International IDEA
Constitution Building Publications

8 November 2024 marks the fourth anniversary of Myanmar’s 2020 Elections which have been defamed by the military’s fabricated narrative of electoral fraud to justify the attempted coup on 1 February 2021. The “State Administration Council” perpetuates this narrative of electoral fraud and claims to be preparing fresh elections by making changes to election and political party laws, implementing a new electoral system, and conducting a flawed census to create a new voter list.

Myanmar’s pro-democracy forces not only continue to resist military rule but are also engaged in redefining a constitutional framework for a future democratic and federal Myanmar.

In this context, it is opportune to reflect on Myanmar’s 2020 general election results, the strengths and weaknesses of its election system and questions of electoral design, and the role of Myanmar’s interim parliament which can assist in countering the military’s narrative and highlight the implications of its election plans.

In line with the roadmap outlined in Myanmar’s Federal Democracy Charter (FDC), the National Unity Consultative Council (NUCC) is mandated to take the lead in drafting a transitional constitution. In order to assist the NUCC in this process, the National Unity Government (NUG) presented a preparation document for a Transitional Federal Union Constitution to the NUCC in September 2023. This preparation document was included in the NUG’s report to the People’s Assembly in April 2024 and made public. The preparation document is based on the principles outlined in the FDC and the “Constitution of the Federal Republic of the Union of Burma (Second Draft)” drafted by the by Federal Constitution Drafting and Coordinating Committee (FCDCC) in 2008, revised in 2016. According to the FDC, the transitional constitution is meant to guide the work of the transitional national unity government until a permanent federal constitution can be agreed.

Read the draft proposal of the Transitional Federal Union Constitution (in Burmese pages 46 to 127 and in English pages 130 to 204) here. 

On 5–6 December 2022, International IDEA gathered 30 leading experts on democracy, anti-corruption and human rights at the inaugural Democracy in Asia and the Pacific Outlook Forum. Representing 23 institutions and organizations from 12 countries, attendees discussed key trends in democracy in the Asia and the Pacific region over the course of seven topical sessions.

The sessions were previously defined by a round of consultations and interviews with several experts on democracy and human rights. The sessions—on human rights; regional cooperation; climate change; China; disinformation; electoral authoritarianism and militarization; and political finance—attempted to take stock of the current state of democracy in the region and forecast the determining factors in the year to come.

Myanmar’s military junta has sought to justify the 1 February 2021 coup d’état with dubious allegations of electoral fraud surrounding the 8 November 2020 general elections. The State Administration Council perpetuates this narrative of electoral fraud and claims to be preparing fresh elections, including by making changes to election and political party laws, implementing a new electoral system, and updating the voter list.

At the same time, pro-democracy forces are not only supporting civil disobedience and opposition to military rule, but also seeking to reconfigure the constitutional framework for a future democratic and federal Myanmar. In this context, it is advisable to factor in questions of electoral design from an early stage, which can also assist in countering the military’s problematic narrative.

Against the background of Myanmar’s recent electoral history and ongoing political crisis, this Policy Paper outlines key areas to consider with regard to elections in the context of federal constitutional design: the overall electoral legal framework, electoral system choice, electoral management, voter registration, including a clear framework for suffrage rights, and electoral dispute resolution.

Myanmar’s military junta has sought to justify the 1 February 2021 coup d’état with dubious allegations of electoral fraud surrounding the 8 November 2020 general elections. The State Administration Council perpetuates this narrative of electoral fraud and claims to be preparing fresh elections, including by making changes to election and political party laws, implementing a new electoral system, and updating the voter list.

At the same time, pro-democracy forces are not only supporting civil disobedience and opposition to military rule, but also seeking to reconfigure the constitutional framework for a future democratic and federal Myanmar. In this context, it is advisable to factor in questions of electoral design from an early stage, which can also assist in countering the military’s problematic narrative.

Against the background of Myanmar’s recent electoral history and ongoing political crisis, this Policy Paper outlines key areas to consider with regard to elections in the context of federal constitutional design: the overall electoral legal framework, electoral system choice, electoral management, voter registration, including a clear framework for suffrage rights, and electoral dispute resolution.

Myanmar’s military junta has sought to justify the 1 February 2021 coup d’état with dubious allegations of electoral fraud surrounding the 8 November 2020 general elections. The State Administration Council perpetuates this narrative of electoral fraud and claims to be preparing fresh elections, including by making changes to election and political party laws, implementing a new electoral system, and updating the voter list.

At the same time, pro-democracy forces are not only supporting civil disobedience and opposition to military rule, but also seeking to reconfigure the constitutional framework for a future democratic and federal Myanmar. In this context, it is advisable to factor in questions of electoral design from an early stage, which can also assist in countering the military’s problematic narrative.

Against the background of Myanmar’s recent electoral history and ongoing political crisis, this Policy Paper outlines key areas to consider with regard to elections in the context of federal constitutional design: the overall electoral legal framework, electoral system choice, electoral management, voter registration, including a clear framework for suffrage rights, and electoral dispute resolution.

Myanmar is rich in natural resources and a global biodiversity hotspot. Myanmar is also one of the countries worst affected by climate change and one of the least equipped to improve its resilience without external support. How to manage natural resources has always been at the heart of Myanmar’s history and learning how to manage economic development sustainably became a central question of Myanmar’s democratic transition.

Since the February coup, the people of Myanmar have been mobilizing against the military through protest and an armed resistance led by ‘People’s Defence Forces’ and ethnic resistance organizations. These groups of actors and their associated federal-level interim governance institutions are developing a political framework to negotiate both an interim constitution and a permanent constitution for the future Federal Democratic Union of Myanmar.

This Policy Paper provides an overview of Myanmar’s environment- and climate-related governance challenges. It also identifies key considerations on how a future constitutional framework could guarantee environmental protection, protect biodiversity, promote access to justice and address climate change, informed by international good practices and comparative case studies.

Let’s talk about constitutions! is designed to present difficult constitutional concepts to non-specialist and young audiences in an entertaining and informative way. It has been developed to promote young people’s understanding of constitutional issues and thereby empower and inspire youth to play a full and meaningful part in their own constitution-building process.

With dynamic images, relatable characters and simple language, Let’s talk about constitutions! illustrates key concepts to answer the questions: what is a constitution and why is it important?

The cartoon is an educational tool that can be enjoyed by youth and adults alike, whether integrated into youth centre curricula or non-governmental organizations civic education campaigns. The booklet is designed primarily for Myanmar and the characters and scripts are tailored to this context. The information shared in the cartoon, however, is relevant for people interested in learning and teaching about constitutions all around the world.

Countries often amend their constitutions or enact new ones following major political events, such as the founding of newly independent states, the fall of an authoritarian regime or the end of violent conflict.

Significant constitutional reform at a crucial moment is often a high-stakes process because a constitution regulates access to public power and resources among different groups.

