Constitutional Referendum in Guinea-Bissau: Another Constitutional Crossroads
As Guinea-Bissau heads toward a constitutional referendum next week, its transitional government is pursuing reforms that could reshape the balance between the presidency, Parliament, and the judiciary. Examining the proposed amendments and the contested process behind them, Ibrahima Niang considers the tensions between institutional reform and democratic legitimacy, arguing that meaningful constitutional change will depend not only on addressing longstanding political deadlock, but on ensuring an inclusive, transparent, and credible process.
Guinea-Bissau has once again entered a period of acute constitutional tension. On 6 January, Transitional President Horta Inta-A Na Man announced the holding of a constitutional referendum on 30 August, in accordance with the Transitional Charter and the recently approved referendum law. Voters will be asked to vote on the constitutional amendments prepared by the Conselho Nacional de Transição (CNT) via "universal, direct, secret, and personal suffrage."
For citizens in Guinea-Bissau and across the region, this is not an abstract legal discussion. If adopted, the proposed amendments will directly affect the national budget, delivery of health and education services, and the credibility of upcoming electoral processes, among other things.
This article provides the political and legal context of the current reform efforts, analyzes the content of the proposed amendments, presents the views and criticisms of different stakeholders, and outlines the next steps of the process, including the planned referendum.
Political and Legal Context
Guinea-Bissau’s democratic trajectory has been defined by fragility and institutional rivalry. Since independence from Portugal in 1974, no elected president has completed two full terms without interruption. The boundary between constitutional interpretation and political power struggle remains dangerously thin in this small West African nation. The 1984 Constitution established a semi-presidential system in which the President serves as head of state and the Prime Minister, appointed from the parliamentary majority, heads the government. In principle, this model requires constant dialogue between the executive and the legislature but, in practice, cooperation rarely occurs.
Since the 2012 military coup, the country has experienced the dismissal of several elected prime ministers, early dissolutions of Parliament, and frequent government reshuffles. Each crisis has further eroded public trust in democratic institutions. A fundamental weakness in the current constitutional framework is the absence of a Constitutional Court: without an independent arbiter, political actors have become the final interpreters of the law during moments of dispute.
On 26 November 2025, the Guinea-Bissau military seized power, arresting President Umaro Sissoco Embaló and annulling the results of a tense presidential election, and installed General Horta Inta-A Na Man as transitional leader for a one-year term. The opposition and regional leaders denounced the move as a coup orchestrated to avert an electoral defeat.
The Reform Trigger
In January 2026, following a period of political deadlock after the November 2025 coup, the newly established transitional government issued a decree suspending the activities of the National People's Assembly for 90 days and announced a timetable for national consultations on constitutional reform. According to the official statement, the suspension was necessary to restore constitutional legality and democratic normality and unblock institutions.
The reaction from the legislature was immediate. The Speaker of the National People's Assembly, Domingoes Simoes Perreira, called the decree “a violation of the separation of powers” and “an attack on representative democracy.” Opposition parties including the African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde (PAIGC) and the Social Renewal Party (PRS) announced protests and rejected the legitimacy of governing by decree. Reports indicate that several deputies saw the action as a “constitutional coup in slow motion.”
On 4 December 2025, to replace the National Assembly, the military High Command established the Conselho Nacional de Transição (CNT), tasked with legislating, overseeing government action, and adopting a Transition Charter. The Charter, comprising 29 articles, was adopted on 9 December and provides for the holding of presidential and legislative elections within 90 days after the 12-month transition.
While not part of its mandate, the CNT also decided to launch a constitutional reform project in early January 2026.
While not part of its mandate, the CNT also decided to launch a constitutional reform project in early January 2026. This move triggered strong reactions from ECOWAS, civil society actors, and political parties considering that the CNT lacks the legitimacy to undertake constitutional reforms. Regional bodies responded within 48 hours by issuing a statement calling for restraint, offering to deploy a mediation mission to Bissau, and urging all state institutions to engage in dialogue and respect democratic principles.
Content of the Proposed Constitutional Reform
On 13 January 2026, the CNT published a draft of proposed constitutional amendments prepared by a group of technical legal experts selected by the CNT and acting under the control of the transitional regime, rather than an inclusive, multi-party constituent assembly or a freely elected parliament. The stated objective of the proposed reform is to modernize institutions and prevent future paralysis, and the draft contains several significant changes to the current constitutional structure.
First, it proposes granting the President authority to dissolve Parliament once per term without prior consultation with the Council of State. Government officials argue this will provide decisiveness in moments of legislative deadlock. Critics warn that this would tilt the balance of power toward the executive.
Second, the draft proposes reducing the size of Parliament from 102 deputies to 61 and reorganizing electoral districts. This measure could negatively affect smaller parties as the vote threshold required to secure a parliamentary seat would automatically rise, placing minor political groups at a significant disadvantage. The redrawing of electoral districts would also foster a concentration of seats, limiting the local representation of small parties in favour of large national coalitions. The government justifies this as a cost-saving and efficiency measure.
Third, the draft proposes the creation of a 9-member Constitutional Court tasked with adjudicating disputes between state institutions, a long-standing demand from legal experts and human rights organizations in Bissau.
Fourth, the proposal introduces a mixed electoral system that combines proportional representation with first-past-the-post constituency seats. The stated goal is to increase accountability by creating a direct link between deputies and local voters.
