Approaching the Constitutional Process in Post-Assad Syria

Syria has entered a delicate transitional phase marked by constitutional uncertainty and governance instability. A caretaker government has initiated a constitution-making process, but urgent issues like territorial unity, fragile security and economic conditions, political pluralism, and heavy sanctions must be addressed. Further, despite the inclusive and moderate rhetoric since coming into power, the Islamist background of the current leadership fuels apprehension about future governance and commitment to genuine inclusivity. These interconnected issues must be meaningfully addressed to achieve national reconciliation, economic stability, and an inclusive, democratic constitutional process – writes Dima Moussa

[Editor's Note: The Constitutional Declaration setting a five-year transitional period for Syria was signed 13 March 2025 and is available here]

Background

On 8 December 2024, Syrians and the entire world woke up to the news that Bashar al-Assad had fled the country, accompanied by the historic announcement by a Syrian news anchor: ‘Syria is without Bashar al-Assad.’

The moment was certainly historic—one that most Syrians never thought they would live to see. It was not just a moment that Syria became ‘without Bashar al-Assad’, but that it was also without the al-Assad dynasty after over 54 years of family rule: more than 24 years under Bashar ruling preceded by his father Hafez for 30 years.

The beginning of the end was in March 2011, when the popular uprising that began as peaceful demonstrations and later turned into a multi-sided armed conflict with heavy international involvement. During this time, numerous atrocities took place, the majority of which were committed by the Assad regime, which detained, tortured, and killed activists and demonstrators, forcibly disappeared hundreds of thousands, displaced millions, and shelled to destruction vast areas of the country. This was accompanied by increasingly deepening fissures in Syrian society along ethnic, religious, and sectarian lines, contributing to growing distrust and grievances among Syrians, and dominance of sub-national identities and affiliations.

Meanwhile, nearly all state institutions became increasingly linked to the regime and its close circle, and corruption turned from a phenomenon to the main cornerstone of the economy— particularly amid harsh sanctions imposed by the West, and especially US sanctions, the harshest of which was (and remains) the so-called “Caesar Act” (which took effect in June 2020, after being passed with the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020).

Thus, the country was devastated in all senses of the word, with more than 90 per cent of the population under the poverty line. Furthermore, while most of the country is now under the control of Damascus, northeast Syria remains under the control of predominantly Kurdish civil and military forces, who refuse to turn over control to Damascus, though recently there have been positive mutual statements from both sides, signalling the potential for reaching an agreement on some of the outstanding issues. Some other areas remain tense, for varying reasons, including the three southern provinces (Daraa, Suwayda, and Quneitra) and the coastal areas.

From 2011 until 8 December 2024, efforts to resolve the Syrian crisis were mainly of a political nature, with various initiatives and UN resolutions calling for dialogue between the regime and the political opposition—while military operations continued in the background. However, the regime would not sit at the negotiations table, and obstructed all efforts, even by its closest allies, to take steps toward a political solution.

Ultimately, the regime’s end came as a result of a military operation that started on 27 November, when several armed opposition groups led by Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), a Jihadi Islamist organization, marched from Idlib to Damascus in a bloodless military operation. They faced negligible resistance from the regime’s army, whose senior commanders and officers had left their posts and given the troops no orders. Since the majority of the troops were forcibly conscripted, they put down their arms without a fight.

Current Context

Today, nearly three months since Assad’s flight, there is a caretaker government in Damascus. Ahmad al-Sharaa, previously known as “Abu Muhammad Al-Joulani” when he was the head of Idlib-based HTS and commander of the military operation that led to Assad’s flight, was declared president of the transitional phase: effectively the president of Syria. He has since taken several actions, the most significant of which was suspending Syria’s 2012 Constitution, which had been tailored for the Assad regime to rule the country as it did. As a result, since 30 January there has been a constitutional vacuum in Syria, causing growing concern.

Other problematic steps include the closure of most state institutions (with only a few or certain sections of some resuming work), preventing citizens from obtaining many services; instability of the currency accompanied by a lack of resources to pay salaries to government employees, many of whom have been dismissed while awaiting review to determine who will be reinstated; crimes of a sectarian and revenge nature, albeit limited compared to what was expected after decades of the former regime’s practices that led to deep divisions among Syrians; and absence of clarity about the applicable legal framework and which laws are still in force, despite taking positive steps like suspension of the ill-famed exceptional laws used to detain activists and prisoners of conscience.

Thus far the rhetoric has been increasingly moderate and reassuring, indicating that every step towards transition will be inclusive of all Syrians.