While disagreements over divisive topics are likely and even inherent to constitution-making, they may also result in a serious deadlock when stakeholders are unable to reach agreement. A prolonged deadlock can delay or even derail the whole reform process. In this context, it may be advisable to create incentives that can help parties to the negotiations overcome divergence and resolve deadlocks should they occur. This Constitution Brief focuses on strategies and mechanisms for breaking a deadlock in constitutional negotiations conducted in an environment of competitive democratic politics.

Modern constitutions typically contain a variety of provisions on language.

They may designate one or more official languages, each with a different kind of legal status. Constitutions may also create language rights, usually held by minority-language speakers, granting groups and individuals the right to communicate with, and receive services from, the government in their native tongue. In systems of multi-level governance, constitutions may vest the authority to designate official language(s) for each order of government.

This Primer addresses the role of language in constitutional design, and the key considerations, implications and potential challenges that arise in multilingual states. It discusses the range of claims around language as a constitutional issue, and the potential consequences of successfully addressing these claims—or failing to do so.

Public participation has become a core element of modern constitution-building.

Robust participation is credited with a range of benefits—from improving individual behaviours and attitudes to democracy to shaping elite bargaining dynamics, improving constitutional content, and strengthening outcomes for democracy and peace. Yet it is not well understood whether and how public participation can achieve these ends. Much of what we think we know about participatory constitution-building remains theoretical. No two processes are alike, and there is no agreed definition of what constitutes a ‘participatory process’.

Yet national decision-makers must contend with the key question: What does a robust participation process look like for a particular country, at a particular time, in a particular context? What considerations and principles can be derived from comparative experience to guide decisions?

This Policy Paper unpacks the forms and functions of public participation across different stages of the constitution-building process and considers the ways in which public engagement can influence the dynamics of the process, including political negotiations.

Since the coup conducted by the Myanmar military on 1 February 2021, the military regime has attempted to portray itself as the country’s legitimate government by arguing that it is adhering to the 2008 Constitution. Although constitutional authority is only one dimension of the current struggle to restore democratic governance in Myanmar, it is important to demonstrate why the military’s seizure of power was unconstitutional, and therefore why the military regime and its actions and decisions have no constitutional authority.

This Brief was developed to enable a better understanding of the unconstitutionality of the military coup in Myanmar. It helps deconstruct the military regime’s claim that it is adhering to the 2008 Constitution.

On 1 February 2021, the Myanmar military staged a coup and unconstitutionally declared a one-year state of emergency transferring all state powers to the Commander-in-Chief. Against the backdrop of Myanmar’s political crisis and a steady transformation commonly known as the ‘Spring Revolution’, the broadest front of resistance, known as the National Unity Consultative Council (NUCC), endorsed and published a new Federal Democracy Charter in April. The Charter’s promulgation marked a new phase in popular resistance to military rule and efforts to rebuild society.

This Constitution Brief looks at the revised Federal Democracy Charter’s substantive provisions to identify the key ones and to raise questions, where relevant, about how certain issues have been approached. This Brief is structured around three main sections: Section 1 provides an overview of the process through which the Charter was developed and revised; Section 2 explores the political purpose and legal nature of the Charter; and Section 3 focuses on the content of the Charter. Furthermore, the Brief highlights legal and political considerations to support interim institutions’ constitution-building efforts.

The Brief is intended for key stakeholders interested and/or participating in Myanmar’s return to democracy and to enable a better understanding of the Charter.

A NEW CONSTITUTION FOR MYANMAR: Towards Consensus on an Inclusive Federal Democracy provides a study of the constitutional history and trajectory of Myanmar, together with an analysis of the positions of certain key stakeholders in Myanmar with regard to constitutional issues. Areas of constitutional convergence (where the key democratic stakeholders are broadly agreed) and divergence (where they differ) are identified, as are those areas of constitution-building on which the key stakeholders are relatively silent, and that require further attention. This publication thereby provides democratically legitimate political actors in Myanmar, as well as the international community in support of Myanmar’s federal democracy, with a finer understanding of the available range of viable and acceptable constitutional choices.

In the current interim period in Myanmar, with an illegitimate military regime in power and efforts by the interim governance institutions under way to build and enable a transition to a genuine democracy, the formation of an interim EMB—like a government and a legislature—is urgent and necessary as a key institution to support and prepare for the restoration of democracy. There are no standard models for establishing EMBs in transition periods and during conflict. However, it is important that key interim government stakeholders in Myanmar agree on a road map for future constitutional and electoral reform informed by the lessons learned from the 2015 and 2020 general elections.

To contribute to this process, this paper seeks to outline key considerations for Myanmar’s interim governance institutions—the CRPH, the NUG and the NUCC—and the international community regarding the establishment of a legitimate interim EMB, and its agenda during the current interim phase and the future transition period in Myanmar.

Constitution-making is often integral to achieving a new political settlement after conflict and in fragile settings. However, the process fails with relative frequency, in that actors cannot agree on a new text or the finalized text is not approved or ratified. While failure may be temporary—the process may resume after a period of time—it can also be costly. Key reforms may depend on the adoption of a new or revised constitution, and in its absence negotiations may stall and conflict recur.

This Paper starts a conversation about the potential grounds for, and strategies to prevent or build on, failure. It was developed following the Ninth Edinburgh Dialogue on Post-Conflict Constitution-Building held in September 2022.

The end-game of violent conflict is perhaps the most difficult phase of transformation in a hugely difficult process.

In that phase, parties need two overall aids. They need to be able to avail themselves of the most effective and appropriate dialogue process to facilitate their negotiations; and they then need to successfully negotiate a sustainable settlement by putting in place effective and appropriate democratic structures and political institutions.

This Handbook provides practical advice on how to broker peace in countries emerging from deep-rooted conflict and outlines options negotiators can draw upon when trying to build or rebuild democracy. It includes a thorough overview of democratic levers, including power-sharing formulas, questions of federalism and autonomy, options for minority rights, constitutional safeguards and many others.

The Handbook also analyses actual negotiated settlements in countries including Bosnia and Herzegovina, Fiji, Northern Ireland, Guatemala, Sri Lanka, Papua New Guinea and South Africa. Written by international experts and experienced negotiators, the Handbook is designed as a quick reference tool containing numerous case studies, fact sheets and practical examples.

This Guide presents International IDEA’s State of Democracy (SoD) Assessment Framework.

Developed for public use around the world, the SoD Framework has been applied in some 20 countries since its first launch in 2000.

The Framework is different from other methodologies because its comprehensive assessments are led and owned by local actors, and move away from the practice of ranking democratic performance and making external judgements. It combines a commitment to the principles of democracy with dialogue, and looks beyond the formal existence of democratic institutions and focuses, more importantly, on their performance.

The Guide also links assessment to reform and in doing so, highlights achievements and challenges as well as lessons learnt from previous assessment teams’ experiences.

Others seeking to apply the Framework in their countries stand to benefit greatly from the experiences, lessons and insights shared from the SoD Network—a community of practice that has applied the SoD assessment Framework in their countries and regions. The Guide also offers guidance on sources and standards of good practice.

