A new freedom in Luxembourg's Constitution: Constitutionalizing access to abortion

In March 2026, Luxembourg’s Chamber of Deputies approved the first constitutional vote on a proposal to enshrine the freedom to access abortion in the Constitution. Presented as a measure aimed at strengthening existing protections and safeguarding reproductive autonomy, the initiative forms part of a broader European debate on the constitutional status of abortion rights following recent international developments. This article examines the political and legal context surrounding Constitutional Revision Proposal No. 8379, the debates it has generated within Luxembourg’s institutions and political parties, and the potential legal implications of recognizing access to abortion as a constitutional freedom.

The History of Abortion Access in Luxembourg’s Legal Framework

Until the law of 1978, Luxembourg maintained a nearly complete prohibition of abortion. This instrument introduced, for the first time, circumstances in which abortion was not subject to criminal punishment. In 2012, a new law amended several provisions of the Criminal Code and simplified access to abortion by reducing the discretionary evaluative role of physicians. In 2014, abortion was finally removed from the scope of criminal law. Although greater emphasis was placed on the decisional autonomy of the person concerned, certain procedural requirements have nevertheless been retained.

Following the 2022 decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in Dobbs v. Women’s Health Organization, which held that the Constitution does not confer a right to abortion and thereby allowed individual states to ban or heavily restrict the procedure, Luxembourg’s Parliament adopted a resolution affirming its intention to pursue a pro‑choice policy. The resolution also emphasized that the 2014 decriminalization proved insufficient to guarantee long‑term, effective, equal, and safe access to abortion. Finally, in 2025, a new reform was adopted, one of its objectives being the abolition of the mandatory three‑day reflection period between the legal consultation and the abortion procedure.

The Political and Legal Context of Revision Proposal No. 8379

In 2024, in reaction to the overturning of Roe v. Wade in the United States, France became a pioneer by enshrining the freedom to access abortion in its Constitution. In the same vein, in Luxembourg, Constitutional Revision Proposal No. 8379 was introduced in May 2024 by Marc Baum (The left “déi lénk”) with the aim of supplementing Article 15 of the Constitution, which regulates public freedoms, by enshrining the freedom to access abortion. 

This proposal forms part of a broader effort to strengthen women’s right to be in control of their bodies and to fight against stigmatization and the social marginalization linked to abortion, particularly in light of recent developments in the United States and in certain European countries. In Poland, for instance, following the 2021 judgment of the Constitutional Tribunal, the provision allowing abortion in cases of severe fetal malformation or incurable disease threatening the life of the unborn child was declared unconstitutional. This judgment has since been condemned by the European Court of Human Rights.

The constitutional amendment procedure

According to Article 131 of the Constitution of Luxembourg, any constitutional amendment must be adopted by the Chamber of Deputies in two successive votes which must be separated by an interval of at least three months. To be adopted, the revision must obtain a two‑thirds majority in the Chamber. In addition, there exists the possibility for the text adopted during the first constitutional vote to be submitted to a referendum, replacing the Chamber’s second vote. This shall occur if, within two months of the first constitutional vote, a request is made either by more than one quarter of the Members of the Chamber or by twenty‑five thousand voters registered on the electoral rolls for legislative elections. 

The proposal to revise Article 15 of the Luxembourg Constitution was adopted (first constitutional vote) on 3 March 2026 with the required majority (48 votes out of 56), thereby allowing it to proceed to the second constitutional vote, which may take place no earlier than the 3 June 2026. As described below, a motion calling for a referendum failed to secure enough votes.

Political deliberations

The core of contention around the proposal did not revolve around whether abortion should be permitted, but rather on whether the freedom to access abortion ought to be enshrined in the Constitution. In fact, access to abortion is already regulated by the law of 1978. Therefore, the debate focused on two issues: first, whether the issue ought to be taken to constitutional level, and second, whether it should be enshrined as a “right” or as a “freedom.” This disparity brought up the question of whether the provision should be inserted into the section on fundamental rights (Chapter II, section 2) or into the section on public freedoms (Chapter II, section 3) of the Constitution. 