There have been apprehensions that the new authority would rule as it did in Idlib. However, thus far the rhetoric has been increasingly moderate and reassuring, indicating that every step towards transition will be inclusive of all Syrians, men and women, and inclusive of ethnic, religious, sectarian, or any other affiliation. Yet this has not yet been entirely translated into tangible or practical steps. Additionally, the caretaker government is composed entirely of the same ministers and officials who were in HTS’s Islamist “Salvation Government” in Idlib, all of whom are men. Some see this as a sign of things to come, while others find it logical for al-Sharaa to rely on trusted individuals in the beginning to maintain control and prevent complete collapse of the fragile state. A self-imposed deadline of 1 March was set for the caretaker government, with expectations that a new, more inclusive, diverse, and experienced government would be appointed. However, at the time of writing, no changes have been made.

What is Expected Regarding the Constitutional Process?

Since 2011, all initiatives aimed toward reaching a political settlement, including UNSC Resolution 2254, referred to a constitutional process, with Resolution 2254 specifically mentioning the drafting of a new constitution. This is mainly because the 2012 Constitution was tailored for the Assad regime and a major tool for oppressing Syrians. Furthermore, the accumulated grievances and fissures in Syrian society require a legal basis to reassure the various segments of Syrian society that there would be no repetition of past and ongoing injustices.

The end of October 2019 witnessed the launch of the Syrian Constitutional Committee, now obsolete given that it was structured around the two-sided format of regime and opposition. However, and despite not reaching agreement on any constitutional articles, the Syrian opposition and various civil society organizations did conduct broad consultations on constitutional issues, and developed significant materials on constitutional principles as well as related legislation—mainly on elections and political parties laws—due to their close connection with the constitution-drafting process and a potential referendum to adopt the constitution.

The new administration indicated since day one that there would be a National Dialogue Conference, one outcome of which will be a committee to draft a constitution. Meanwhile, there would be a constitutional declaration to govern the state’s affairs in the interim.

A Preparatory Committee was formed for the National Dialogue Conference on 11 February, composed of five men and two women. One of the members is a Christian, which people took as a positive sign of inclusion, though there were concerns that the other six members all came from a similar Arab Sunni Muslim background. The Committee conducted consultations in the various provinces in February 2025. Statements from the Committee’s president have mentioned ensuring the broadest representation of Syrians, with a focus on qualifications, without noting such requirements might undermine the promised broad representativeness. Additionally, the Committee’s spokesperson stated that the recommendations of the Conference will be submitted to the presidency, but will be non-binding, which has not been received well by Syrians.

The Conference was held on 25 February, a mere two weeks after the Preparatory Committee was formed, with the participation of hundreds of Syrians from all over the country, though the final list of the participants was not officially released. The participants were divided into groups to discuss six subjects: transitional justice, constitution building, institutional reform, individual freedoms, role of civil society, and economic principles. Participants described the discussions as rich and occasionally heated. This can be perceived positively, as it indicates there were diverse opinions, but it also meant that consensus could not be reached on many issues.

The only outcome of the Conference, thus far, is a final statement [...] lacking specific details about the discussions, and there is still a lack of clarity about how the outcomes will be handled by the current administration . . . 

Key concerns about the Conference include the fact that participants were invited in their personal capacities rather than as representatives of the various political, civil and social entities, which undermines the legitimacy of the outcomes. Further, invitations were sent about 24 hours before the Conference started, preventing those who were abroad or in more remote parts of the country from attending. The only outcome of the Conference, thus far, is a final statement, which many believed was too general and lacking specific details about the discussions, and there is still a lack of clarity about how the outcomes will be handled by the current administration. There are also concerns that this will be a one-time event, insufficient for meaningful dialogue among Syrians about major issues, and where other important issues were not addressed. However, item 18 of the final statement mentioned the need to create a culture of dialogue, with mechanisms for ‘continuing discussions.’

The presidency issued a decree on 2 March to form a committee composed of seven legal experts, including two women, to draft ‘the constitutional declaration regulating the transitional phase in the Syrian Arab Republic.’

With the margin for political activity still permitting expansive public discussions, the following remain on the list of issues that must be resolved as directly relevant to the future constitution of Syria:

— The unity of Syria’s territory remains incomplete, as the northeast is still under the control of a different de facto authority. Further, parts of the south (the Suwayda and Daraa provinces) are not fully under the control of Damascus. Starting a constitutional process—especially local consultations—without these areas means excluding a significant portion of Syria’s population, though some of the concerns that the authorities in these areas have might be addressed through the constitution-making process. Inclusion of articles that address these concerns in the constitutional declaration can also have a positive effect in this regard.

