Thailand’s 2026 Constitutional Referendum: A Step Towards Reform or a Symbolic Victory?
In February 2026, a decisive majority of Thai voters endorsed the drafting of a new constitution, marking an unprecedented popular challenge to the military-era 2017 Constitution. This article explores the referendum’s legal foundations, the institutional resistance it faces, and the risk that a historic assertion of popular sovereignty may yet be neutralized by entrenched elite control.
On 8 February, more than 30 million people in Thailand participated in a preliminary constitutional referendum on whether the country should replace its 2017 Constitution. While the general election held on the same day resulted in a victory for the conservative Bhumjaithai party, the referendum produced a decisive outcome: over 65% of voters supported the drafting of a new constitution. After years of public calls to replace the junta-backed 2017 Constitution and amid repeated failed reform efforts, a rigid amendment procedure, and sustained judicial intervention by the Constitutional Court, the referendum results represent an unexpected and significant step toward constitutional reform in Thailand. But is the 2026 constitutional referendum a venue for vox populi to reaffirm their sovereignty, or simply a big white elephant?
The Unpopular Constitution
The current Constitution of 2017 is the legacy of the 2014 coup d’état. The National Peace and Order Council (NCPO), as the junta was known, demanded a constitution that provided a democratic façade while entrenching its conservative influence in a political process. The NCPO handpicked drafters (trusted lawyers and military generals), mandated guidance, and closely monitored the entire process. The result was a draft constitution that introduced tutelary democracy, whereby elections were only allowed with the intervention of several guardian bodies such as the Constitutional Court and other watchdog agencies that were already co-opted. These non-elected bodies are often considered elitist and anti-majoritarian, regularly and arbitrarily asserting their influence on electoral politics. The draft was put to a vote in the 2016 constitutional referendum, which was far from a fair process. The NCPO arrested anyone who criticised the draft, and as many as 62 per cent of voters were misinformed or coerced into voting in favour of the draft.
The 2017 Constitution was designed based on the junta’s distrust in the majority’s wisdom, and to distort the will of the people. The Move Forward Party, a major social democratic and progressive political party in Thailand, won a decisive victory in the 2023 general election only to be blocked from forming a government by the junta-appointed Senate, which refused to approve the prime ministerial candidate. The Constitution also imposes a long and arduous list of qualifications for political officeholders. Often, these trivial restrictions provide grounds for political opponents to harass rivals through frivolous lawsuits and disproportionately severe punishments. For instance, the Constitutional Court dissolved three major parties in 2019, 2020, and 2024 and disqualified a handful of politicians including two prime ministers for dishonesty. This zealous pursuit of clean politics is in contrast with the design of Thailand’s non-elected bodies. Although critics regularly raised concerns about expanding the role of the judiciary and watchdog agencies, which could further jeopardize the separation of powers, the 2017 drafters removed the impeachment procedure and assigned judges greater roles in disciplining politicians. For example, the Constitutional Court could remove a political office holder for committing a vaguely termed “unethical act.”
Empirically, under the 2017 Constitution, Thailand’s corruption index rapidly worsened, instead of moving towards eradicating corruption, restoring the rule of law, and instilling a sense of accountability in the country.
A Pointless Referendum
Calls to amend the 2017 Constitution began even before its promulgation. A similar call was made during the 2020 youth uprising—with key demands including the resignation of former Prime Minister Prayuth, reforming the monarchy, and a new constitution—and again during the 2023 election campaigns. The ultimate goal was to create a constitution drafting assembly made of the people’s representatives. However, the 2017 drafters introduced an impossibly high threshold to amend it with silence on the procedure to adopt a new constitution.
According to Section 256 of the Constitution, an amendment needs to be approved by a legislative supermajority within which at least one-third of the senators and 20 percent of the opposition must vote in favour. Moreover, according to the same provision, if the amendment would alter provisions which the Constitution considers critical, for example, the monarchy, the amendment procedure, the judiciary, or the watchdog agencies, a referendum is required. Lastly, Section 256 provides that an amendment may be subject to judicial review by the Constitutional Court before the King signs it into law. The entire process, while claiming to ensure that an amendment is democratic and consensual, provides the minority and elites with the upper hand in controlling and vetoing any radical change to the status quo.
