Chile’s liberal democracy at a crossroads: Between Kast’s populist authoritarian impulse and a strong liberal-democratic culture

Since taking office, Chilean President José Antonio Kast has faced growing questions about his commitment to liberal democracy. Two proposed constitutional amendments aimed at weakening rights protections and expanding executive emergency powers in the name of fighting organized crime were ultimately withdrawn following widespread criticism. This article examines what these failed initiatives reveal about Kast’s political project, the resilience of Chile’s constitutional safeguards, and the risks facing its constitutional democracy.

Ever since José Antonio Kast was elected President of Chile in December 2025, his adherence to liberal democracy has been a source of debate. While those endorsing the thesis that he is a far-right authoritarian populist point to his open sympathy for General Pinochet’s military regime, his membership in the far-right Conservative Political Action Conference (CPAC) and his enthusiastic support for leaders such as Viktor Orbán, Jair Bolsonaro, Javier Milei, Nayib Bukele and Donald Trump, those who resist classifying Kast as an authoritarian populist highlight the fact that he is more “institutionalist”, a trait evidenced by his immediate recognition of defeat against the left-wing politician Gabriel Boric in the presidential election of 2021, his adherence to judicial decisions, his respect for even the most critical journalists and a political rhetoric which does not divide Chileans between “patriots” and “traitors”. 

During his first months in office, President Kast’s actions and style seemed to have indicated that he is not a far-right authoritarian but, instead, an ultra-conservative Catholic with a neoliberal economic approach. Indeed, during those early months in government, he did not use his position to intimidate critical journalists, attack the courts or try to govern by decree, focusing instead on introducing legislation to implement his economic plan. This trajectory was, however, interrupted in August with the introduction by his administration of two—ultimately aborted—constitutional amendments. Although reportedly aimed at fighting organized crime and terrorism, these proposals were incompatible with principles of constitutional democracy: the first amendment sought to circumvent a decision of the Constitutional Tribunal which protected social rights, and the second would have conferred on Kast unusually broad emergency powers. After briefly describing these amendments, this piece analyzes the reaction of Chile’s civil society to these controversial proposals in order to then assess what these failed attempts at abusive constitution-making suggest about the character of Kast’s administration and what lies ahead for Chile’s constitutional democracy.

Kast’s first attempt to engage in “abusive” constitution-making

The first constitutional amendment, leaked to the press the first days of August 2026, aimed at preventing the Constitutional Tribunal from invalidating a proposal of ordinary legislation introduced in Congress on 12 June 2026 (which aims to deprive people convicted of vandalism of certain social rights). Given that the Tribunal had previously declared unconstitutional sections of a different bill denying access to free university tuition for juveniles convicted of violent crimes, the proposed constitutional amendment sought to shield the anti-vandalism bill from being declared unconstitutional through the following means. First, by introducing a new Article 9 bis to the Constitution which, among other things, established that those convicted for organized crime, terrorism and drug trafficking would be denied access to state-funded benefits related to education, healthcare, work and social security during their conviction and for 15 years after the conclusion of their time in prison. Second, by amending Article 19(2) of the Constitution to state that the loss of social rights as an accessory criminal sanction under the proposed Article 9 bis could not be considered discriminatory. And finally, by amending Article 19(26), according to which no law may affect the “essence” of a right, stipulating that Article 9 bis would not infringe that guarantee. Had these constitutional amendments been approved, the Constitutional Tribunal would have been forced to declare that depriving those convicted of vandalism from social rights is not unconstitutional.

The intention of the Kast administration to override the Constitutional Tribunal’s precedent was all but confessed in the explanatory section of the constitutional amendment proposal, where it candidly states that the amendment was necessary considering the “excessive” concern for due process exhibited by Chile’s Constitutional Tribunal. 

Once this proposal got leaked, it immediately sparked a strong negative reaction (...).

Once this proposal got leaked, it immediately sparked a strong negative reaction from constitutional scholars and influential columnists, but the final blow came from one of the most loyal members of the government coalition, the President of the Unión Demócrata Independiente (UDI), Guillermo Ramírez, who declared that his party would not support the amendment because it weakened the Constitution’s non-discrimination clause, as well as the one guaranteeing the respect for the essence of fundamental rights. This statement forced the government to abort the proposal even before submitting it to Congress.

Kast’s second attempt at abusive constitution-making 

The second constitutional amendment pushed by Kast’s government, which was even more illiberal than the first one, was formally submitted to Congress on 10 August 2026. Its most troublesome aspect was the introduction of a new state of emergency, the so-called “state of public security” which would have given President Kast powers only granted to the executive in situations of war (during the so-called “state of assembly”), such as suspending or restricting personal freedom and mobility and restricting the exercise of the right of association, as well as ordering the interception, opening, or search of documents and all forms of communication, and the seizure of property. Furthermore, the proposed state of public security could have been unilaterally declared by the President without congressional authorization for the first 240 days, with only subsequent extensions requiring parliamentary approval, contrasting with the requirement to get immediate approval from Congress in the case of a state of assembly. 

The measures the proposal would have allowed the President to decree were far more intrusive of individual rights and freedoms than those available under the most severe peacetime state of exception, the state of siege. 