— The current leadership has an Islamist jihadist background, and some remain apprehensive and unsure of how it will rule in the long run, since most top positions are held by those who were in the “Salvation Government” in HTS-held Idlib province. To many Syrians the current government has not yet demonstrated enough openness to others or attempts to engage more diverse Syrian expertise (political and technical) in state administration, which raise concerns that there will be attempts to impose Islamist rule through a constitution aligned with their background.

— Despite talk about inclusivity, many are not convinced as no concrete steps have been taken. Outreach has been made to religious, sectarian, and other social leaders, but there has been clear exclusion of political forces and parties.

— Relatedly, there is still no clarity on how much political organization will be allowed, especially since one of the root causes of the crisis in Syria has been the absence of political pluralism.

— Key contentious constitutional issues have not been resolved and will have to be addressed, such as sources of legislation, extent of decentralization, relationship between state and religion, and the economic model. These were contentious within the political opposition as well, and may prove the most difficult to resolve given Syrians’ divergent positions.

— Ninety per cent of Syrians remain under the poverty line, while Western sanctions, especially US sanctions, continue to be the main obstacle to improving the economy, and more importantly, to starting the reconstruction process—both of which are crucial for the return of millions of Internally Displaced Peoples (IDPs) and refugees, particularly from neighbouring countries. Although the EU suspended some of its sanctions on 24 February, they are limited in scope, and it is not clear yet how effective they will be in light of continued US sanctions, especially the “Caesar Act”.

— The security situation remains somewhat fragile and incursions by Israel into Syrian territory continue in violation of the 1974 Disengagement Agreement, in addition to shelling Syrian territory, without any serious response by the international community or apparently the ability to prevent them.

Concluding Remarks

Given the above, and while a new constitution is a major step and a necessity in Syria, the current authority should consider the following to lay firm and stable foundations to build a new Syria and avoid falling back into a cycle of violence.

First, a constitutional declaration that provides a clear legal basis for governing the transitional phase should be quickly accomplished, until such time as a permanent constitution is adopted.

First, a constitutional declaration that provides a clear legal basis for governing the transitional phase should be quickly accomplished, until such time as a permanent constitution is adopted. The constitutional declaration would provide an opportunity to send positive and comforting messages to Syrians through articles that address fears and apprehensions that Syrians still have, and translate officials’ statements into constitutional articles, including those about inclusivity and non-discrimination or special treatment on any basis. This must be complemented with translating those statements into practice through state institutions and procedures.

Second, the new leadership should prioritize improving security, living conditions, and the economy through policies and practices that assume Western sanctions will not be fully lifted any time soon, particularly US sanctions.

Third, a precondition to starting the constitution-drafting process is restoring Syria’s unity. Significant progress toward reintegrating all regions is necessary to avoid exclusion of any part of the population, and the formal process should not start until such unity is irreversibly underway. However, since the main blockage to restoring unity are concerns that actors in the areas outside the control of Damascus have, and are related to constitutional issues, a reasonable solution would be to include clear signals in the constitutional declaration that would rectify some of these concerns.

Fourth, the constitutional process should not be rushed. Instead, consultations and preparations for it must start now, with a focus on resolving as many contentious issues and accumulated grievances as possible, to allow for greater consensus-building by the time a committee is formed to put together a draft of the constitution. This could also have a positive effect on the previous point.

Finally, it is essential that all consultations—on the constitution and for any other activity relating to governance—be truly inclusive. Representatives of different Syrian groups must be involved, ensuring significant inclusion of women and youth, and most importantly inclusion of political forces and parties.

In summary, stability and sustainable peace and security in Syria require a credible transitional process, which must be through broad-based inclusion of all Syrians. The current administration has a historic opportunity to lay the foundations for the Syria that Syrians aspired to when they took to the streets in 2011. Nevertheless, the importance of what occurred on 8 December should not be underestimated, as it eliminated the main obstacle to moving forward with change in Syria, and gave Syrians much-needed hope for a better future.

Dima Moussa is a Syrian politician and legal expert, and is a US licensed lawyer. She was a member of the Syrian political opposition from 2011 until the fall of the Assad regime on December 8, and was a member of the Syrian Constitutional Committee, which was formed based on UNSC Resolution 2254. She is also a founding member of the Syrian Women’s Political Movement, a feminist political body. She has recently relocated to Damascus, after more than 13 years of being unable to enter Syria due to her political activity within the opposition.

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Suggested citation: Dima Moussa, ‘Approaching the Constitutional Process in Post-Assad Syria’, ConstitutionNet, International IDEA, 8 March 2025, https://constitutionnet.org/news/voices/approaching-constitutional-process-post-assad-syria

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