A 2025 decision settled the debate, clarifying that a constitutional replacement requires three referendums in total (...).
In 2012, the Constitutional Court ruled that an amendment intended to replace the entire constitution could not be treated as an ordinary amendment because the constitution derives its authority from the people and therefore requires explicit popular consent before a wholesale constitutional replacement can proceed. This principle was reaffirmed in 2021 when the Constitutional Court clarified that the existing constitution could, in principle, be replaced, but only through a constitution-making process distinct from the ordinary amendment procedure and grounded in popular sovereignty. The Court indicated that a referendum was required before the drafting of a new constitution, and another referendum to approve the completed draft. However, the Court did not clarify whether the first referendum corresponded to the amendment procedure under Section 256. A 2025 decision settled the debate, clarifying that a constitutional replacement requires three referendums in total: an initial referendum to authorize the drafting of a new constitution, a second referendum in accordance with Section 256 to approve the drafting process, and a final referendum to approve the completed draft. The requirement of a preliminary referendum is, however, controversial because it is not provided for in the constitutional text but derives from the Constitutional Court’s interpretation.
Based on this framework, the 2026 preliminary referendum asking whether people wanted a new constitution at all took place on 8 February, concurrently with the general election. According to the Constitutional Court, the first and second referendums could have taken place at the same time. However, the unexpected dissolution of the House of Representatives in December left the Parliament no chance to prepare the amendment bill on time for the second referendum to take place concurrently.
Headwinds for the Referendum
The outcome of the referendum is impressive. Roughly 19 million Thais voted in favour, while 10 million rejected the idea of a new constitution. Almost three million voted ‘no opinion’. Voter turnout was at 65 percent. Geographically, the South, which is known as a stronghold of the conservatives, overwhelmingly voted against the proposal.
This victory was not an easy one to reach. Due to several factors, campaigners struggled and, at one point, the possibility of resounding rejection seemed a real possibility. First, the Election Commission (EC), which should act as a rule-keeper, is perceived as incompetent and biased. Second, the conservative elites tried to counter the amendment campaign with misinformation and royalism.
The incumbent government paid no attention to communicating with the people on the referendum.
The EC was responsible for overseeing the referendum and the general election, which were held on the same day. However, it seemed that the EC tried its best not to facilitate the referendum. The two events were managed separately, resulting in great confusion among the public. The incumbent government paid no attention to communicating with the people on the referendum. While an election permits advance voting, the EC later ruled that advance voting was not permissible for a referendum. This decision undoubtedly excluded a significant number of voters who had already registered for advance voting before being informed that they had to vote for the referendum on the actual date. Millions of Thais who live abroad were not informed about registration for overseas referendum vote.
The EC also has a record of poor performance, which is a combination of its capture by the NCPO and the conservative party, as well as bureaucratic stagnation. Under the 2017 Constitution, the seven incumbents enjoy virtually absolute impunity and therefore feel no accountability to the people. Initially, the EC prohibited political parties from discussing the referendum, until someone pointed out that the law did not, in fact, prohibit such practices. Ironically, it was the EC—explicitly prohibited by law from taking a stance—that criticised the referendum in a pamphlet delivered to every voter. The pamphlet explained that a constitutional replacement could more likely instigate a political conflict and was also more wasteful than an amendment. Although it failed to raise public awareness, the EC pursued legal action against social media accounts that promoted the referendum, accusing them of spreading false information. Meanwhile, thousands of fake social media accounts spreading misinformation against the referendum flourished.
However, the EC was not the only challenge. The ultra-conservative politicians, media, and influencers, such as Thai Pakdi and Rak Chat parties resisted the call for a new constitution, considering the 2017 Constitution a symbol of patriotism and royalism. An alteration, even minor, would signify defeat to popular democratic activism. The 2017 Constitution confers total dominance of the country upon them, and they are therefore unwilling to relinquish their grip on power.