Once formally presented to Congress, this second constitutional amendment proposal raised deep concerns amongst constitutional circles, the press, and even politicians from the government coalition. The measures the proposal would have allowed the President to decree were far more intrusive of individual rights and freedoms than those available under the most severe peacetime state of exception, the state of siege. Under a state of siege, the executive may only restrict rather than suspend the right to personal liberty, for example by ordering the detention of individuals in their homes or in places designated by the law. 

While public criticism mainly focused on the introduction of this new state of emergency, the proposed constitutional amendment included other elements contrary to liberal-democratic values, such as the proposal to authorize the President, with the approval of two-thirds of the Senate, to designate a specific group as a terrorist or organized crime organization. This would have transferred to political bodies a function traditionally reserved for the judiciary, namely determining whether an organization meets the legal criteria for such a designation. Another illiberal proposal was to authorize Parliament to enact legislation depriving individuals convicted of membership in organized crime or terrorist groups of state-funded benefits related to education, healthcare, employment, and social security for up to 15 years after they finish their prison terms.

This proposal was confronted with a strong negative reaction from civil society, but also from opposition parties. However, this time, the government attempted to fight back. The Minister of Security, Martín Arrau, defended the bill by arguing that Chile is facing an existential threat from emerging forms of organized crime and terrorism, a fact that made the approval of the amendment compelling. He also invoked popular support for harsher punishments, accusing constitutional scholars and the press of being detached from the fears that ordinary Chileans experience. Resorting to a tactic commonly deployed by authoritarian-populists, he even floated the idea of “asking the people” what they thought about the proposed amendment. That idea was eventually abandoned, however, since Chile’s Constitution does not provide for a referendum when a constitutional amendment originates from the government itself.

[A]lthough Chileans support severe punishments for criminals, they do not want to relinquish their most basic freedoms in exchange for broader government powers to combat crime (...).

Given the punitive environment that has prevailed in Chile in the last few years—due to the increase in the homicide rate and gruesome assassinations by organized crime groups—opposition parties initially remained mostly silent on the proposal, perhaps fearing that opposition to the amendment would carry political costs given the popularity of even the most severe measures to combat crime. In this context, the task of fighting the proposed constitutional amendment fell primarily on civil society and the press. This remained the case until opinion polls revealed that, although Chileans support severe punishments for criminals, they do not want to relinquish their most basic freedoms in exchange for broader government powers to combat crime, a fact that led opposition parties to voice their clear opposition to the proposed constitutional amendment. The final blow to the latter came when the leader of President Kast’s own political party, Senator Arturo Squella, was forced to recognize in a televised interview that, had the opposition presented the exact same amendment, he would have rejected it.

On 6 October 2026, Kast’s government eventually announced the withdrawal of this second attempt to amend the Constitution, stating that it would instead support another constitutional amendment proposal sponsored by a group of senators from both the government and the opposition. As opposed to Kast’s, this proposal aims at fighting organized crime by strengthening the already-existing “state of emergency” in a manner compatible with constitutional democracy.

Taking stock of aborted authoritarian initiatives

After the set of events that surrounded the two consecutive attempts to introduce constitutional amendments of an illiberal nature, the question of how to assess the ideological character of Kast’s administration becomes urgent. In other words, is it possible to accept the notion that such illiberal proposals were motivated solely by the perceived necessity of fighting organized crime and terrorism, rather than by a desire to concentrate an enormous amount of power in the executive for political gains?

At this point, analysts have divergent opinions. For those who tend to trust Kast’s “institutionalist” past, the two consecutive attempts to amend the Constitution reveal precipitation in the quest for fighting organized crime, not an illiberal pulsion to concentrate power for partisan purposes. For others, however, it is hard to believe that this was merely the result of precipitation, incompetence, or failure to assess the significance of what the government was proposing. The truth might be in the middle, with a leader who seems to have illiberal inclinations, but who can be persuaded, especially by his allies, to abort actions in that direction. What is clear is that, under Kast, Chile might be in danger of falling into a populist authoritarian path. It is also clear that the country’s constitutional culture is still at work, even among the more moderate members of Kast government coalition, something which provides some hope in Chile’s capacity to survive the perils that lie ahead.

About the Author

Javier Couso is Professor of Law at Universidad Diego Portales (Chile) and Chair in Global Trends in Constitutionalism at Utrecht University (The Netherlands). He specializes in Comparative Constitutional Law, with an emphasis in Latin American Constitutionalism. His work focuses on the interplay between constitutionalism, the rule of law and legal cultures in new democracies. He is the author and editor of dozens of academic articles and books, including Constitutional Law in Chile (Wolters Kluwer 2013) and Cultures of Legality (CUP 2010). A former holder of the Prince Claus Chair in Development and Equity at Utrecht University, he has been a visiting professor at Melbourne University, the University of Wisconsin, Leiden University and the University of California-Berkeley.

Suggested Citation

Javier Couso, ‘Chile’s liberal democracy at a crossroads: Between Kast’s populist authoritarian impulse and a strong liberal-democratic culture', ConstitutionNet, International IDEA, 12 October 2026, https://constitutionnet.org/news/voices/chiles-liberal-democracy-crossroads 

Further Reading

• Updates on constitutional developments in Chile.