Toward a Unicameral Federalism in Belgium?

In June 2025, the Belgian federal government announced its intention to initiate the abolition of the Senate—an institution established in 1831 as part of Belgium’s foundational constitutional framework. Though long expected, this move signals the potential culmination of decades of institutional erosion, during which the Senate’s legislative influence and political relevance have been systematically questioned. In this article, Mathias El Berhoumi traces the historical trajectory of the upper chamber, examines the constitutional and political hurdles surrounding its proposed dissolution, and explores alternative visions for its future.

Established as the upper chamber following the adoption of the Belgian Constitution in 1831, the Senate may soon be abolished. In June, the federal government announced its intention to submit the necessary constitutional amendments to that effect in the near future. This development came as no surprise, as it reflects a long-standing trend in Belgium of progressively curtailing the Senate’s functions—an institution increasingly regarded as lacking demonstrable relevance and effectiveness. Nevertheless, the prospect of its dissolution raises significant questions regarding the role of parliamentarians in the legislative process and in the oversight of the government, as well as the involvement of federated entities in federal decision-making.

Anatomy of a Fall

Originally, within the framework of the unitary Belgian state, the Senate was primarily conceived as an aristocratic body, designed to represent the interests of large landowners and to serve as a counterweight to the Chamber of Representatives. While voting for both chambers was subject to a tax qualification, eligibility for the latter was not contingent upon the payment of a property-based tax (“cens”). The gradual extension of franchise, culminating in the introduction of universal male suffrage following the First World War, brought an end to the socio-economic disparity that had previously characterized the composition of the two legislative chambers. Nonetheless, senators continued to exhibit a profile different from that of deputies, notably in terms of age—until 1995, eligibility for the Senate was restricted to individuals aged 40 and above. Furthermore, the 1921 reforms introduced new categories of senators. In addition to those directly elected, the Senate included members drawn from provincial councils as well as co-opted individuals. Consequently, alongside the democratization of the Senate’s composition, elements of a territorial assembly and a council of elders were incorporated into its design.

Inspired by established federal systems—particularly the United States—the architects of Belgian federalism envisioned the Senate as a forum for the federated entities (...).

This diversification in the institutional origins of senators likely contributed to reinforcing the perceived value of maintaining the upper chamber. The benefits of bicameralism also appeared to be acknowledged. Two chambers provide greater opportunities to improve legislation, deepen deliberation, and temper excesses. The Senate underwent another significant transformation with Belgium’s transition to a federal State. Inspired by established federal systems—particularly the United States—the architects of Belgian federalism envisioned the Senate as a forum for the federated entities: the three Communities (Flemish, French and German-Speaking) and the three Regions (Flanders, Wallonia and Brussels-Capital). Although Belgium initiated its federal transformation in 1970 with the first of several ‘state reforms’, this vision only materialized with the fourth reform in 1993 and only with respect to the Communities: 21 out of 70 senators were selected from the parliaments of the three Communities, and the chamber’s functions were substantially reduced. The previously existing symmetrical bicameralism was replaced: the Senate lost its role in the legislative process for many policy areas. It also relinquished its prerogative to trigger the resignation of the federal government. Despite these reductions, the Senate carved out a specialized consultative role in international relations, institutional matters, and so-called ethical debates—such as those concerning end-of-life issues.

(...) [T]he bicameral deliberation process came to be perceived as a waste of time, since debates often reiterated the same arguments and voting outcomes consistently mirrored the divide between the governing majority and the opposition.

