Behind the Gridlock: The Hidden Politics of Armenia’s Constitutional Impasse

In early 2025, despite years of delayed reform efforts and limited public engagement, the Armenian government announced an accelerated timeline for drafting a new constitution, raising questions about the transparency and underlying political motivations of the process. Amid stalled peace negotiations with Azerbaijan and mounting domestic uncertainty, Tigran Mughnetsian and Armen Mazmanyan examine how external pressures and internal power dynamics are shaping the country’s constitutional future.

Introduction

(...) [O]ver the past five years, several expert commissions have been established to produce a comprehensive concept note for constitutional reforms, yet not a single document has been presented by the government for public deliberation.

Armenia’s government recently announced an accelerated timeline for drafting a new constitution, with Minister of Justice Srbuhi Galyan stating that work on the text was already underway. This announcement is somewhat puzzling, given the recent history of constitutional reform efforts in the country. In fact, over the past five years, several expert commissions have been established to produce a comprehensive concept note for constitutional reforms, yet not a single document has been presented by the government for public deliberation. In this light, Galyan’s statement has raised a storm of questions about the strategic vision behind the current process. It also sparked concerns about the perceived clandestine nature of the reform, particularly when compared to previous commissions, which held open, publicly broadcast sessions. By contrast, the current constitutional process appears neither open nor transparent.  

This lack of clarity regarding the strategic direction of the reform is also cause for concern, as previous rounds of constitution-building efforts have revealed an underlying unwillingness by the government to accept any reasonable limits on executive power or to promote power-sharing institutions. These efforts also reflect the government’s lack of interest in using constitutional momentum to initiate a new social contract—one that includes not only grassroots movements but also embattled and emerging political stakeholders currently excluded from the process. 

(...) [I]t appears that the fast-tracked constitutional reform (...) may be connected to the ongoing peace process between Armenia and its long-term regional rival, Azerbaijan (...).

For some, the lack of interest in such conventional causes for drafting a new constitution suggests a more unconventional raison d’être of the reform: external pressure. In fact, it appears that the fast-tracked constitutional reform, promoted by the incumbent government, may be connected to the ongoing peace process between Armenia and its long-term regional rival, Azerbaijan, following the brief yet devastating second Nagorno-Karabakh War in 2020. Credible reports have emerged suggesting that a change in Armenia’s constitution was proposed by Azerbaijan as yet another precondition for concluding the peace agreement that Armenia’s Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan is so eager to reach.

From a legal perspective, Azerbaijan is concerned with the preamble of Armenia’s Constitution, which references the country’s 1990 Declaration of Independence. That document, in turn, refers to a 1989 joint decision calling for the reunification of Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh, then an autonomous region within the Soviet Republic of Azerbaijan. Despite repeated assurances from Armenia’s government, and a recent opinion by Armenia’s Constitutional Court stating that the Declaration of Independence has no immediate legal effect, Azerbaijan insists, as a matter of principle, on removing the reference, considering it an unequivocal claim against its territorial integrity. Alternatively, as many believe, this “legal” pretext may be used to hijack the peace process, especially given the complexity of passing constitutional amendments via referendum in a time of severe polarization and extreme national sensitivity surrounding Armenia’s identity and sovereignty.

Constitutional Developments: Backstory

Under mounting public pressure, Sargsian ultimately stepped down, demonstrating how constitutional choices can affect political stability and trigger significant social movements.

Armenia's last major constitutional overhaul occurred in 2015, when the country shifted from a semi-presidential to a parliamentary form of government. During that reform, then-President Serzh Sargsian repeatedly assured the public that the constitutional changes were not intended to keep him in power. However, in 2018, Sargsian was elected Prime Minister by the Parliament, breaking his earlier promises. This perceived breach of trust—combined with public fatigue over ongoing political manipulation—triggered widespread public outrage and mass protests known as the "Velvet Revolution." Under mounting public pressure, Sargsian ultimately stepped down, demonstrating how constitutional choices can affect political stability and trigger significant social movements.

Nikol Pashinyan, who led the protests against Sargsian, had been a vocal critic of the 2015 constitutional changes while serving as an opposition member of Parliament.

Nikol Pashinyan, who led the protests against Sargsian, had been a vocal critic of the 2015 constitutional changes while serving as an opposition member of Parliament. He consistently argued that the reforms were primarily designed to extend Sargsian's political dominance by creating what he termed a "super-prime-ministerial" institutional arrangement that concentrated excessive power in that office. When elected as Prime Minister in 2018, following the Velvet Revolution, Pashinyan initially maintained his critical stance toward the constitutional framework and expressed intentions to establish a more balanced system. However, during the parliamentary election campaign later that year, when asked about the absence of constitutional reform in his party's platform, Pashinyan argued that the constitution had only been in effect for seven months and needed time for proper implementation before any substantial change could be considered.