The Overview is also available in print.

Direct democracy describes those rules, institutions and processes that enable the public to vote directly on a proposed constitutional amendment, law, treaty or policy decision. The most important forms of direct democracy covered in this Primer are referendums and initiatives.

International IDEA’s Constitution-Building Primers are designed to assist in-country constitution-building or constitutional-reform processes by helping citizens, political parties, civil society organizations, public officials and members of constituent assemblies make wise constitutional choices.

They also provide guidance for staff of intergovernmental organizations and other external actors working to provide well informed, context-relevant support to local decision-makers.

Each Primer is written as an introduction for non-specialist readers, and as a convenient aide-memoire for those with prior knowledge of, or experience with, constitution-building. Arranged thematically around the practical choices faced by constitution-builders, the Primers aim to explain complex constitutional issues in a quick and easy way.

This revised and reformatted edition was published in October 2017.

This Constitution Brief provides basic information about the nature and functions of constitutions and is intended for use by constitution-makers and other democratic actors and stakeholders in Myanmar.

The choice of electoral system is one of the most important institutional decisions for any democracy.

In almost all cases the choice of a particular electoral system has a profound effect on the future political life of the country concerned, and electoral systems, once chosen, often remain fairly constant as political interests solidify around and respond to the incentives presented by them. The choices made may have consequences that were unforeseen, as well as predicted effects.

Electoral systems can also have a significant impact on the wider political and institutional framework. Their design and effects are heavily contingent upon other structures within and outside the constitution. Successful electoral system design comes from looking at the framework of political institutions as a whole: changing one part of this framework is likely to cause adjustments in the way other institutions within it work.

This Handbook provides a comprehensive overview of the electoral systems in use in more than 200 countries and includes 18 case studies as well as a map showing where the various electoral systems are used. It discusses the advantages and disadvantages of different electoral systems, and the factors to consider when modifying or designing an electoral system.

The Overview is also available in print.

International IDEA’s Constitution-Building Primers are designed to assist in-country constitution-building or constitutional-reform processes by helping citizens, political parties, civil society organizations, public officials and members of constituent assemblies make wise constitutional choices.

They also provide guidance for staff of intergovernmental organizations and other external actors working to provide well-informed, context- relevant support to local decision makers. Each Primer is written as an introduction for non-specialist readers, and as a convenient aide-memoire for those with prior knowledge of, or experience with, constitution-building.

Arranged thematically around the practical choices faced by constitution-builders, the Primers aim to explain complex constitutional issues in a quick and easy way.

A constitutional amendment alters the content of a constitutional text in a formal way. Constitutions need to be amended over time to adjust provisions that are inadequate, to respond to new needs, including supplementing rights. Otherwise, the text of a constitution cannot reflect social realities and political needs over time. Yet the constitution also needs to be protected from short-sighted or partisan amendments.

International IDEA’s Constitution-Building Primers are designed to assist in-country constitution-building or constitutional-reform processes by helping citizens, political parties, civil society organizations, public officials and members of constituent assemblies make wise constitutional choices. They also provide guidance for staff of intergovernmental organizations and other external actors working to provide well informed, context-relevant support to local decision-makers.

Each Primer is written as an introduction for non-specialist readers, and as a convenient aide-memoire for those with prior knowledge of, or experience with, constitution-building. Arranged thematically around the practical choices faced by constitution-builders, the Primers aim to explain complex constitutional issues in a quick and easy way.

The content of a constitution provides a blueprint for the operation of a state, guarantees rights and outlines mechanisms for their enforcement, as well as shapes the future of a nation.

Constitutions that emerge after conflict are often a result of negotiated settlements and competition between many forces including identity-based groups, former parties to conflict, political and military actors and international actors.

This Handbook provides an essential foundation for understanding constitutions and constitution building. Full of world examples of groundbreaking agreements and innovative provisions adopted during processes of constitutional change, the Guide offers a wide range of examples of how constitutions develop and how their development can establish and entrench democratic values. 

Beyond comparative examples, the Handbook contains in-depth analysis of key components of constitutions and the forces of change that shape them. It analyses the adoption of the substantive elements of a new constitution by looking at forces for the aggregation or dissemination of governmental power, and forces for greater legalization or politicization of governmental power, and examining how these forces influence the content of the constitution. 

This handbook is designed as a box which includes seven separate chapters. Separate chapters are also available in print.  

Local democracy is the self-government of cities, towns, villages and districts by democratic means—typically, but not exclusively, through elected mayors, councils and other local officials.

International IDEA’s Constitution-Building Primers are designed to assist in-country constitution-building or constitutional-reform processes by helping citizens, political parties, civil society organizations, public officials and members of constituent assemblies make wise constitutional choices. They also provide guidance for staff of intergovernmental organizations and other external actors working to provide well informed, context-relevant support to local decision-makers.

Each Primer is written as an introduction for non-specialist readers, and as a convenient aide-memoire for those with prior knowledge of, or experience with, constitution-building. Arranged thematically around the practical choices faced by constitution-builders, the Primers aim to explain complex constitutional issues in a quick and easy way.

This revised and reformatted edition was published in October 2017.

Resource wealth brings a unique set of challenges often known as the ‘resource curse’—challenges which political parties with informed and comprehensive policy positions are well positioned to help address.

Political parties have an important role to play in ensuring that natural resources are managed transparently, accountably and in the long-term best interests of their countries.

According to research by the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International IDEA) and the Natural Resource Governance Institute (NRGI), where there is free and equal access to political power, there are stronger laws, institutions and practices in place to help realize the full value of resource extraction and to manage the resulting revenues.

The purpose of this Guide is to examine the role that parties have and can play in resource governance, and to assist political parties looking to develop strong policy positions across a wide range of political and technical topics. The Guide builds on the lessons from a 2015–16 project in Ghana on the development of resource policy positions for political parties, and is informed by six country case studies as well as a broad body of good practice in party engagement and resource governance.

The Guide is the product of a collaboration between International IDEA and NRGI. Both organizations are committed to supporting political parties to develop and follow through on evidence-based resource policy positions.

The vast majority of contemporary constitutions describe the basic principles of the state, the structures and processes of government and the fundamental rights of citizens in a higher law that cannot be unilaterally changed by an ordinary legislative act. This higher law is usually referred to as a constitution.

International IDEA’s Constitution-Building Primers are designed to assist in-country constitution-building or constitutional-reform processes by helping citizens, political parties, civil society organizations, public officials and members of constituent assemblies make wise constitutional choices. They also provide guidance for staff of intergovernmental organizations and other external actors working to provide well informed, context-relevant support to local decision-makers.

Each Primer is written as an introduction for non-specialist readers, and as a convenient aide-memoire for those with prior knowledge of, or experience with, constitution-building. Arranged thematically around the practical choices faced by constitution-builders, the Primers aim to explain complex constitutional issues in a quick and easy way.

This revised and reformatted edition was published in October 2017.

