting that the call to boycott the process had not been heeded. On 15 November 2025, the Committee concluded public consultations and started compiling its report and draft constitutional amendments. Both documents are expected to be submitted to the government by 30 November 2025.
The fact that the opposition is weak and fragmented also entails that there is unlikely to be a strong bulwark against the reforms.
The government looks determined to proceed with the amendment process. Judging from official public statements, it seems the greatest interest in the reform is to delimit existing constituencies and create new ones. Considering the technical nature of the issue, it is unlikely to attract strong public opposition. The fact that the opposition is weak and fragmented also entails that there is little chance of it becoming a strong bulwark against the reforms. The main criticism, however, is likely to come from civil society organisations. As mentioned, amendments would require a two-thirds majority in the National Assembly. Although the ruling party Members of Parliament account for slightly less than two-thirds of the Assembly, considering that there is no strongly organised opposition party, it is likely that some opposition and independent members will vote alongside the ruling party and pass the prospective amendments. At this stage, however, it is not known which parts of the Bill will make it to Parliament, if at all, as the Committee reports are not binding on the government.
The search lives on
Although the Committee recommendations remain unknown and are in any case non-binding, a number of individuals and organisations have already filed lawsuits challenging the legality of the Committee, with some going as far as challenging its terms of reference. Considering that the Constitutional Court was narrowly split (4-3 majority) in the Munir Zulu ruling, it is difficult to anticipate the outcome of these legal challenges. While it is possible that the Court will assert itself further and halt the constitution amendment process, it might also decide to refine its reasoning and the views expressed in the Munir Zulu case.
Whatever the outcome, it is unlikely that the current process will comprehensively address the country’s constitutional challenges and structural issues as the current constitutional reform proposals have a narrow focus on electoral provisions and do not address constitutional power and public institutions. The search for a more democratic constitutional order in Zambia will therefore continue.
O’Brien Kaaba teaches law at the University of Zambia and is a senior research fellow at the Southern African Institute for Policy and Research (Saipar).
♦ ♦ ♦
Suggested citation: O'Brien Kaaba, ‘Zambia: The Endless Search for a New Constitution’, ConstitutionNet, International IDEA, 26 November 2025, https://constitutionnet.org/news/voices/zambia-endless-search-new-constitution
Click here for updates on constitutional developments in Zambia.
If you are interested in contributing a Voices from the Field piece on constitutional change in your country, please contact us at constitutionnet@idea.int.