A New Constitution for Chad: Sowing the Seeds of a Personalised and Dynastic Political Regime

In October 2025, Chad’s government pushed through major constitutional amendments extending presidential terms to seven years, abolishing term limits, and allowing President Mahamat Idriss Déby Itno to lead his ruling party. Passed under the guise of a “technical revision” and without public consultation, the reform consolidates Déby's grip on power amid a silenced opposition. Nathan Leubnoudji Tah analyzes how this shift reshapes Chad’s political order by creating a constitutional framework that favors presidential longevity over peaceful alternation of power, raising concerns about the country’s democratic and institutional future.

In October 2025, the Chadian Parliament adopted major controversial amendments to the 2023 Constitution. These include the extension of the duration of presidential terms from five to seven years, the removal of presidential term limits, and the lifting of the ban preventing the President from holding partisan positions. These reforms were overwhelmingly approved by the National Assembly in September and subsequently approved by the Senate in early October in a tense political context marked by the near monopoly of the ruling party and the repression of the opposition. Following endorsement of the amendments by Parliament, President Mahamat Idriss Déby Itno promptly promulgated the new version of the Constitution on 8 October 2025, thereby strengthening presidential powers and deeply altering governance rules in the country. The changes were effected largely behind closed doors and without any public consultations.

Political and Legal Context of the Reform

The reforms are part of Chad’s political trajectory since 2021, the year Mahamat Idriss Déby took power following the death of his father, President Idriss Déby Itno, and the adoption of the 2023 Constitution and its promise to restore constitutional order and lay the groundwork for new national institutions.

The Patriotic Salvation Movement (MPS), the party of President Mahamat Idriss Déby Itno, holds a large majority in Parliament since the legislative elections of December 2024 and subsequent (indirect) senatorial elections of February 2025. The 2024 elections were highly controversial and disputed as several opposition parties either boycotted the polls or were repressed. In the newly formed National Assembly, 124 out of the 188 seats (65.95%) are held by the ruling party. Additionally, 32 seats are occupied by members of allied parties. In the 46-member Senate, only five belong to the opposition, three of whom were appointed by the President.

Thus, Mahamat Idriss Déby Itno effectively holds full control of both the executive and legislative branches, allowing him to amend the Constitution without major resistance. In fact, according to Article 280 of the 2023 Constitution, constitutional amendments require a two-thirds majority in Parliament and a confirmatory referendum. However, in case of “technical revisions”, such referendum is not necessary if the amendments are approved by a three-fifths majority in Parliament. As will be described below, such threshold was easily reached in this case.

Since the tragic events of October 2022 (...) the democratic opposition, represented by the “Wakit-Tamma” citizen platform and the political party “Les Transformateurs,” has been silenced.

Meanwhile, the political scene is devoid of any serious opposition capable of challenging the regime. Since the tragic events of October 2022—when security forces violently repressed pro-democracy demonstrations in N’Djamena and other cities, resulting in dozens of deaths, injuries, and mass arrests—the democratic opposition, represented by the “Wakit-Tamma” citizen platform and the political party “Les Transformateurs,” has been silenced. Since that date, Dr. Succès Masra, leader of Les Transformateurs, is the only opposition figure forced into exile to have returned to Chad after the Kinshasa Agreement of October 2023. However, on 9 August 2025—only days before the constitutional revision process began—Dr. Masra, considered the only opposition leader capable of mobilizing large crowds, was sentenced to twenty years in prison in a controversial case. With his removal and the weakening of his party, the few dissenting voices left in Chad are those of the Group of Political Actors Consultation (GCAP), which brings together about ten political leaders, and some activists and media outlets based abroad. Inside the country, the media operate under strict control of the intelligence services and the High Authority for Media and Audiovisual (HAMA), the national regulatory body.

The reform thus takes place in a climate where opposition figures have been prosecuted or imprisoned in recent months, where independent media outlets are absent, and where executive and legislative powers are concentrated in the hands of President Mahamat Idriss Déby Itno.

Main Legal Amendments

The stated purpose of the reform is to “technically adapt” the 2023 Constitution. However, a revision that modifies the Constitution from the preamble to the final provisions, even affecting areas of sovereignty, can hardly be considered technical. The reference to a “technical revision” is therefore a means to avoid the requirement to hold a public referendum.  

The overwhelming majority in favor of the Bill in Parliament was portrayed as evidence of its political validation.