International law is an increasingly relevant consideration in constitution-building.

It is therefore helpful for a constitution to prescribe the effect of international law in domestic law. If all or some international law has automatic effect, it is helpful for the constitution to describe its position in the hierarchy of domestic law.

This Constitution Brief was written initially for use in Myanmar, and it explains the nature of international law and explores how it relates to constitution-making. It then addresses four questions about international law that are raised when a constitution is being drafted or substantially changed:

• Should a constitution mention the relationship between international law and domestic law in the domestic legal system? If so, what are the options?
• Should a constitution specify how the state enters into binding commitments under international law?
• What are the implications, if any, of international law for the substance of a constitution?
• What are the implications, if any, of international law for the process of constitution-making?

Socio-economic rights provide protection for the dignity, freedom and well-being of individuals by guaranteeing state-supported entitlements to education, public health care, housing, a living wage, decent working conditions and other social goods.

International IDEA’s Constitution-Building Primers are designed to assist in-country constitution-building or constitutional-reform processes by helping citizens, political parties, civil society organizations, public officials and members of constituent assemblies make wise constitutional choices. They also provide guidance for staff of intergovernmental organizations and other external actors working to provide well informed, context-relevant support to local decision-makers.

Each Primer is written as an introduction for non-specialist readers, and as a convenient aide-memoire for those with prior knowledge of, or experience with, constitution-building. Arranged thematically around the practical choices faced by constitution-builders, the Primers aim to explain complex constitutional issues in a quick and easy way.

This revised and reformatted edition was published in October 2017.

This Primer discusses independent regulatory and oversight institutions. These are public bodies, politically neutral and independent from the three main branches of government, whose purpose is to ensure the integrity—and improve the quality and resilience—of democratic governance.

International IDEA’s Constitution-Building Primers are designed to assist in-country constitution-building or constitutional-reform processes by helping citizens, political parties, civil society organizations, public officials and members of constituent assemblies make informed constitutional choices. They also provide guidance for staff of intergovernmental organizations and other external actors working to provide well informed, context-relevant support to local decision-makers.

Each Primer is written as an introduction for non-specialist readers, and as a convenient aide-memoire for those with prior knowledge of, or experience with, constitution-building. Arranged thematically around the practical choices faced by constitution-builders, the Primers aim to explain complex constitutional issues in a quick and easy way.

Electoral system design plays a crucial role in political settlement processes.

However, it is a world with which political actors in transitions—and even to some extent the constitutional community itself—often have limited familiarity.

This Discussion Paper is based on a presentation by the author at the fourth Edinburgh Dialogue on post-conflict constitution-building, held in Edinburgh, United Kingdom, on 4–5 December 2017.

It argues that, while the timing, stages and sequencing of a constitutional transition might be thought to be relevant to electoral system choice, there does not currently appear to be any strong link between them.

A limitation clause enables constitutional rights to be partially limited, to a specified extent and for certain limited and democratically justifiable purposes, while prohibiting restrictions that are harmful to democracy by reason on their purpose, nature or extent.

International IDEA’s Constitution-Building Primers are designed to assist in-country constitution-building or constitutional-reform processes by helping citizens, political parties, civil society organizations, public officials and members of constituent assemblies make wise constitutional choices. They also provide guidance for staff of intergovernmental organizations and other external actors working to provide well informed, context-relevant support to local decision-makers.

Each Primer is written as an introduction for non-specialist readers, and as a convenient aide-memoire for those with prior knowledge of, or experience with, constitution-building. Arranged thematically around the practical choices faced by constitution-builders, the Primers aim to explain complex constitutional issues in a quick and easy way.

The content of a constitution provides a blueprint for the operation of a state, guarantees rights and outlines mechanisms for their enforcement, as well as shapes the future of a nation. Constitutions that emerge after conflict are often a result of negotiated settlements and competition between many forces including identity-based groups, former parties to conflict, political and military actors and international actors. This Handbook provides an essential foundation for understanding constitutions and constitution building. Full of world examples of groundbreaking agreements and innovative provisions adopted during processes of constitutional change, the Guide offers a wide range of examples of how constitutions develop and how their development can establish and entrench democratic values. Beyond comparative examples, the Handbook contains in-depth analysis of key components of constitutions and the forces of change that shape them. It analyses the adoption of the substantive elements of a new constitution by looking at forces for the aggregation or dissemination of governmental power, and forces for greater legalization or politicization of governmental power, and examining how these forces influence the content of the constitution. This handbook is designed as a box which includes seven separate chapters. Separate chapters are also available in print.

This issue of Constitutional INSIGHTS examines the choice between making a new constitution and amending an existing constitution to achieve substantial constitutional change.

This choice arises in the early stages of constitution building. It is likely to affect the constitution-building process and it may have significance for the perceived legitimacy of the changes. The choice between a new or amended constitution may, in context, also affect the success of the constitution-building exercise.

The Melbourne Forum on Constitution-Building in Asia and the Pacific is a platform co-organized by the Constitution Transformation Network and International IDEA. It brings together scholars and practitioners of constitution building from across the region, to share their perspectives on critical issues, as a contribution to global understanding of the field.

This series of publications captures insights from the Melbourne Forum in an accessible and practice-oriented format.

Direct public participation is a feature of almost every exercise in constitution-building in the 21st century.

This issue of Constitutional INSIGHTS examines three different forms of direct public participation in constitution-building—consultation, deliberation and decision-making—and identifies ways to promote inclusive and meaningful direct public participation.

Federalism is a constitutional mechanism for dividing responsibilities between different levels of government in a country. It grants constituent units (i.e. substate territorial entities that may be called states, regions, provinces, Länder or cantons) a certain degree of autonomy (or self-rule) in regulating some policy areas.

Another key component of federalism is shared rule: constituent units are represented and participate in decision making at the federal or central level. In most federations, this takes place through a bicameral legislature (i.e. a legislature composed of two legislative chambers) at the federal level, in which the first chamber represents the people of the country and the second chamber represents the constituent units in some way. While almost all federations have bicameral federal legislatures, there is significant variation in the composition and mandate of the second chamber, and consequently in its role in the overall federal system.

When negotiating the design of a future federal system, stakeholders in a given country will need to consider various constitutional design alternatives and agree on the structure and responsibilities of the upper house insofar as it is meant to achieve shared rule. This Report highlights key considerations and provides an overview of these alternatives based on comparative analysis.

Territorial divisions come in many forms. They occur in both federal and unitary states, and may involve divisions based on religion, language, history and identity, as well as natural resources.

They can involve one region within a country or several. Because of the close association of territory and sovereignty, territorial divisions raise very high stakes issues, going to the heart of the definition the political community, national identity and statehood. They are often emotive and can seem intractable.

This Constitution Brief covers the spatial arrangement of public power through constitutional design. By changing the way in which public resources and power are allocated, and autonomy and identity are recognized, constitutional arrangements related to managing territorial divisions can be critical in transforming societal division and conflict to unity and peace.