This reform did not prevent a gradual questioning of its existence. Within the Belgian political system, parties play a preeminent role, which is reflected in the strong voting discipline among parliamentarians. Consequently, the bicameral deliberation process came to be perceived as a waste of time, since debates often reiterated the same arguments and voting outcomes consistently mirrored the divide between the governing majority and the opposition. Community senators, rather than championing the specific interests of their respective entities, tended to echo their party’s positions. This dynamic fuelled criticism from those decrying inefficiencies and their high costs. Flemish nationalists, in particular, targeted the institution, whose history and archaic decorum—with its red colour inspired by the House of Lords and portraits of medieval princes—symbolize a bygone era, an outdated vision of Belgium (“La Belgique de papa”). The delegitimization of this assembly also contributes symbolically to the weakening of the federal level by eliminating one of its oldest institutions. This is somewhat paradoxical from a nationalist perspective to challenge the only body where the Community Parliaments are directly represented.

The sixth state reform (2012–2014) accentuated the dual trajectory that had underpinned the 1993 amendments. On the one hand, the federal character of the Senate was reinforced: 50 of its 60 members would henceforth be delegated from the Community and Regional Parliaments. On the other hand, its legislative functions were further curtailed—this time to a significantly greater extent than two decades earlier.  So much so that the Constitution now explicitly states that “The Senate is a non-permanent body”.

Rather than revitalizing the institution, this reform arguably sealed its fate. The position of those who denounce its lack of utility has been strengthened by the limited volume of activity taking place within the prestigious chamber.

Constitutional Procedures and Political Obstacles to the Dismantling of the Senate

As evidence of the shared recognition that the current situation is unsatisfactory, both the Chamber of Representatives and the Senate adopted—just weeks before the June 2024 federal elections and with unanimous support from all members present—a declaration to revise the Constitution opening the possibility of amending the articles concerning the Senate. This marks the first step in the revision procedure prescribed by Article 195 of the Constitution. The second step must be undertaken by the members of the Parliament elected in June 2024: within the bounds of the provisions submitted to revision in the declaration, the constitutional amendments must be adopted by a two-thirds majority of votes cast in both the Chamber and the Senate—potentially marking the final bicameral debate in Belgian parliamentary history.

(...) [T]he endorsement or at least the abstention of opposition parties will be needed for the government to advance its constitutional agenda.

The Federal Government can rely on the support of parliamentarians from the five coalition parties, representing 80 out of 150 members in the Chamber of Representatives and 34 out of 60 senators. Consequently, the endorsement or at least the abstention of opposition parties will be needed for the government to advance its constitutional agenda. It has explicitly stated that it does not intend to depend on the votes of either the far right or the radical left. This political stance implies that any initiative to abolish the Senate would entail the backing of the Socialist Party (PS), in addition to either the Flemish Liberal Party (Open VLD) or the Green parties (Ecolo-Groen). At present, no formal announcement has been made regarding a broader consensus including these parties. Securing the support of the PS may prove particularly challenging, given the party’s current position as one of the most vocal critics of the government’s policies.

These political parties could engage in the negotiations by advocating for an alternative to the outright abolition of the Senate. Since the announcement of the intention to dissolve the institution, several figures from civil society and the academic community have spoken to the media—not to defend the status quo, but to articulate and highlight different futures the Senate could embody. Two main trajectories are being promoted. One is a federal path: grounded in the premise that federalism necessitates a bicameral system, several commentators have underscored the absence of a parliamentary forum dedicated to the oversight of intergovernmental decision-making or to the negotiation of Belgium’s positions within the Council of the European Union. The second trajectory pertains to deliberative democracy: the current debates surrounding the Senate present a window of opportunity to advance the idea of a citizens’ assembly chosen by lot, akin to the model implemented by the German Speaking Community of Belgium. These two trajectories are not mutually exclusive and may, in fact, be combined—particularly within an assembly that, as previously noted, has long included members selected through distinct mechanisms. That said, one cannot entirely dismiss the hypothesis that this patchwork composition may have hindered the Senate’s institutional clarity and, by extension, its legitimacy.

