Sovereignty Reimagined: Constitutional Implications of Allowing Foreign Military Bases in Ecuador

On 3 June 2025, Ecuador’s Parliament approved a landmark constitutional amendment proposal to lift the long-standing ban on foreign military bases—a move that has sparked intense debate across the country. As this reform proceeds to judicial review by the Constitutional Court, Professor Andrés Martínez-Moscoso delves into the government’s motivations behind the proposal, the polarized responses it has elicited, and the potential implications for Ecuador’s national sovereignty, security strategy, and role in regional geopolitics.

The growing insecurity in Ecuador is far from a mere perception. It has become an entrenched reality, particularly in major urban centers like Guayaquil and Durán. These cities now rank among the most dangerous in the world, plagued by escalating violence linked to drug trafficking, gang activity, and organized crime. The surge in violent deaths has deeply affected public life and trust in state institutions.

In response, recent Ecuadorian administrations have sought to bolster security measures. This includes deploying more police officers in high-risk areas and, more controversially, involving the armed forces in maintaining internal order. These military deployments are often framed as necessary for citizen security, especially when civilian institutions struggle to contain criminal groups.

In early 2024, President Daniel Noboa succeeded in passing a constitutional amendment via referendum that formally authorized the military to participate in complementary security roles such as supporting law enforcement in high-risk areas, conducting joint operations against organized crime, and providing logistical assistance in maintaining public order. This political move was accompanied by the declaration of a state of “internal armed conflict” (as defined by international humanitarian law) in Ecuador. According to Noboa, the threat is not merely internal but stems from a broader, transnational network of criminal organizations operating across the Americas and Europe.

(...) [T]he government moved to overturn its long-standing constitutional ban on foreign military bases by proposing a constitutional amendment to permit their presence in Ecuador (...).

Most recently, the government moved to overturn its long-standing constitutional ban on foreign military bases by proposing a constitutional amendment to permit their presence in Ecuador—a measure that was approved by Parliament on 3 June 2025. This article explores the government’s motivations behind this proposal and examines the arguments in favor of the reform, the criticisms voiced by opponents, and the implications of such measure on national sovereignty, legal doctrine, and regional geopolitics. The article also outlines the current procedural status of the reform and the possible paths ahead.

Security Policy: A Strategic Necessity or a Risky Gamble?

Public safety has become the number one concern for Ecuadorians.

Public safety has become the number one concern for Ecuadorians. This issue dominated the national debate during the April 2025 presidential elections. Candidate Daniel Noboa focused his platform on adopting a "mano dura" (“iron fist”) approach to fighting crime. This included introducing stricter penalties for organized crime and controversial measures like expanding international cooperation on defense and intelligence.

Among the more polarizing moments was Noboa’s meeting with Erik Prince, the founder of the private military company Blackwater (now Academi), which has a controversial legacy in international security operations due to its involvement in incidents during the Iraq War, including civilian casualties and allegations of human rights violations. This meeting sparked debate about the extent and nature of foreign involvement in Ecuador’s internal affairs.

(...) Noboa has been careful to position himself as a democratic reformer, not an authoritarian leader.

Despite—or perhaps because of—these bold proposals, Noboa won re-election. Many see his leadership style as similar to that of Salvadoran President Nayib Bukele, who has earned both praise and criticism for his aggressive approach to security. Yet Noboa has been careful to position himself as a democratic reformer, not an authoritarian leader.

Nevertheless, violence has continued. Homicide rates remain stubbornly high in Ecuador, and other forms of crime—extortion, abductions, and the recruitment of minors into criminal networks—show no signs of abating. The persistence of these problems has fueled debate about the effectiveness of militarized responses.

This would allow, for the first time since 2008, the formal installation of foreign bases on Ecuadorian territory.

To address these challenges, Noboa’s administration has proposed a new, ambitious strategy: establishing a legal framework for foreign military cooperation. This would allow, for the first time since 2008, the formal installation of foreign bases on Ecuadorian territory. Such a step is reminiscent of the early 2000s, when Ecuador played a role in the United States (U.S.)-led "Plan Colombia". At that time, American forces operated from the Eloy Alfaro Air Base in Manta.

