A Mandate Deferred: The Ruling Party’s Obstruction of Constitutional Reform in Bangladesh
In February 2026, Bangladesh appeared poised for sweeping constitutional reform after voters overwhelmingly endorsed the July Charter. Yet the ruling party’s refusal to engage in the proposed Constitution Reform Assembly, and its pivot to ordinary amendment procedures, quickly cast doubt on that trajectory. What has followed suggests not a technical disagreement, but a pattern of obstruction that risks diluting a reform mandate grounded in popular will—writes Imran A Siddiq.
On 5 August 2024, after a decade and a half of systematic repression, Bangladesh saw the downfall of its brutal authoritarian regime. The moment was widely understood as a rupture, a rare opportunity for constitutional renewal and democratic re-foundation. The July Charter embodied that promise. Forged through a consensus between as many as 30 political parties and the Interim Government, it sets out a broad framework for constitutional, electoral, and administrative reforms reflecting the aspirations of the people in the aftermath of the July 2024 uprising.
On 12 February 2026, in addition to securing a victory for the Bangladesh Nationalist Party during the parliamentary elections, the people of Bangladesh delivered a resounding verdict in favour of the July Charter proposals during a nationwide constitutional referendum, with nearly 50 million citizens—an overwhelming 68% of the electorate—voting “Yes”. With such emphatic public endorsement, one might reasonably have expected the ruling party to proceed with implementation without delay. That expectation proved to be misplaced.
Derailing the Constitutional Reform Assembly
On 13 November 2025, in preparation for this institutional ‘reset’, the Interim Government enacted the July Charter (Constitution Reform) Implementation Order, 2025. The Order provided a detailed framework for translating the Charter into reality, including the holding of a referendum to secure public approval. Crucially, it envisaged that elected representatives would function not only as Members of Parliament (MPs) but also as Members of a Constitution Reform Assembly, vested with the constituent power of the people to undertake large-scale constitutional transformation.
This was not an incidental design choice. The reforms contemplated by the July Charter were not confined to minor incremental amendments; they involved changes that would potentially affect the basic structure of the Constitution, such as structural redesign, reconsideration of foundational principles, institutional restructuring, and redistribution of state powers. For instance, the Charter proposed a transition from a unicameral to a bicameral legislature and the reconfiguration of the fundamental principles of state policy—replacing ‘secularism’, ‘socialism’, and ‘nationalism’ with ‘equality’, ‘human dignity’, and ‘social justice’. Pursuing such reforms through the amendment procedure provided for in the Constitution would invite inevitable judicial scrutiny and possible invalidation. Constituent power, by contrast, operates on a higher normative plane and is not constrained by the doctrinal limits that govern ordinary amendment procedures. The Constitution Reform Assembly was therefore indispensable, not optional.
Yet, within a week of the referendum, this carefully constructed framework was derailed. On 17 February 2026, the newly elected MPs took oath as Members of Parliament. While opposition MPs also took the additional oath as Members of the Constitution Reform Assembly, in a dramatic move, the ruling party MPs refused to do so. The justification offered—that the Constitution contains no express provision for such a body or for the administration of oath in that capacity—betrays a reliance on literalism to defeat substance. Constitutions do not, and cannot, anticipate mass uprisings nor the course of the political and constitutional journey in the aftermath of such upheaval. To insist otherwise is, at best, a convenient misreading.
Challenging the Implementation Order
This pattern of obstruction did not end there. Shortly thereafter, a writ petition was filed, reportedly at the behest of ruling party affiliates, challenging the legality of the Implementation Order on the ground that the Constitution does not permit the President to issue such an Order. Once again, a narrow and formalistic reading of the Constitution was deployed, one that ignores the extraordinary political and legal circumstances that necessitated the Order in the first place. What was overlooked was that Parliament had been dissolved in the wake of the mass uprising that brought down the authoritarian regime. The uprising had triggered the constituent power of the people—a fact expressly recognised in the preamble to the Implementation Order—and it was in exercise of that power that the President issued the Order.
The subsequent issuance of a Rule Nisi by the High Court questioning the legality of the Implementation Order, while procedurally routine, was promptly appropriated as a political shield. The Court’s order provided ruling party MPs with an opportunity to argue in Parliament that the Order was void ab initio and need not be complied with. In doing so, legislators effectively assumed the role of the judiciary, purporting to invalidate a legal instrument even as its legality remained under judicial consideration.