Another difficulty is of a legal nature: the declaration of revision adopted in 2024 does not encompass all the provisions relating to the Senate. However, this obstacle may be circumvented, as the provision outlining the revision procedure itself is open to amendment. This provision was revised as early as 2012, not to structurally alter the multi-stage revision process—widely regarded as overly cumbersome—but rather to broaden the scope of the amendable articles. At the time, this procedural sleight of hand was criticized by many legal scholars, although the Venice Commission did not consider the technique to be formally irregular. Some political parties may now be reluctant to repeat this circumvention of the constitutional revision procedure.

Should the negotiations become more complex, both the majority and the opposition may find themselves at an impasse.

Should the negotiations become more complex, both the majority and the opposition may find themselves at an impasse. For the governing coalition—and particularly for the party of the Prime Minister, a Flemish nationalist—the abolition of the Senate represents a symbolic and indispensable achievement, intended to signal progress on their institutional agenda at a time when advances in other areas, such as the transfer of competences, appear highly uncertain. On the opposition side, assuming responsibility for the preservation of a delegitimized chamber could also entail significant political costs.

It is regrettable (...) that the main argument advanced by the government has been of a budgetary nature.

It is regrettable, in any case, that the main argument advanced by the government has been of a budgetary nature. The Senate’s €45 million endowment weighs little against the €25.5 billion federal deficit projected for 2025. Moreover, it is far from certain that the anticipated savings will fully materialize, given that a number of staff members will be absorbed by the Chamber of Representatives and that the maintenance of the Senate building—which the State does not intend to sell—will continue to incur costs. More fundamentally, it must be acknowledged that democracy has a price, and in light of overall public expenditures, the resources currently allocated to it appear far from exorbitant.

Parliamentary Deliberation at a Crossroads?

Belgium’s trajectory is rather atypical: It has become less bicameral even as it has become more federal. While bicameralism is a common—though not inherent—feature of federal systems, the fourth and the sixth state reforms have failed to assign a clear and coherent institutional role to the second chamber. More significantly, the deepening of federalism advocated by Flemish nationalists envisions the outright abolition of this body.

The abolition of the Senate is scheduled to take effect following the next planned federal elections, in 2029.

The abolition of the Senate is scheduled to take effect following the next planned federal elections, in 2029. This timeline thus leaves room for the reform to be carefully considered. Allowing time for deliberation and reflection is, in fact, a contemporary argument in favour of bicameralism. That this rationale no longer resonates today is not merely indicative of the Senate’s failure to embody it meaningfully; it also reflects the broader and ongoing trend of parliamentary marginalization. This is the fundamental issue that must be addressed without delay: rather than simply accepting this marginalization, what institutional mechanisms—whether within the Senate, the Chamber of Representatives, or elsewhere—can be implemented to strengthen the role of elected officials?

(...) [R]ather than further diminishing the role of parliamentarians on the basis of spurious budgetary arguments, the current reform process could instead lead to innovative ways of reinforcing their institutional position.

The precise terms of the agreement reached within the government have not yet been made public. In particular, it remains unclear how the Chamber of Representatives will respond to this change. During the sixth state reform, the diminishing role of the Senate was accompanied by the strengthening of certain parliamentary procedures in the Chamber, notably the facilitated activation of a second reading of legislative texts. The Chamber fully embraced these new prerogatives. One may hope that the current debate on the Senate will draw inspiration from this noteworthy precedent. Thus, rather than further diminishing the role of parliamentarians on the basis of spurious budgetary arguments, the current reform process could instead lead to innovative ways of reinforcing their institutional position.

Mathias El Berhoumi is a professor at UCLouvain Saint-Louis, where he teaches constitutional law and the theory of the State. He is co-director of the Interdisciplinary Centre for Constitutional Research (CIRC). His main research interests include the interactions between federalism and public policy, education law, and the institutional framework of representative democracy.

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Suggested citation: Mathias El Berhoumi, ‘Toward a Unicameral Federalism in Belgium?’, ConstitutionNet, International IDEA, 7 July 2025, https://constitutionnet.org/news/voices/toward-unicameral-federalism-belgium

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