This Constitution Brief introduces the concept of self-determination and its evolution over time, and provides a survey of different approaches to self-determination from comparative constitutional practice.

The MyConstitution project works towards a home-grown and well-informed constitutional culture as an integral part of democratic transition and sustainable peace in Myanmar.

Based on demand by Myanmar stakeholders, expert advisory services are provided to those involved in constitution-building efforts. This Constitution Brief is produced as part of this effort.

Federalism is a constitutional mechanism for dividing power between different levels of government, such that federated units can enjoy substantial, constitutionally guaranteed autonomy over certain policy areas while sharing power in accordance with agreed rules over other policy areas. Thus, federalism combines partial self-government with partial shared government.

International IDEA’s Constitution-Building Primers are designed to assist in-country constitution-building or constitutional-reform processes by helping citizens, political parties, civil society organizations, public officials and members of constituent assemblies make wise constitutional choices. They also provide guidance for staff of intergovernmental organizations and other external actors working to provide well informed, context-relevant support to local decision-makers.

Each Primer is written as an introduction for non-specialist readers, and as a convenient aide-memoire for those with prior knowledge of, or experience with, constitution-building. Arranged thematically around the practical choices faced by constitution-builders, the Primers aim to explain complex constitutional issues in a quick and easy way.

This revised and reformatted edition was published in October 2017.

From Spain to Tanzania to Ukraine, the idea of secession is a critical issue for constitutional design, and has been since the first modern constitution was adopted in the United States in 1789.

Secession involves a subunit of a state breaking off, usually to form a new state, but sometimes to join an existing neighbour. In many countries, demands for secession from one or more regions are a major issue in constitutional design, and can trigger further demands for constitutional drafting.

Once a constitution is in place, secessionist demands can put great pressure on the constitutional bargain thereafter. If constitutions are devices to keep countries together, they can also provide for orderly processes of separation.

This Constitution Brief provides an overview of trends and approaches in the treatment of secession in the world’s constitutions. The major design choices of allowing, prohibiting, or staying silent on the issue of secession are each discussed.

A federation consists of at least two levels of government, each of which has a degree of autonomy that is protected by a constitution.

Countries with a federal system of government share powers between these levels in different ways, which affects their decision-making processes. The primary focus of this Constitution Brief is the division of legislative power, which typically raises the most difficult questions.

How does a newly democratized nation constructively address the past to move from a divided history to a shared future?

How do people rebuild coexistence after violence?

This Handbook presents a range of tools that can be, and have been, employed in the design and implementation of reconciliation processes. Most of them draw on the experience of people grappling with the problems of past violence and injustice.

There is no ‘right answer’ to the challenge of reconciliation, and so the Handbook prescribes no single approach. Instead, it presents the options and methods, with their strengths and weaknesses evaluated, so that practitioners and policymakers can adopt or adapt them, as best suits each specific context.

Federalism or devolution involves the organization of public power so that government, on at least two levels, is responsive and accountable to the people that it serves.

More than 25 countries around the world operate as a federation of some kind. Many more devolve power in other ways, either across the country or in particular regions with special autonomy.

This issue of Constitutional INSIGHTS explains why any change from a centralized to a federal or devolved system is a significant one. It also outlines some of the challenges that arise in the context of such change, and suggests options that might be available to meet them.

The Melbourne Forum on Constitution-Building in Asia and the Pacific is a platform co-organized by the Constitution Transformation Network and International IDEA. It brings together scholars and practitioners of constitution building from across the region, to share their perspectives on critical issues, as a contribution to global understanding of the field.

This series of publications captures insights from the Melbourne Forum in an accessible and practice-oriented format

This issue of Constitutional INSIGHTS deals with the questions presented by constitutional or legal arrangements that treat one region of a state differently from others.

Differential treatment of this kind is sometimes described as ‘asymmetry’. Asymmetry is a feature of constitutional arrangements in all parts of the world. Examples of asymmetry on which this issue of Constitutional INSIGHTS draws include Jammu and Kashmir in India; Aceh in Indonesia; the Bangsamoro region in the Philippines; the Autonomous Region of Bougainville in Papua New Guinea; Sabah and Sarawak in Malaysia; and the Oecusse in Timor-Leste.

The Melbourne Forum on Constitution-Building in Asia and the Pacific is a platform co-organized by the Constitution Transformation Network and International IDEA. It brings together scholars and practitioners of constitution building from across the region, to share their perspectives on critical issues, as a contribution to global understanding of the field.

This series of publications captures insights from the Melbourne Forum in an accessible and practice-oriented format.

This Constitution Brief provides a basic guide to constitutional courts and the issues that they raise in constitution-building processes, and is intended for use by constitution-makers and other democratic actors and stakeholders in Myanmar.

While there are general principles that apply to the judiciary in all federations, there are different ways of structuring a federal judiciary and allocating authority, or competence, to it.

Each approach raises different issues for consideration and decision. The choices made can be informed by comparative experience but will depend on the context and preferences of each federation.

The brief begins by outlining the typical characteristics and key features of a federal system of government, before examining how the judicial branch of government might be organized. It identifies two sets of related questions that are relevant to consider when designing a federal judiciary: the structure of the courts and whether (and if so, how) the authority allocated to them should be divided along federal lines.

This Primer covers the rules governing the tenure, immunity, discipline and removal of judges in constitutional democracies. In particular, it discusses various attempts to balance the need for judicial independence and neutrality to be balanced against judicial responsiveness and accountability.

International IDEA’s Constitution-Building Primers are designed to assist in-country constitution-building or constitutional-reform processes by helping citizens, political parties, civil society organizations, public officials and members of constituent assemblies make wise constitutional choices. They also provide guidance for staff of intergovernmental organizations and other external actors working to provide well informed, context-relevant support to local decision-makers.

Each Primer is written as an introduction for non-specialist readers, and as a convenient aide-memoire for those with prior knowledge of, or experience with, constitution-building. Arranged thematically around the practical choices faced by constitution-builders, the Primers aim to explain complex constitutional issues in a quick and easy way.

This revised and reformatted edition was published in October 2017.

This Primer covers the systems used for appointing judges in constitutional democracies. Various commonly used systems of appointment are discussed, including career judiciaries, appointment by an independent commission and appointment by the representative or cooperative interaction of legislative and executive branches.

International IDEA’s Constitution-Building Primers are designed to assist in-country constitution-building or constitutional-reform processes by helping citizens, political parties, civil society organizations, public officials and members of constituent assemblies make wise constitutional choices. They also provide guidance for staff of intergovernmental organizations and other external actors working to provide well informed, context-relevant support to local decision-makers.

Each Primer is written as an introduction for non-specialist readers, and as a convenient aide-memoire for those with prior knowledge of, or experience with, constitution-building. Arranged thematically around the practical choices faced by constitution-builders, the Primers aim to explain complex constitutional issues in a quick and easy way.

This revised and reformatted edition was published in October 2017.