According to the Council of State, which serves as an advisory body issuing opinions on legislative proposals, inserting the freedom to access abortion into the Constitution will have no impact on the existing legal system. The constitutionalization of this freedom merely aims to provide more protection. It further noted that although intangible fundamental rights are protected by Articles 12 to 14 of the Constitution, the public freedoms outlined in Articles 15 to 36 may be restricted, provided that those restrictions adhere to Article 37’s requirements. As regards the question of whether the term “right” or “freedom” should be used, the Council of State referred to the opinion of the French Council of State, which considers that, in this context, both terms have the same scope, so that it makes little difference which one is chosen.

According to the Œuvre pour la protection de la naissance, a civil society organization which issued the only negative opinion on the proposal, the proposed revision is exceptionally serious. It represents a purely strategic political manoeuvre, was not anticipated in the coalition agreement, constitutes a derogation from the right to life—which, in its view, does not exclude the unborn child—and fails to strike an adequate balance between the right to life and the woman’s right to self-determination. 

On 3 March 2026, political parties were given the opportunity to voice their opinions on the proposed revision before the first constitutional vote. The governing coalition (the Christian Social People’s Party (CSV) and the Democratic Party (DP)) contended that the constitutional revision aims to consolidate and secure the existing legal framework. Within Luxembourg’s legal system, ordinary legislation remains reversible, insofar as its adoption or amendment requires only a simple majority. By contrast, the constitutional entrenchment of a freedom introduces a higher degree of structural stability, thereby preventing potential policy fluctuation from one legislative term to the next. Furthermore, by framing the provision in terms of a freedom rather than a right, the coalition noted that access to abortion would no longer be conceived as a prerogative granted by the State. While the Constitution represents the foundational normative structure of society and should therefore not be amended lightly, it is nonetheless intended to protect fundamental values. Since abortion and, more broadly, self‑determination are regarded matters of fundamental importance, the coalition argued that it legitimately warrants constitutional recognition. It further emphasized that the debate concerns the appropriate constitutional weight to be given to this freedom, and underscored that the proposed revision would in no way alter the current procedural framework.

The Alternative Democratic Reform Party (ADR), which was the only political party to oppose the revision, contended that the Constitution, as a foundational normative instrument, should not become a platform for cultural or ideological confrontation. The party further questioned the utility of the proposed revision, as it would not alter the existing legal framework and would not prevent future legislative modifications. In the ADR’s assessment, the revision merely represents a political symbol. It argued that, if a matter of such nature is to be decided, it should be submitted to a referendum so that the electorate may directly express its will, particularly since the proposed revision did not feature in any party’s manifesto for the current legislative term. Consequently, the ADR tabled a motion calling for a referendum. However, the motion was not adopted, as it failed to secure enough votes (6 to 45).

Legal consequences

According to the proposal, if passed during its second constitutional vote, the new provision would be placed in the third section of Chapter II of the Constitution. As a result, the freedom would have to be interpreted in conjunction with Article 37 of the Constitution, a horizontal clause applicable to all constitutional freedoms of the chapter. Under this provision, any limitation must respect the essential content of the freedom, be proportionate to the aim pursued, and be necessary in a democratic society.

In other words, if access to abortion is recognized as a constitutional freedom, the legislature may still regulate it, but only in strict compliance with Article 37 of the Constitution. As a result, each future legislative amendment on the matter would be scrutinized more closely for both proportionality and the preservation of the essential core of the constitutional freedom.

While enshrining a new freedom in the Constitution gives it considerably greater weight than if it remained a mere ordinary piece of legislation, particularly since constitutional revisions require a far more demanding procedure, the exercise of that freedom nonetheless continues to be regulated by ordinary law. This framework may still be amended and could even become more restrictive, provided that any limitations introduced comply with constitutional requirements.

Thus, although constitutional recognition offers a safeguard for the future, it does not alter the current legal framework governing access to abortion, as the existing procedure remains unchanged. It may therefore be more appropriate to focus efforts on practical measures and consider how this framework itself could be improved. 

About the Author

Francisco Matos Folgado is a PhD researcher in constitutional law at the University of Luxembourg. 

Suggested Citation

Francisco Matos Folgado, ‘A new freedom in Luxembourg's Constitution: Constitutionalizing access to abortion’, ConstitutionNet, International IDEA, 10 March 2026, https://constitutionnet.org/news/voices/new-freedom-luxembourgs-constitution-constitutionalizing-access-abortion 

Further Reading

• Updates on constitutional developments in Luxembourg.
• International IDEA, Primer on Constitutional Amendment Procedures.

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