Finally, the draft clarifies term limits by confirming that the President may serve a maximum of two terms and that the Prime Minister must maintain the confidence of Parliament to remain in office.
The government announced that these amendments would be submitted to a national referendum on 30 August 2026.
Stakeholder Views and Criticism
The proposed reforms have generated different reactions across the political spectrum. Government spokespersons and presidential allies defend the process as necessary and urgent. They argue that the 1984 Constitution is outdated and creates structural incentives for deadlock.
Opposition parties reject both the process and much of the content of the proposals. The PAIGC has stated that any constitutional reform must first be debated and approved in Parliament. Opposition leaders also criticize the proposed expansion of presidential powers as a move toward “hyper-presidentialism” and warn that reducing the size of Parliament will weaken representation.
Civil society organizations have taken a more nuanced position. The Guinean League for Human Rights President strongly criticized the lack of public consultation, stating that the Constitution should not be drafted or revised in a hurry or tailored to people, interests or short‑term political circumstances, and that reform should be inclusive and transparent. Other NGOs have expressed concern that there is not enough time until the August 2026 referendum to allow for adequate civic education.
Several experts are calling for national dialogue and a unity government involving political parties and warn that reducing Parliament while simultaneously increasing presidential powers could undermine the system of checks and balances.
ECOWAS and the European Union expressed support for constitutional reform in principle but stressed that the process must be inclusive and respect democratic norms.
The international community has urged caution. ECOWAS and the European Union expressed support for constitutional reform in principle but stressed that the process must be inclusive and respect democratic norms. ECOWAS has mandated Senegal as mediator in the process and offered to send observers for the planned referendum.
For most citizens, daily concerns remain focused on rising food prices, irregular electricity, and youth unemployment. Yet media coverage and public debate indicate significant interest in the constitutional process. Call-in programs on national radio receive hundreds of calls each week. On social media platforms, young people debate the merits of the draft amendments. Three sentiments dominate public discussion: widespread fatigue with repeated political crises, support for the creation of a Constitutional Court to resolve future disputes, and scepticism on whether the referendum will be free, fair, and inclusive.
Path to the Referendum
The National Electoral Commission (CNE) has been tasked with organizing the referendum, while its legitimacy has been widely debated among civil society actors, political parties, and experts. Questions regarding its lack of independence arise from the context of its creation stemming from a coup d'état, in the absence of an elected parliament, and amidst a disputed referendum process.
Several organizational challenges lie ahead. In fact, given the limited time remaining before 30 August, organizing the referendum effectively will be difficult. There have been delays in distributing information to the public on the proposed changes and their implications for the country's future. Education campaigns in both Portuguese and Creole will be needed to ensure citizens understand the proposals. Voting procedures must also be explained to ensure an inclusive referendum, and voter participation will be a central topic of debate, as it could serve as a gauge of public enthusiasm.
Political inclusivity will also be essential, as a boycott by major opposition parties would undermine the legitimacy of the result.
Another key question is whether the campaign will reach enough citizens—particularly outside Bissau—before polling day. Logistical challenges of organizing a vote across the mainland and the Bijagós islands will require significant donor support. Political inclusivity will also be essential, as a boycott by major opposition parties would undermine the legitimacy of the result.
There are three potential scenarios going forward. The first is a scenario of inclusive dialogue where ECOWAS mediation leads to a brief reconvening of Parliament to debate the amendments, followed by a credible referendum with broad participation. The second is a contested referendum that proceeds without opposition support, resulting in low turnout and continued protests. The third is a scenario of institutional breakdown where dialogue fails, the decree remains in place, and the referendum is postponed indefinitely.
To avoid the latter scenarios, several steps are critical: Political leaders should reopen parliamentary debate, even in a limited format, to increase legitimacy; the timeline for the referendum should be extended to allow for proper public consultation; and the Constitutional Court should be established immediately through consensus appointments with members of civil society, academics, experts, and the diaspora. A national civic education campaign and support from ECOWAS to facilitate the dialogue are also essential.
Conclusion
Guinea-Bissau stands at another constitutional crossroads. The proposed amendments address long-standing problems including institutional deadlock, the absence of a constitutional arbiter, and an electoral system that many citizens view as unresponsive. However, the legitimacy of any reform will depend as much on the process as on the content of the amendments. A reform imposed by presidential decree risks repeating the cycle of crisis that has defined the country’s political history. A reform built through dialogue and broad consultation could finally provide the stability that Bissau-Guineans deserve.
The upcoming referendum represents both an opportunity and a test. It will test whether political leaders can prioritize national interest over partisan gain. It will test whether civil society can mobilize informed public debate. Most importantly, it will test whether citizens believe their vote can change the rules of the game. The coming weeks will determine whether Guinea-Bissau turns this crisis into an opportunity to strengthen democracy.
About the Author
Dr. Ibrahima Niang is a political analyst and researcher based in Dakar, Senegal. He focuses on constitutional governance and democratic transitions in West Africa. He has published extensively on institutional reform and conflict prevention in Africa.
Suggested Citation
Ibrahima Niang, ‘Constitutional Referendum in Guinea-Bissau: Another Constitutional Crossroads', ConstitutionNet, International IDEA, 21 August 2026, https://constitutionnet.org/news/voices/constitutional-referendum-guinea-bissau-another-constitutional-crossroads