Political Consensus in the Balance: Government Proposal to Reshape Sweden’s Judiciary and Constitutional Amendment Process

In April 2025, the Swedish Government introduced a Bill titled “Enhanced Protection for Democracy and the Independence of the Courts,” proposing substantial reforms to Sweden’s constitutional amendment procedure and judicial independence framework. While initially grounded in cross-party consensus, the reforms are now proving divisive, particularly among the governing parties. In this article, Mikael Ruotsi examines the Bill’s key provisions, the critiques raised during the consultation process, and the shifting political dynamics—highlighted by the Sweden Democrats’ recent party motion opposing the proposal.

Background

In April 2025, the Swedish Government presented a Bill to the Swedish parliament (Riksdag), titled “Enhanced Protection for Democracy and the Independence of the Courts.” The proposals closely follow the reforms suggested by an all-party Committee of Inquiry in March 2023, analyzed here. 

In essence, the Bill proposes to reform the Swedish constitutional amendment procedure and further strengthen the independence of courts and judges in the face of democratic backsliding in Europe.

In essence, the Bill proposes to reform the Swedish constitutional amendment procedure and further strengthen the independence of courts and judges in the face of democratic backsliding in Europe. As many of the proposals in the Bill entail amendments to the Instrument of Government—one of the four fundamental laws that make up the Swedish Constitution—it is proposed that the reforms enter into force on 1 April 2027, following the 2026 elections to the Riksdag.

This article will discuss the main proposals of the Bill, address the views expressed during the public consultation process—which followed the Committee’s final report and preceded the Government Bill—and analyze the party motion put forward by the Sweden Democrats, the second-largest party in the Riksdag.

Constitutional Amendment Procedure

The Bill suggests changing the rules governing constitutional amendments. According to the current procedure, the Swedish fundamental laws can be amended by two simple majority decisions by the Riksdag, which must be separated by a general election. Furthermore, a minority of one-third of the Riksdag members can initiate a referendum on pending constitutional amendments. In such cases, the referendum takes place concurrently with the general election to the Riksdag that separates the two votes on the proposed constitutional amendment.

Instead of a simple majority, the Bill proposes that the second vote on a constitutional amendment be supported by a qualified majority, namely two-thirds of the members of the Riksdag [Section 4.2.2 of the Bill]. In addition, it suggests introducing quorum rules for both votes, requiring that the specified majorities be calculated from the total number of members in the Riksdag, rather than the number of members taking part in the vote [Section 4.2.1 of the Bill]. Under the proposed reform, any amendment to a fundamental law would require the support of a qualified majority in the second vote. That means that increased rigidity for amending the fundamental laws would not be limited to provisions particularly important for the protection of democracy and the rule of law, but also minor technical changes.

The main concern is that the proposals will make it too difficult to amend parts of the fundamental laws that are of no significant relevance to the aim of the reform.

Several stakeholders, including an expert from the Legislative Committee, have criticized this proposal, advocating instead for the introduction of a tiered system of constitutional amendments whereby more important or democracy-protecting provisions would require stricter amendment rules than less significant ones. The main concern is that the proposals will make it too difficult to amend parts of the fundamental laws that are of no significant relevance to the aim of the reform. In the Bill, the Government brushes these concerns away, asserting that all four fundamental laws should, in principle, have equal formal standing, and arguing that it is extremely difficult to pinpoint certain provisions as more deserving of stronger protection than others.

The Bill also proposes that constitutional amendments concerning fundamental rights and freedoms be mandatorily reviewed by the Council on Legislation, a body composed of current and retired Supreme Court justices which performs non-binding ex-ante scrutiny of legislative proposals [Section 4.4 of the Bill]. However, a number of stakeholders have argued that all changes to the fundamental laws ought to be subject to scrutiny by the Council on Legislation as many other parts of the fundamental laws could benefit from an expert opinion. The Government, which does not share this position, argues that the Instrument of Government, in particular, contains provisions on the allocation of power which are primarily the result of political negotiations, and should therefore not be subject to such scrutiny. This position may seem unusual but stems from a historical—and somewhat still prevailing—view of the Constitution as more of a political than a legal instrument in Sweden.

Increasing the Independence of Courts and Judges

To strengthen the independence of the judiciary, the Bill proposes that the court administration agency, while remaining under the power of the executive, be overseen by a board. This board would be composed of a majority of current or former permanent judges, with representatives of the executive and legislative branches explicitly excluded from serving. The board would be responsible for appointing the director of the court administration agency, whereas under the current system, the director of the Swedish National Courts Administration is appointed by the Government [Section 5.3 of the Bill].

Many stakeholders welcome this proposal, but some suggest that it is not far-reaching enough. Instead of retaining the court administration under the executive, they argue it should either be placed under the authority of the Riksdag or replaced by an institutionally independent judicial council. According to the Government, the creation of a judicial council would require fundamental changes to the current state structure, since the Instrument of Government only envisages agencies that are either under the power of the executive or under the power of the Riksdag. The Government further argues that placing court administration under the executive is consistent with Council of Europe recommendations and practices in other Nordic countries.