In May 2019, a significant turning point occurred when a trial court ordered the release of former President Robert Kocharyan from pre-trial detention. Kocharyan faced charges related to the violent suppression of protests—in which Pashinyan was one of the leaders—following the 2008 presidential elections. This ruling provoked an unprecedented response from Prime Minister Pashinyan, who called on citizens to block entrances to courthouses across the country. Subsequently, Pashinyan began advocating for constitutional amendments to facilitate judicial vetting and broader reforms of a judiciary portrayed as loyal to the previous regime.

Later that year, Pashinyan cautioned against frequent constitutional revisions, suggesting they were often instruments of political manipulation. These controversial statements indicated the lack of a coherent strategic vision for comprehensive constitutional reforms—a pattern that would persist in the years to follow.

The amendments had an immediate impact: three justices were forced to retire, and the court's chairman lost his leadership role (...).

Nevertheless, in 2020, Pashinyan’s government initiated a constitutional reform to alter the composition of the Constitutional Court. Originally planned to be passed at a referendum, these changes were instead passed by Parliament due to the Covid-19 pandemic. The amendments had an immediate impact: three justices were forced to retire, and the court's chairman lost his leadership role, though he remained a sitting judge.

Constitutional Reform Gone Wrong: A Case-study in Misguided Process

Shortly before adopting the 2020 amendments, the government established a specialized Commission on Constitutional Reforms, initially tasked with developing a concept note for broader changes. Incrementally, Pashinyan began speaking about a new constitution rather than implementing amendments, though he struggled to articulate the need for such a radical change. He remained cautious about maintaining the parliamentary system, reiterating the need for more time to evaluate its performance.

Regarding "sustainable majority”—a highly debated rule in the constitution that requires the system to always produce a clear winner by giving extra seats to the leading party, even if a second round of voting is needed—Pashinyan acknowledged the trade-off between frequent elections and political stability. In doing so, he echoed ancien régime’s narratives, which he had harshly criticized as an opposition leader.

Prime Minister Pashinyan tasked the Council to assess the need for constitutional changes, again highlighting his unclear strategic vision for the reform.

The 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war disrupted Armenia’s constitutional reform efforts. In 2021, a new Council for Constitutional Reforms was established, effectively dissolving the previous commission. Prime Minister Pashinyan tasked the Council to assess the need for constitutional changes, again highlighting his unclear strategic vision for the reform. Meanwhile, his position on the parliamentary system had also evolved; he praised it for having helped resolve the political crisis during the 2021 snap elections. The Council had to present a draft concept note by 2023. While another expert commission was established to support this effort, neither produced a concept note—or even any single page—by that deadline.

Although the concept note was leaked to the media, neither the Council nor the government officially released it to the public to initiate the expected inclusive debate (...).

This failure prompted the Council to appoint a new expert commission, the third since 2020. Granted unprecedented independence and operating without any political direction, the three-member Commission submitted a comprehensive concept note in December 2023. The note proposes a significant shift towards a more decentralized governance model featuring stronger power-sharing and considerable limits on the Prime Minister’s exclusive competencies, albeit preserving the parliamentary government structure. Although the concept note was leaked to the media, neither the Council nor the government officially released it to the public to initiate the expected inclusive debate—reportedly due to strong opposition from Pashinyan’s team as some provisions would curtail the powers of the Prime Minister and the ruling party.

Constitutional Reforms between War and Peace

The 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war fundamentally altered Armenia's geopolitical position and, consequently, the context for constitutional reform. Following the war, a brokered trilateral ceasefire agreement was signed by Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Russia. This agreement includes provisions for deploying Russian peacekeepers to Nagorno-Karabakh, maintaining the Lachin Corridor connecting Nagorno-Karabakh to Armenia, and the unblocking of all economic and transport connections in the region, including between Azerbaijan and its exclave of Nakhichevan.

In response to military pressure, Prime Minister Pashinyan announced Armenia's recognition of Azerbaijan's territorial integrity and readiness to sign a peace treaty by 2023.

In 2021 and 2022, Azerbaijan launched military offensives along the Armenia-Azerbaijan border, reportedly trying to pressure Armenia into agreeing to a corridor to connect mainland Azerbaijan with the exclave of Nakhichevan. In response to military pressure, Prime Minister Pashinyan announced Armenia's recognition of Azerbaijan's territorial integrity and readiness to sign a peace treaty by 2023. Later that year, Azerbaijan's offensive on Nagorno-Karabakh led to the mass displacement of the region’s indigenous Armenian population, an act that has been described by some observers as ethnic cleansing and is the subject of ongoing proceedings before the International Court of Justice.