What is more, the conservative elites and the democratic activists have little trust in each other and are therefore unable to reach any compromise. Some ultra-conservative elites believe that a participatory drafting process would allow democratic activists to dominate the design of the new constitution and potentially use it to undermine judicial independence, anti-corruption measures, and ultimately threaten the constitutional monarchy. This fear is baseless, as such change would likely not be so sudden or radical. The Parliament still has to convene, parties have to discuss the possible outline and timeline of the new drafting process, and the Senate and Constitutional Court still retain control over the amendment process. However, the ultra-conservative faction deliberately spread such rumours to convince people to vote against the new constitution.
On the other hand, democratic activists failed to provide the public with a tentative outlook of what the new constitution would look like, conveniently leaving the content of the amendments to the new CDA. This is a fatal flaw since this blank cheque provided the conservatives with ample opportunity to project their fears and doubt on the public.
Faced with the EC’s inefficiency and inertia, a network of citizens stepped in to undertake the duty of raising awareness among the public in the weeks that preceded the referendum. They made short videos inviting people to vote. Many forums were organized to discuss the necessity of getting rid of the military-era constitution. The last two weeks became the critical period when the tide was eventually turned in favour of the democratic activists.
Looking Forward
Thailand has a poor record of constitutional referendums. In 2007 and 2016, referendums were employed as a tool to legitimize an authoritarian constitution and further weaken popular democracy. The impact of a single referendum can last for about a decade. For instance, in the years following the 2016 referendum, particularly between 2020 and 2025, it was repeatedly invoked to encourage the younger generation to accept the status quo, even as they sought to right the wrongs of their predecessors. The 2026 constitutional referendum was the first one initiated by the popular movement but it faced strong obstacles.
This victory is only a small step in Thailand’s constitutional journey. It shows that there is a possibility of change for this ailing country. Nevertheless, such change will not happen quickly. Political parties and citizens are now being called to submit their proposals for a new constitution. The new Parliament shall convene to consider these proposals. Both those who support and reject the new constitution have a chance to debate over the path forward. The amendment’s success depends on the Senate, the Constitutional Court, and the next two rounds of referendum.
Not every political party is enthusiastic about replacing the 2017 Constitution, which they see as a way to dismantle the elite’s control over Thai politics.
This victory is also bittersweet. Not every political party is enthusiastic about replacing the 2017 Constitution, which they see as a way to dismantle the elite’s control over Thai politics. While the majority of Thais voted for constitutional change, the general election, held on the same day, resulted in the landslide victory of the Bhumjaithai (BJT) party. The BJT identified itself closely with the military and the monarchy, the two forces behind the 2017 Constitution. It therefore has no incentive to instigate any change that can potentially upset the establishment, such as reforms to the Constitutional Court and the watchdog agencies. The BJT adamantly insisted that a constitutional change could not affect constitutional provisions related to the monarchy.
BJT’s electoral success might therefore mean that the agenda for the new constitution would be reduced to minor changes that only benefit conservative politicians. Tragically, such misalignment between citizens and political parties means that the people might vote “no” in the next referendum.
About the Author
Khemthong Tonsakulrungruang is a constitutional law scholar who teaches at the Faculty of Political Science, Chulalongkorn University in Bangkok, Thailand.
Suggested Citation
Khemthong Tonsakulrungruang, ‘Thailand’s 2026 Constitutional Referendum: A Step Towards Reform or a Symbolic Victory?’, ConstitutionNet, International IDEA, 10 February 2026, https://constitutionnet.org/news/voices/thailands-2026-constitutional-referendum-step-towards-reform-or-symbolic-victory
Further Reading
- Updates on constitutional developments in Thailand.
- Ponson Liengboonlertchai, Do you hear the people sing?: Thais demand a democratic constitution to replace the junta.
- International IDEA, Primer on Direct Democracy.
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