This Primer discusses constitutional rules for the selection and removal of parliamentary governments. Governments in parliamentary democracies are not elected directly by the people; rather, they are selected indirectly by or through parliament, are responsible to parliament and may be removed from office by a parliamentary vote of no confidence.

International IDEA’s Constitution-Building Primers are designed to assist in-country constitution-building or constitutional-reform processes by helping citizens, political parties, civil society organizations, public officials and members of constituent assemblies make wise constitutional choices. They also provide guidance for staff of intergovernmental organizations and other external actors working to provide well informed, context-relevant support to local decision-makers.

Each Primer is written as an introduction for non-specialist readers, and as a convenient aide-memoire for those with prior knowledge of, or experience with, constitution-building. Arranged thematically around the practical choices faced by constitution-builders, the Primers aim to explain complex constitutional issues in a quick and easy way.

A bicameral parliament or legislature is one in which two assemblies share legislative power. Legislatures with two chambers can represent sub-national governments, act as a body of expert scrutiny and review, provide a further democratic check on the power of the lower house, and provide representation for various socio-economic interests or ethno-cultural minorities.

International IDEA’s Constitution-Building Primers are designed to assist in-country constitution-building or constitutional-reform processes by helping citizens, political parties, civil society organizations, public officials and members of constituent assemblies make wise constitutional choices.

They also provide guidance for staff of intergovernmental organizations and other external actors working to provide well informed, context-relevant support to local decision-makers.

Each Primer is written as an introduction for non-specialist readers, and as a convenient aide-memoire for those with prior knowledge of, or experience with, constitution-building. Arranged thematically around the practical choices faced by constitution-builders, the Primers aim to explain complex constitutional issues in a quick and easy way.

This revised and reformatted edition was published in October 2017.

This Constitution Brief discusses the appointment of ministers in different systems of government.

It focuses on the question of whether ministers should have seats in the legislature. It is tailored to the specific needs of the Myanmar context.

The Constitution Brief explores: (a) the appointment of ministers at the union level and (b) the appointment of chief ministers and ministers at the region and state levels.

A non-executive president is a symbolic leader of a state who performs a representative and civic role but does not exercise executive or policymaking power. A non-executive president may, nevertheless, possess and exercise some discretionary powers of extraordinary political intervention as a constitutional arbiter or guarantor.

International IDEA’s Constitution-Building Primers are designed to assist in-country constitution-building or constitutional-reform processes by helping citizens, political parties, civil society organizations, public officials and members of constituent assemblies make wise constitutional choices. They also provide guidance for staff of intergovernmental organizations and other external actors working to provide well informed, context-relevant support to local decision-makers.

Each Primer is written as an introduction for non-specialist readers, and as a convenient aide-memoire for those with prior knowledge of, or experience with, constitution-building. Arranged thematically around the practical choices faced by constitution-builders, the Primers aim to explain complex constitutional issues in a quick and easy way.

This revised and reformatted edition was published in October 2017.

The Juba Peace Agreement (JPA), signed on 3 October 2020 by the Government of Sudan and the Sudan Revolutionary Front coalition of armed movement factions and political groups, partially succeeded in halting hostilities between the two sides. The agreement was signed as part of the democratic and peace building arrangements put in place for the transitional period. It opened the door to confidence building and conditions conducive to political consensus and dialogue. These conditions were recognized as necessary before a sustainable peace could be achieved in Sudan following the fall in 2019 of the dictatorship of the National Congress Party under ousted President Omar al-Bashir. 

The JPA emphasized many democratic principles, including equality, non-discrimination, a civil and democratic federal state, affirmative action in conflict-affected areas, and transitional justice. 

This Technical Paper concludes that in the framework of measures to return to the path of democratic transition and ensure the success of the JPA, it is necessary to make (the process of building sustainable peace) and (the process of transitioning to democracy) complementary so that they are successful, and not separate, undertakings.

Substate constitutions are broadly understood as written legal instruments that limit and structure political power at the substate level, with legal supremacy regarding other substate laws.

Their primary goals are to define the specific governance system of the substate entity, and often to codify citizen rights within its territory. They may also serve to delineate the political community and identity at the substate level. Substate entities, in turn, can be defined as territorially delineated constitutive parts of a country or state.

This Policy Paper examines substate constitutions in fragile and conflict-affected settings—in both federal and unitary (or hybrid) states—adopted after the end of the Cold War starting in 1991. It aims to fill a significant gap in the policy and academic literatures regarding the process and design of substate constitutions in fragile and conflict-affected settings, and their role in the broader political-settlement and peacebuilding process.

In situations of violent conflict, negotiated agreements—including ceasefire or peace agreements and documents detailing constitutional arrangements—attempt to reach a new political settlement between the warring protagonists, which is ideally supported by the broader society.

Such political settlements aim to move the country or region from conflict to a situation characterized by constitutional commitments to good governance and the rule of law.

The sequencing—and the success or failure—of these negotiated agreements depends on a number of factors, including the diverse processes through which a political settlement is reached; when (and how) peace agreements and constitutions reach a political settlement; when (and why) constitution-making separates from the political settlement process; and the consequences of such a separation.

This Policy Paper aims to address the gap in the constitution-making and peacebuilding literatures regarding descriptive and normative accounts of the relationship between peace agreements and constitutional arrangements in political settlement processes. It explores the sequencing of peace deals and constitutional arrangements in order to better understand when (and why) sequencing does not follow the logical model, and the implications for any coherent and workable constitutional framework.

Constitution-building processes are increasingly seen as critical elements within both peacebuilding and state-building processes.

A constitution-building process in a conflict-affected setting is often necessary to renegotiate access to public power and resources. The resulting constitution will ideally make the state more inclusive and, therefore, responsive to a higher number of social, political and/or economic groups, thereby contributing to sustaining peace and preventing the resumption of conflict. 

Who makes the constitution? How are they selected? These are crucial questions in the constitution-building process, which serve to determine the overall legitimacy of the process, and the content and success of the new political framework itself. 

This Policy Paper examines the types of constitution-making bodies (CMBs) present in 37 constitution-building processes that took place from 1991 to 2018 in the aftermath of conflict, and ways in which they were selected. Additionally, the paper focuses on the frequency of specific types of CMB in conflict-affected settings, and on whether the broader constitution-building process and its specific design has an impact on the type of CMB chosen.

This Policy Paper aims to fill a significant gap in the policy and academic literature on the process and design of interim constitutions in conflict-affected settings.

It argues that, unlike both peace agreements and interim arrangements, the strength of interim constitutions lies in their legal enforceability. It examines the diversity of post-1990 interim constitutions in terms of their structure and their role in broader peacebuilding processes.

One of its main conclusions is that, despite key differences that also relate to the relationship between the country context and the choice of procedure and design, interim constitutions potentially offer time or the opportunity to facilitate consensus over time. They also have the potential to contribute to a culture of participatory constitutionalism, and address sequencing issues around elections and the strengthening of key institutions responsible for implementing constitutional frameworks.