Military Bases in the Andean Region

During the early 2000s, the U.S. and Colombia intensified cooperation to combat drug trafficking and dismantle illegal armed groups, including the left-wing Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and National Liberation Army (ELN), and right-wing paramilitaries. The plan involved technical training, intelligence sharing, and enhanced military operations. Ecuador became part of this regional initiative in 1999 by permitting U.S. forces to use the Manta base.

While some praised the arrangement for helping reduce the flow of cocaine to the U.S., others criticized it as an infringement on Ecuador’s sovereignty.

While some praised the arrangement for helping reduce the flow of cocaine to the U.S., others criticized it as an infringement on Ecuador’s sovereignty. Reports of misconduct by foreign personnel and the lack of clear legal accountability further intensified the controversy.

The political tide shifted when Rafael Correa assumed presidency. Representing a new wave of Latin American leaders who promoted "21st century socialism”, Correa prioritized sovereignty, social justice, and South-South cooperation. In 2007, he announced that the Manta base agreement would not be renewed. The 2008 Constitution formalized this position, with Article 5 stating: 'Ecuador is a territory of peace. The establishment of foreign military bases or foreign facilities for military purposes shall not be allowed. It is forbidden to transfer national military bases to foreign armed or security forces'.  

Constitutional Reform: Legal Process and Political Stakes

On 16 September 2024, President Noboa submitted a proposal to amend Article 5 of the Constitution by removing the explicit prohibition of foreign military bases. The revised text would only retain the phrase: 'Ecuador is a territory of peace', effectively opening the door to foreign deployments through bilateral agreements.

Under the Constitution of Ecuador, constitutional reforms can be pursued through three avenues: amendment, partial reform, or the establishment of a constituent assembly to reform the Constitution. The Constitutional Court is responsible for determining the appropriate path. In this case, it ruled that the proposal qualified as a partial reform, subject to approval by the National Assembly and a popular referendum.

The bill is now under final review by the Constitutional Court, which has 20 days to issue a decision. (...) Should the Court give its green light, the National Electoral Council must call a referendum.

The bill was sent to the National Assembly on 17 October 2024. After two rounds of debate, the proposal was approved on 3 June 2025 by a majority of 82 members of parliament (coming from government allies and indigenous lawmakers) out of a total of 151. The bill is now under final review by the Constitutional Court, which has 20 days to issue a decision. If no ruling is made within that period, the proposal is deemed valid by default. Should the Court give its green light, the National Electoral Council must call a referendum. Ecuadorians will then vote on whether to authorize the reform. The process reflects both representative and direct democracy, involving all branches of government and the electorate.

Arguments and Criticisms

[Supporters] view the presence of allied foreign forces as a strategic advantage, especially for securing ports and maritime drug routes.

Supporters argue that Ecuador cannot tackle transnational crime on its own. They view the presence of allied foreign forces as a strategic advantage, especially for securing ports and maritime drug routes. They also cite the perceived success of the Manta base, arguing that crime surged after the Americans left in 2009.

Critics fall into two camps. Academic experts warn that militarization addresses symptoms, not causes. They advocate for investment in education, social protection, and employment in high-risk areas. Long-term solutions, they argue, must reduce the economic incentives that drive people toward crime.

The political opposition, led by Correa’s movement, opposes the reform on ideological grounds. They argue that permitting foreign military forces jeopardizes national independence and alters Ecuador’s geopolitical orientation. Aligning more closely with the U.S. and the European Union, they warn, could alienate partners like China and Russia, with potential economic and diplomatic costs.

Critics argue that opening the door to foreign military presence—even temporarily—could result in diminished political autonomy and long-term strategic dependencies that compromise Ecuador’s ability to act independently on regional issues.