Choosing Amendments over Comprehensive Reforms
As the reform process edged towards paralysis, the ruling party proposed an alternative: the formation of a special parliamentary committee comprising members of the Treasury Bench and the opposition to implement the July Charter. A senior Minister indicated in Parliament that the parliamentary committee would be formed for amendment, not for reform of the Constitution. The distinction it drew between “amendment” and “reform” is particularly significant. The Government made it clear that changes to the Constitution would be made under the amendment procedure set out in Article 142 of the Constitution and not in exercise of the constituent power of the people by the Constitution Reform Assembly.
However, under the ‘basic structure doctrine’, the Bangladesh Supreme Court has the power strike to down amendments altering the Constitution’s basic features, including democracy, rule of law, judicial independence, and separation of powers. The reforms the ruling party claims to support, such as bicameralism, judicial decentralisation, and revision of fundamental principles of state policy, are therefore unlikely to survive judicial scrutiny if pursued under Article 142 of the Constitution. In this context, the government’s insistence on proceeding through ordinary amendment to implement the July Charter reforms suggests not a genuine commitment to reform, but a willingness to see it fail.
What is more, Bangladesh’s recent experience with parliamentary committees on constitutional amendment offers little cause for confidence. Prior to the enactment of the Constitution (Fifteenth Amendment) Act, 2011, a 15-member Special Parliamentary Committee was constituted on 21 July 2010, dominated by members of the then ruling party, the Bangladesh Awami League, which commanded a two-thirds majority in Parliament. The Committee consulted over 100 distinguished individuals and recommended retention of the caretaker government system introduced through a political settlement among major parties in the mid-1990s. Yet, following consultations with the then Prime Minister, it abruptly reversed course and endorsed its abolition. The caretaker government system was thus dismantled despite the Committee’s earlier recommendation. This episode illustrates how parliamentary committees, particularly under conditions of overwhelming majority control, can become procedural façades for predetermined outcomes, often in subversion of broader political consensus and public expectation.
Undermining Judicial Independence
Further grounds for scepticism arise from the fact that a parliamentary committee dominated by ruling party members recommended repealing two key ordinances introduced by the Interim Government: the Supreme Court Secretariat Ordinance, 2025 and the Supreme Court Judges Appointment Ordinance, 2025. The former sought to insulate judicial administration from executive control by establishing an independent Supreme Court Secretariat responsible for matters relating to the posting, promotion, transfer, and discipline of subordinate judges. Section 7, in particular, vested these administrative functions in the Secretariat acting on behalf of the President. The latter aimed to introduce a structured and transparent process for the appointment of Supreme Court Judges through a council led by the Chief Justice, reducing arbitrariness and strengthening institutional integrity. Both measures reflect widely accepted safeguards of judicial independence. Yet the ruling party has proceeded to repeal the Ordinances despite having raised no substantive objections during consultations with the National Consensus Commission. This abrupt reversal raises legitimate concerns about the sincerity of the ruling party in implementing the July Charter reforms.
Conclusion
There can be little doubt that the constitutional reforms initiated by the Interim Government now risk being systematically undermined by the ruling party’s intransigence. By choosing the path of “amendment” to implement the July Charter, the government has placed itself in a position of convenience—retaining full control over whether, when, and in what form any constitutional amendment bill will be introduced. Although it has floated the idea of forming a parliamentary committee to consider the matter, such a step appears unlikely in the near future, particularly given the opposition’s growing mistrust in the ruling party’s approach.
What has been presented by the ruling party as a commitment to constitutionalism reflects a pattern of calculated obstruction. A reform process endorsed by an overwhelming majority of citizens is being diluted, delayed, and redirected through mechanisms that are legally fragile, if not deliberately ineffective. This is not merely a political disagreement over method. It is a subversion of the popular will. For a country emerging from authoritarian rule, such conduct does not merely stall reform but also calls into question the sincerity of the commitment to democratic transformation itself.
About the Author
Imran A Siddiq, Barrister-at-law, is a Senior Advocate. He has served as a member of Bangladesh Constitution Reform Commission (2024-2025) and a member of the expert legal panel of Bangladesh National Consensus Commission (2025).
Suggested Citation
Imran A Siddiq, ‘A Mandate Deferred: The Ruling Party’s Obstruction of Constitutional Reform in Bangladesh', ConstitutionNet, International IDEA, 15 April 2026, https://constitutionnet.org/news/voices/mandate-deferred-ruling-partys-obstruction-constitutional-reform-bangladesh
Further Reading
- Updates on constitutional developments in Bangladesh.
- Muhammad Ekramul Haque and Sumit Bisarya, July Charter and Constitutional Reforms in Bangladesh (2025).
- Sara Hossain, Bangladesh’s Referendum and Reforms: The Need to Return to a Constitutional Process (2026).
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