The increased prevalence of political transitions following internal conflict has seen heightened attention given to both transitional justice and constitution-building as fields of study and intervention.

However, little attention has been paid to understanding how the interaction between the two fields can better serve their respective and mutual objectives. This Policy Paper promotes better understanding of synergies between transitional justice and constitution-building and encourages decision-makers and experts in the field to consider options for maximizing the comparative advantages of transitional justice and constitution-building respectively, to pursue the overall goal of sustainable peace and development.

The paper illustrates the potential power of combining transitional justice and constitution-building, but also details the challenges inherent in conflating the two processes. Without proposing specific models or answers, the paper highlights the importance of seeing transitional justice and constitution-building processes as complementary rather than competitive, and expands understanding not only of what one process can do to improve itself, but of the ways in which breaking down silos and looking at nuanced interactions between transitional justice and constitution-building processes can help to address the major challenges that transitions present

Security sector reform, democratization and constitutional reform are intrinsically linked. The constitution-building process can therefore provide a critical forum for negotiations over changes in the relationship between civilian and security sector institutions.

This Policy Paper aims to support advisors and decision-makers in navigating these complex transitions. The Paper focuses on the relationship between security sector reform (SSR) and constitutional reform processes. While SSR and constitution-building are typically seen as separate issues, in practice they are deeply interconnected, and the success of a transition to constitutional democracy depends on the successful handling of security sector issues. Constitutional reform and SSR processes intersect in democratic transitions from military rule, civil war and authoritarian regimes.

The inclusion and participation of combatants in constitution-building processes raises a number of distinctive issues.

Constitutional INSIGHTS No. 5 examines the rationales for including combatants in constitution-building, the challenges this presents and some of the mechanisms that might be used to support their participation in constitution-building processes.

ငြိမ်းချမ်းရေးသဘောတူညီမှု၏ တစ်စိတ်တစ်ပိုင်းအဖြစ် အစိုးရအပြောင်းအလဲဆိုင်ရာ လုပ်ငန်းစဉ်များကို စီမံခန့်ခွဲရာတွင် အသွင်ကူးပြောင်းရေးဆိုင်ရာအစီအမံများကို ‘ပေါင်းကူးတံတား’ အဖြစ်အသုံးချကာ ပဋိပက္ခအပြီး လူမှုအဖွဲ့အစည်းအဖြစ်သို့ ကူးပြောင်းရန်အတွက် ဆောင်ရွက်လေ့ရှိသည်။ ကြားကာလ စီမံအုပ်ချုပ်မှုဆိုင်ရာ အစီအမံများကို အောက်တွင်ဖော်ပြထားသည့်အတိုင်းအသုံးချပါက ထိုသို့အသွင်ကူးပြောင်းခြင်းဖြစ်သည်။

The background to this brief is the context of the military coup in Myanmar in February 2021, and the declaration of a state of emergency by the military, which has effectively set aside the 2008 Constitution and the elections held under it. The coup has been rejected by the international community as illegitimate and has generated a strong civil disobedience and protest movement, and those elected in November 2020 have formed interim institutions aiming to move towards a democratic order. The military have also recently re-termed their post-coup regime as a ‘provisional government’.

This brief sets out some comparative principles and practices of interim governance arrangements, which are a device often used to move on from crisis. The brief does not purport to offer direct advice as to the way forward in Myanmar, as that will be for all the relevant stakeholders in the country to agree. Rather, it seeks to support deliberation, and some questions for this purpose are provided at the end of the brief.

Constitution-building processes in post-conflict settings are exceedingly difficult undertakings.

Actors that have previously engaged in violent confrontation become responsible for the (re)framing and (re)building of the post-conflict state. Interim constitutions represent a form of ‘political settlement’ that seeks to dis-incentivise armed conflict as a means of pursuing political goals.

This report documents a workshop held on 4–5 December 2014 at Old College, Edinburgh, and hosted by International IDEA and the Edinburgh Centre for Constitutional Law in association with the Global Justice Academy, University of Edinburgh.

The workshop was the first step in an initiative that aimed to fill a gap in the policy and academic literature on the process and design of interim constitutions in conflict-affected settings. The experiences and knowledge shared in the workshop informed the development of a subsequent International IDEA Policy Paper, Interim Constitutions: Peacekeeping and Democracy-Building Tools. 

Identity and ethnicity have long been central to Myanmar’s extended political crisis and are key factors in the quest to build an inclusive federal democratic system. 

To better understand how identity and ethnicity affect social and political preferences, systematic data is needed that can explain people’s perceptions of political systems and institutions, policy preferences and political attitudes as well as how they see themselves in relation to those with whom they share the same socio-political spaces. 

This information is vital for present-day Myanmar as it stands at a crossroads, striving towards an inclusive, sustainable peace and a federal democratic union.

This easy-to-read version of the policy brief explores inclusion strategies for persons with disabilities (PWD) in post-coup Myanmar in the light of the ongoing transitional constitutional and democratic reform process. It highlights the challenges faced by PWD before and since the 2021 coup, including those of Myanmar’s interim government institutions in supporting PWD. It analyses how inclusive Myanmar’s interim government institutions are for PWD, and what the Federal Democracy Charter (FDC) states about including PWD in consideration of the international legal framework for PWD.

According to a 2019 survey, 12.8 per cent of Myanmar’s 54.38 million population (an estimated 5.9 million people) live with disabilities. In a survey conducted for the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International IDEA) in 2022 for Myanmar, PWD were identified as the most marginalized segment of the population. Since the coup, PWD are among the most adversely affected since the 2021 coup, experiencing a loss of rights and education, compromised health, and diminished livelihoods.

This Policy Brief explores inclusion strategies for persons with disabilities (PWD) in post-coup Myanmar in the light of the ongoing transitional constitutional and democratic reform process. It highlights the challenges faced by PWD before and since the 2021 coup, including those of Myanmar’s interim government institutions in supporting PWD. It analyses how inclusive Myanmar’s interim government institutions are for PWD, and what the Federal Democracy Charter (FDC) states about including PWD in consideration of the international legal framework for PWD.

This technical paper explores and analyses diversity management in Sudan’s democratic transition arrangement (2019–2021). It primarily utilizes the concept of ‘diversity management’ for legislative practice. To administer geographical, multicultural, multi-ethnic and multilingual population diversity, Sudan has passed, in accordance with international principles, many laws to manage diversity in a way that reflects strategic national planning.

The paper analyses existing Sudanese legislation in light of its role in administering coexistence, protecting minorities’ rights and observing human rights as enshrined in national transitional documents and laws. It reflects on some indicators that reveal that Sudan has many gaps in managing diversity peacefully. There is no definite and well-defined set of measures that constitute diversity management.

The paper concludes that the first step towards diversity management might be to analyse national laws regarding the present state and effects of diversity. Consequently, to address the identified gaps, the author concludes that Sudan must develop a law reform strategy in the interest of diversity management and equality based on international standards.