In the public debate surrounding this issue, there are deeper concerns tied to Ecuador's history of foreign intervention, especially coming from powerful nations. For many, the memory of past involvement by global superpowers in Latin America invokes a sense of caution. Critics argue that opening the door to foreign military presence—even temporarily—could result in diminished political autonomy and long-term strategic dependencies that compromise Ecuador’s ability to act independently on regional issues.

Legal scholars have also raised important constitutional concerns. Allowing foreign bases could, they suggest, set a precedent for future exceptions to other fundamental provisions. While the government insists this is a narrowly tailored reform for a specific security need, others see the proposal as a slippery slope that could lead to further erosion of constitutional protections in the name of public safety.

If Ecuador were to reverse its ban on foreign military bases, it could strain relations with neighboring countries that view such measures as a betrayal of shared principles of non-intervention and peaceful coexistence.

Furthermore, the regional implications cannot be ignored. Latin America has a long-standing tradition of asserting regional sovereignty and resisting military intervention. If Ecuador were to reverse its ban on foreign military bases, it could strain relations with neighboring countries that view such measures as a betrayal of shared principles of non-intervention and peaceful coexistence. The reform could thus create diplomatic frictions that extend beyond bilateral relations and affect multilateral frameworks.

Supporters of the reform counter these arguments by pointing to the evolving nature of global crime. They argue that Ecuador is being used as a corridor for narcotics and weapons trafficking, which in turn fuels violence domestically and abroad. In their view, international cooperation is not a surrender of sovereignty but a strategic alliance to defend it. With rising flows of illicit goods, technological surveillance and military logistics provided by allies may be the only viable tools to interrupt these networks.

Possible Futures

Public demand for safety may well drive approval of the referendum, expected to take place late 2025 or early 2026. Yet, so far, no foreign government has publicly committed to building a base in Ecuador. The proposal thus remains largely symbolic—yet politically potent.

If the reform passes, Ecuador may soon face decisions about the scope, terms, and partners for foreign military cooperation.

If the reform passes, Ecuador may soon face decisions about the scope, terms, and partners for foreign military cooperation. Will it pursue bilateral agreements with traditional allies like the United States, or will it open negotiations with other powers? These choices could realign Ecuador’s foreign policy and test regional alliances.

President Noboa, who has repeatedly expressed frustration with the current Constitution, has also floated the idea of convening a new constituent assembly. Whether or not that happens, security reform is likely to remain at the forefront of his agenda, with broader implications for Ecuador’s democracy and its place in the world.

While the proposed constitutional reform remains under debate, President Noboa, supported by his legislative majority, has recently secured the approval of two controversial pieces of legislation: the Organic Law on National Solidarity and the Organic Law on Intelligence. Both have drawn criticism from civil society organizations and NGOs, particularly due to the broad discretionary powers they confer upon the president to declare and manage scenarios classified as “internal armed conflict”. Concerns have also been raised regarding the potential impact of these laws on intelligence and counterintelligence operations, the use of lethal force, and the erosion of due process guarantees in the collection of information by intelligence agencies.

The outcome of the referendum—and the decisions that follow—will reveal whether Ecuador can chart a security path that safeguards both its people and democratic principles.

Ecuador stands at a crossroads between maintaining a historically rooted constitutional identity and adapting to 21st century security challenges. The outcome of the referendum—and the decisions that follow—will reveal whether Ecuador can chart a security path that safeguards both its people and democratic principles. How the nation decides to balance sovereignty, cooperation, and civil rights will have repercussions not only internally but for the entire Andean region.

Professor Andrés Martínez-Moscoso is a professor of Constitutional Law at Universidad San Francisco de Quito, Ecuador. He holds a PhD in Constitutional Law from Alicante University, Spain. He is a member of the Ecuadorian chapter of the Ibero-American Institute of Constitutional Law.

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Suggested citation: Andrés Martínez-Moscoso, ‘Sovereignty Reimagined: Constitutional Implications of Allowing Foreign Military Bases in Ecuador’, ConstitutionNet, International IDEA, 23 June 2025, https://constitutionnet.org/news/voices/sovereignty-reimagined-constitutional-implications-allowing-foreign-military-bases-ecuador

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