As peace treaty negotiations continued into 2024, Azerbaijan identified Armenia's constitution as an obstacle, stating it contains territorial claims.

As peace treaty negotiations continued into 2024, Azerbaijan identified Armenia's constitution as an obstacle, stating it contains territorial claims. Specifically, it pointed to the constitution's preamble and its reference to the 1990 Declaration of Independence. As mentioned, this declaration cites a 1989 joint decision calling for the reunification of Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh, then an autonomous region within the Soviet Republic of Azerbaijan. Azerbaijan has consistently maintained that a peace treaty cannot be signed unless these references are removed, citing the risk that future governments might revoke the declaration and reopen claims to Nagorno-Karabakh.

While in September 2024, Armenia's Constitutional Court ruled that the reference to the 1990 declaration ‘does not apply to any principle or aim which is not enshrined in the [articles of the] Constitution’—effectively stating that Armenia's constitution contains no territorial claims—peace negotiations hit a stalemate at the end of 2024. Two significant factors contributed to this impasse: the COP29 climate conference being hosted in Baku, which diverted Azerbaijan's diplomatic attention, and uncertainty surrounding the U.S. presidential elections, which affected the broader geopolitical context for regional negotiations.

By March 2025, the draft peace treaty was finalized and ostensibly ready for signing, as Armenia had conceded to Azerbaijan's interpretations of the two previously contentious issues. However, Azerbaijan immediately raised additional preconditions, reiterating that two substantial obstacles remained: the continued existence of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) Minsk Group—created to find a peaceful solution to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict—and Armenia's constitution, which Azerbaijan maintains still contains claims threatening its territorial integrity.

Quo Vadis? Charting a Course through Political Minefields

In response to Azerbaijan's requests, Pashinyan reframed the rationale behind the constitutional reform initiative. While initially advocating for a new constitution on ideological grounds, he now acknowledges its "regional significance", tacitly linking the reform to the peace negotiations.

The Council is expected to produce a document by the end of 2026, with a referendum to be organized after the 2026 parliamentary elections, likely in 2027.

The Armenian Ministry of Justice has indicated that it was working on the draft text of the new constitution, based on the concept notes and proposals submitted by the Council for Constitutional Reforms. It also stated that, for the time being, changes to the preamble—containing the contested references—were not being discussed. The Council is expected to produce a document by the end of 2026, with a referendum to be organized after the 2026 parliamentary elections, likely in 2027. However, this timeline overlaps with significant regional and internal uncertainty.

The amendment process itself presents substantial procedural hurdles. According to Armenia's Constitution, proposed changes must first receive approval from two-thirds of members of Parliament to proceed to a referendum. The referendum itself faces an additional, considerable threshold: changes must be approved by a majority of voters and at least one-quarter of all eligible voters.

Several factors may impede successful passage, including low voter turnout (...) and the fact that more pressing socio-economic issues overshadow constitutional concerns in the public eye.

These high thresholds significantly complicate the constitutional reform. Several factors may impede successful passage, including low voter turnout due to public resistance towards changes perceived as externally driven, and the fact that more pressing socio-economic issues overshadow constitutional concerns in the public eye. A compounding matter is the strong opposition from the ancien régime, who see the referendum as an opportunity to mobilize their voter base and delegitimize the incumbent government.

If constitutional changes are rejected in a referendum due to internal political dynamics, Armenia could face accusations of revanchism and of hijacking the peace process.

The strategic decision to link the peace-building process with constitutional reform and a subsequent referendum carries substantial risks. If constitutional changes are rejected in a referendum due to internal political dynamics, Armenia could face accusations of revanchism and of hijacking the peace process. As many fear, this scenario could potentially provide Azerbaijan with a pretext—casus belli—for renewed military action.

Tigran Mughnetsian is a public policy researcher at Transparency International Armenia and senior lecturer at Yerevan Brusov State University of Languages and Social Sciences. He specializes in issues related to elections, public administration, regime change, party systems and party funding. Tigran holds a PhD in Political Science and a master’s degree in Public Administration.

Armen Mazmanyan is an Associate Professor of Comparative Constitutional and International Law at the American University of Armenia. In Armenia, he served on two constitutional commissions, in 2020 and 2023-2024. He holds a PhD in Law from the European University Institute and is the author of a dozen peer-reviewed articles and chapters on comparative constitutionalism.

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Suggested citation: Tigran Mughnetsian and Armen Mazmanyan, ‘Behind the Gridlock: The Hidden Politics of Armenia’s Constitutional Impasse’, ConstitutionNet, International IDEA, 26 May 2025, https://constitutionnet.org/news/voices/behind-gridlock-hidden-politics-armenias-constitutional-impasse

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