These proposals have been welcomed by a vast majority of the stakeholders, stressing that increased constitutional protection for the independence of the courts could serve as a vital measure to ensure the rule of law in the long run.

Furthermore, under the proposal, while permanent judges would still be appointed by the Government, these appointments would have to be made following a proposal from a specific body consisting of a majority of current or former permanent judges [Section 5.4 of the Bill]. In addition, permanent judges would only be removable from office upon reaching a statutory retirement age, and any changes to that age would not apply retroactively to judges currently in office [Section 5.6 of the Bill]. For judges in the Supreme Court and the Supreme Administrative Court, it is proposed to amend the Instrument of Government so that each court should have at least 12 and no more than 20 justices. Furthermore, the Government’s right to appoint Supreme Court judges would be made conditional on an appointment request from the court concerned [Section 5.5 of the Bill]. These proposals have been welcomed by a vast majority of stakeholders, stressing that increased constitutional protection for the independence of the courts could serve as a vital measure to ensure the rule of law in the long run.

Political Consensus in the Balance?

The Bill is based on the work of an all-party Committee that remarkably presented a reform proposal supported by all parties in the Riksdag, with no dissenting opinions attached to the final report. However, this consensus seems to be dissolving.

(...) [T]he Sweden Democrats submitted such a party motion proposing that the Riksdag reject the proposals concerning the constitutional amendment procedure.

When a Bill is presented to the Riksdag, all members of parliament have the right to submit a private member’s motion addressing issues arising from the Bill. If such a motion is signed by the leader of a political party on behalf of the party, it is commonly referred to as a “party motion”. On 14 May 2025, the Sweden Democrats submitted such a party motion proposing that the Riksdag reject the proposals concerning the constitutional amendment procedure. Additionally, they call for a statement urging the Government to further analyze which parts of the fundamental laws are so central that they should be subject to the qualified majority requirement. The Sweden Democrats highlight the critique raised by stakeholders, arguing that an en bloc qualified majority requirement may constitute an unreasonably high threshold which could hinder urgent constitutional reforms. In connection to this, they point to recent proposals to amend the constitution to enable the prohibition of criminal organizations and the revocation of Swedish citizenship.

(...) [C]onstitutional reforms in Sweden have traditionally been based on broad political support in the Riksdag—even if the formal requirement for constitutional amendments is merely a simple majority.

Since the Government—consisting of the Moderate Party, the Christian Democrats and the Liberals— rules with the support of the Sweden Democrats, this party motion raises questions as to whether, and to what extent, it will affect the Government parties’ willingness to proceed with the proposed reforms. In this context, it should be noted that, as a matter of political praxis, constitutional reforms in Sweden have traditionally been based on broad political support in the Riksdag—even if the formal requirement for constitutional amendments is merely a simple majority. Historically, such reforms have not been pursued if either of the two largest parties, the Social Democrats or the Moderate Party, opposed them. However, following the 2022 election, the Sweden Democrats became the second-largest party in the Riksdag. Whether this shift will change the prevailing understanding of what constitutes “broad political support” remains to be seen.

Now that the Government Bill has been presented to the Riksdag, the reform proposals have been referred to the Committee on the Constitution for consideration. The Committee will adopt a position on the proposals and submit a report to the Riksdag Chamber. Since the Committee consists of seventeen members of parliament, representing the parties in proportion to their relative strength in the Riksdag, its report will reflect how the governing parties choose to address the Sweden Democrats’ dissenting party motion.

The most likely outcome is that the governing parties will choose to ignore the Sweden Democrats’ position and instead rely on the support of the opposition parties to get the Bill accepted by the Chamber.

The most likely outcome is that the governing parties will choose to ignore the Sweden Democrats’ position and instead rely on the support of the opposition parties to get the Bill accepted by the Chamber. Alternatively, the governing parties could change their position on the part of the Bill relating to the constitutional amendment procedure. This would mean that a majority of the Riksdag no longer supports that part of the proposal. In such a case, the provisions concerning the independence of the judiciary could still be adopted. A third possibility is that the Committee recommends splitting the Bill, allowing the Riksdag to adopt two separate parliamentary decisions. Compared to the other scenarios, this could be advantageous: splitting the Bill would allow the Riksdag, when making its second confirming decision, to accept or reject the proposed changes to the amendment procedure and still adopt the changes related to the judiciary. In contrast, under the first two scenarios, the initial Riksdag decision would be binding, since both decisions required to amend the constitution must be identical. Hence, if the entire Bill is adopted in the initial decision, the Riksdag must either accept or reject the whole amendment package when making its final confirming decision.  

It is expected that the first decision on the amendments will be adopted in October 2025, with the confirming decision following the general elections scheduled for September 2026.

Mikael Ruotsi is a senior lecturer in constitutional law at Uppsala University

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Suggested citation: Mikael Ruotsi, ‘Political Consensus in the Balance: Government Proposal to Reshape Sweden’s Judiciary and Constitutional Amendment Process’, ConstitutionNet, International IDEA, 3 June 2025, https://constitutionnet.org/news/voices/political-consensus-balance-government-proposal-reshape-swedens-judiciary-and-constitutional

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