This Report provides a study of the ethnic composition of Myanmar’s subnational units together with an analysis of the historical evolution of the administrative units that existed under the 2008 Constitution.

Relying on the 2019 GAD Township reports, the study addresses the limitation of Myanmar’s ethnic data while discussing its use for understanding Myanmar’s complex ethnic make-up. It describes the ethnic distribution of each subnational unit and emphasizes the complex ethnic make-up of Myanmar society—highlighting Myanmar’s ethnic diversity down to the township level. In parallel, the Report analyses the evolution of Myanmar’s administrative boundaries and highlights the possibility of imagining Myanmar’s federal units beyond the status quo.

This Report provides democratically legitimate political actors in Myanmar, as well as the international community that supports Myanmar’s federal democracy, with a finer understanding of how Myanmar’s diversity is distributed within each subnational unit.

This brief explores how constitutional advocates for women’s equality in Myanmar can advance women’s representation and meaningful participation in public decision-making and institutions. It looks at how different countries have aimed to do this through their constitutions, and what lessons can be learned for your own advocacy strategies.

It is part of a four-part series, which also includes Brief No. 1. A Guide to Being an Effective Advocate for Gender Equality, and Brief No. 3 Preventing Gender-Based Violence in Myanmar and Brief No. 4. Inclusion and Gender Equality in Post-Coup Myanmar.

This brief explores how gender-based violence in Myanmar, particularly violence against women and girls, is addressed in the absence of a clear constitutional provision and legal protection.

It is part of a four-part series, which also includes Brief No. 1. A Guide to Being an Effective Advocate for Gender Equality, and Brief No. 2. Substantive Equality and Women’s Representation in Public Institutions and Brief No. 4. Inclusion and Gender Equality in Post-Coup Myanmar.

This brief explores inclusion strategies for constitutional and democratic reform in the post-coup context of Myanmar. It highlights the challenges to gender equality and inclusion in Myanmar, including the role and demands of the pro-democracy actors in Myanmar’s post-coup political landscape. It analyses how inclusive Myanmar’s legitimate interim government institutions are and what the revised Federal Democracy Charter states about gender and inclusion.

It is one of a four-part series that also includes Brief No. 1. A Guide to Being an Effective Advocate for Gender Equality, Brief No. 2. Substantive Equality and Women’s Representation in Public Institutions, and Brief No. 3. Preventing Gender-Based Violence in Myanmar, which were written before the 1 February 2021 coup in Myanmar.

Gender equality is a cornerstone of a democratic and just society, and International IDEA is committed to supporting democratic processes that empower women.

The constitution-building process provides an extraordinary opportunity for women and gender-equality advocates to participate in the framing of democratic institutions.

The Constitution Assessment for Women’s Equality helps users analyse a constitution or draft constitution from the perspective of the substantive equality of women. Using a series of questions, short explanations and example provisions from constitutions around the world, the Assessment guides you through an examination of the most critical constitutional issues that affect women’s rights and gender equality.

This Assessment is designed for gender-equality advocates as well as those who are engaging in the topic of women’s constitutional rights for the first time, whether as members of a constituent assembly, constitutional drafters, civil society members or concerned individuals. Since gender equality affects the quality of democracy and society as a whole, the Assessment is a resource for both men and women.

Africa has made significant progress in enhancing inclusive political participation and representation, mostly for women, youth and people living with disabilities. This report unpacks the trends and challenges of inclusive participation in Africa.

The domestication (though at varying levels) of global and regional normative frameworks such as the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women, the African Youth Charter, and the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance has enhanced traction towards inclusive political participation across the continent. However, traction towards progressive legislative frameworks to enhance political participation and representation of refugees remains weak. The thrust for a multigenerational and multidimensional focus in addressing barriers to inclusive political participation and representation should be strengthened.

The participants of the third annual Women Constitution-Makers’ Dialogue explored comparative constitutional design approaches to legal pluralism and reconciling tensions between customary/religious systems and guarantees of gender equality and non-discrimination. In addition to technical issues, the discussion also addressed successes and challenges associated with implementation of constitutional guarantees of gender equality and explored innovative approaches to harmonization, transformation and empowerment.

Every major political process, whether peace negotiations, elections, parliamentary terms, constitutional reform or other forms of decision-making, can contribute to challenging gender inequality in public life. This brief explores how to be an effective constitutional advocate for gender equality and women’s rights in Myanmar.

It is part of a four-part series, which also includes Brief No. 2. Substantive Equality and Women’s Representation in Public Institutions, Brief No. 3. Preventing Gender-Based Violence in Myanmar and Brief No. 4. Inclusion and Gender Equality in Post-Coup Myanmar.

The Indigenous Peoples’ Rights in Constitutions Assessment Tool helps users to analyse a constitution from the perspective of indigenous peoples’ rights. Using a series of questions, short explanations and example provisions from constitutions around the world, the Assessment Tool guides its users through the text of a constitution and allows for systematic analysis of the language and provisions of a constitutional text to assess how robustly indigenous peoples’ rights are reflected in it.

A constitution articulates a vision that reflects a state’s values and history, as well as its aspirational objectives for the future. As the supreme law of a state, the constitution defines its structure and institutions, distributes political power, and recognizes and protects fundamental rights, critically determining the relationship between citizens and governments.

Embedding in a constitution recognition of and rights-based protections for specific groups, such as indigenous peoples, can give these groups and their rights enhanced protection. This can be furthered by providing for specialized institutions and processes to deepen the realization of those rights in practice.

In ethnically diverse countries emerging from conflict, it is becoming increasingly common to see federalism as a means of conflict transformation.

However, wherever constituent unit boundaries are drawn to give a particular group a majority, this creates a situation where minorities within those constituent units fear marginalization, deprivation of equal opportunity or even oppression.

This Constitution Brief surveys comparative constitutional practice for different mechanisms and approaches relating to the minorities within minorities challenge. In other words, this brief refers to the protection of minorities within constituent units/states/regions and doesn’t cover the protection of minorities in general.

What roles can women from marginalized communities play in conflict, peacemaking and democratization?

Which factors lie behind their involvement in armed conflict? What are the consequences of women’s inclusion and exclusion from peace-building activities? These are some of the questions explored in Women in Conflict and Peace.

Drawing on case studies from Afghanistan, Myanmar, the Philippines and Rwanda, this publication analyses the impact of women on intrastate conflict and peacebuilding, concluding with recommendations that international and local actors can implement to enhance the participation of marginalized women in future peace- and democracy-building initiatives.

Following an unconstitutional military coup in Myanmar in 2021, the illegal and illegitimate military junta of Myanmar, its State Administrative Council (SAC), and the illegitimate “Union Election Commission” it has established, are planning a sham exercise they call an “election”. International IDEA’s Head of Myanmar Programme, Dr. Marcus Brand, discusses why the military’s plan is illegitimate and how the international community should respond.

Dr. Marcus Brand was a speaker at Burmese media outlet Frontier Myanmar's closed-door panel discussion "Scrutinising the military's plans for a poll', held in March 2023.