Bahrain’s October 24 and 31, 2002 Legislative Elections
On October 24 and 31, 2002, Bahrain held its first legislative elections in 29 years for a
40-seat lower house of Parliament. The National Democratic Institute for International
Affairs (NDI) sent a small study mission to witness the parliamentary election period, and
in cooperation and consultation with its local partners, found that the election was
generally well administered, with no evidence of fraud in favor of any particular
candidate or faction. With 243,449 voters registered, over 50 percent of the population
participated in the first round of the elections, with just over 40 percent casting ballots in the second round. No women were elected to Parliament, but in contrast to the May 2002
municipal elections, two women reached the second round of voting.
Despite this outwardly positive picture, many issues cloud the background. In 2001,
when the King Hamad bin Isa al Khalifa submitted the National Charter (a wide-ranging
set of reforms) for approval by referendum, he assured Bahraini society that successive
reform would be subject to public consultation, and many assumed that the way forward
would be based on the framework of the 1973 constitution, which afforded an elected
parliament considerable authority.2 Political activists, therefore, were disappointed when
the King released a new constitution in February 2002, called for municipal and
parliamentary elections two years ahead of what had previously been scheduled, and
declared Bahrain a kingdom without having consulted any of the main political societies.3
There was also disappointment that under the new constitution, there will be an appointed
chamber with powers and numbers equal to the elected chamber, with the president of the
appointed chamber presiding over joint sessions.
After the King’s February 2002 announcement, there was speculation that some societies
would boycott the municipal elections, but all took a decision to participate in a gesture
of good faith that constitutional issues might be addressed in advance of the
parliamentary elections. Lack of action on constitutional issues in the period between
elections, coupled with what many societies have termed arbitrary decrees on issues
ranging from housing allocations to trade union laws to electoral laws, led some to argue
that the King was not serious about a consultative process.
Citing a lack of movement on the constitution and the constraints posed by the electoral
law, the main Shia Islamist society and the main liberal intellectual society, along with
two of their partners, decided to boycott the legislative elections.4 The government made attempts at reconciliation, meeting with the political societies and subsequently
announcing that some portions of the law (e.g., that political societies could not name or
support candidates and that there could be no public rallies) would not be enforced.
These attempts, however, were unsuccessful. Having lost the support of the influential
Al Wefaq, yet determined to go forward with the elections, the government launched a
visible, active voter mobilization campaign in the weeks leading up to the elections.
With many of the main political actors on Bahrain’s political stage choosing not to stand
as candidates, the election was perceived by many more as a referendum on the King’s
political reform agenda than a vote for particular candidates.
Thus, with the opposition calling into question the legitimacy of the entire reform
process, and approximately half the population staying home on election day, many
obstacles must still be overcome if Bahrain hopes to have a government that is truly
representative of all sectors of society. The King has clearly been the driving force
behind the reform process to date, and he maintains the initiative, with a potentially
quiescent lower house and 40 members to appoint to the Parliament’s upper chamber.
Many Bahrain analysts postulate, however, that reforms instituted from the top can just as
easily be retracted, leaving Bahrain with diminishing prospects for democracy.
It remains to be seen what influence and impact Bahrain’s new elected bodies – the lower
house of Parliament and the municipal councils -- will be permitted to have on Bahrain’s
continued reform agenda; whom the King appoints to the upper house of Parliament will
also be a strong indication of the direction in which the King wants to go. Government
supporters argue convincingly that the King has instituted this deliberate process of
reform in order to achieve eventual reconciliation between the Sunni minority and Shia
majority and cannot move more quickly due to historical and cultural factors. Critics
contend that the King’s steps to date have been primarily for the benefit of the
international community and that his moves may have the effect of solidifying the power
of the al Khalifas and the Sunni minority.
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