The initiative for this constitutional revision was led by a group of 56 members of parliament from the ruling majority, who submitted a constitutional bill proposing amendments to the Constitution of 29 December 2023 to the Bureau of the National Assembly. A Special Committee was then established to review the proposal, and its report was fully adopted by the National Assembly on 15 September 2025, with a majority of 171 votes in favor and only one against. On 3 October, this constitutional amendment—which, according to established procedure, requires adoption by both chambers meeting in Congress—was approved by 236 out of 257 votes in favor, with some abstentions, in line with the legislative procedure for constitutional revision. The final step was the promulgation of bill within 15 days of the Congress vote. On 8 October, ten days ahead of the deadline, the President of the Republic promulgated the constitutional revision, which thereby entered into force. Supporters of the reform argue that the reform guarantees stability, continuity, and legitimacy following the recent elections. The overwhelming majority in favor of the Bill in Parliament was portrayed as evidence of its political validation.

Some of the fundamental changes introduced include::

1. A Presidential Term Without Limits 

The December 2023 Constitution had set a clear institutional framework with a 5-year presidential term renewable once (Article 67). The new text now reads: “The President of the Republic is elected by direct universal suffrage for a term of seven (7) years, renewable.” This is not merely an extension of the term from five to seven years, but also the abolition of term limits, allowing indefinite re-election. To align electoral calendars, Article 113 also extends the parliamentary term from five to six years.

2. Partisanship of the Head of State 

Another controversial change concerns the political partisanship of the President. The new Constitution allows the President to hold office within a political party and even lead it. In January 2025, President Mahamat Idriss Déby Itno was appointed as the president of the Patriotic Salvation Movement (MPS), the ruling party founded and led by his late father for thirty-one years. This contradicted Article 77 of the 2023 Constitution, which prohibited the President from engaging in partisan or union activities. The new Article 77 lifts that restriction.

3. Reaffirmation of National Sovereignty 

The reaffirmation of national sovereignty, present in all previous Chadian constitutions, is strengthened with a new paragraph in the Preamble declaring: “We, the Chadian people, solemnly affirm through this Constitution our full and complete sovereignty and our unwavering will to freely determine our future, our institutions, and our development, free from any foreign interference.” It is clear that the introduction of this paragraph is an expression of the desire for sovereignty displayed by the Chadian government after the controversial departure of the French army in January 2025. However, a simple proclamation can hardly be considered as enough to establish sovereignty.

4. The Position of Deputy Prime Minister

Finally, an optional position of Deputy Prime Minister is introduced under the new Article 99, which states: “The Government is composed of the Prime Minister and the ministers. The Government may also include a Deputy Prime Minister, Minister of State, Deputy Minister, and Secretary of State.” This is a notable shift, considering that the 2018 Constitution had abolished the position of Prime Minister, which was later reinstated in 2021 by the Transitional Charter established by the military junta. The 2023 Constitution maintained this role, and the amendments now add the post of Deputy Prime Minister, reportedly to improve governmental coordination and administrative efficiency.

Government Rejoices, Opposition Fears Chaos, International Community Doubts

At the national level, the opposition protested the changes. Twenty-one opposition members of Parliament (MPs) boycotted or walked out of the final vote, denouncing a breach of democratic principles and what they called a “securitized” grip on power. Political arrests and convictions of opposition members served to reinforce the perception of a deliberate consolidation of power.

The response of civil society at home has been subdued. In any case, the reality of civil society organizations in Chad should be understood from two perspectives. First, while what is commonly referred to as the “real civil society” was for a long time the only actor in the field, a new civil society has emerged around 2010 consisting of organizations whose creation was largely inspired or supported by those in power. Second, the spirit of the “real civil society” appears to have weakened following the dismantling of the coalition of opposition and civil society “Wakit-Tamma” in 2022. As a result, apart from a few human rights organizations, there is now virtually no independent civil society in the country. Consequently, the responses publicly attributed to civil society regarding this constitutional revision essentially mirror the government’s position.

The 2023 Constitution is a referendum-based law, meaning that any amendment to it should be submitted to a popular vote. In attempting to bypass this requirement, the government refers to the change as a “technical revision.” All those opposing this move are therefore calling for a referendum — which is unlikely to take place. Meanwhile, the ruling coalition defended the changes as an institutional reorganization necessary to ensure national stability and continuity. It therefore rejoiced at the adoption of the constitutional reform, describing the high parliamentary support as “an unprecedented political and social consensus.” Among the international community and Chad’s partners, skepticism prevails. Several press agencies and international observers have expressed concern over the erosion of democratic guarantees and the potential for political instability. Diplomatic missions remain cautious, while human rights organizations have publicly voiced criticism and hinted that bilateral relations should be reconsidered.

Likely Implications

The new Constitution, whose main objective is to entrench executive power, could have significant legal, political, security, and diplomatic consequences. Legally, abolishing term limits and extending the presidential term reshapes electoral dynamics by limiting political alternation, and ensuring the consolidation of a dynastic system. At the same time, the amendments further weaken checks and balances. Allowing the President to lead a political party may reduce the state’s institutional neutrality and erode the separation of powers. As Max Kemkoye, spokesman for the opposition platform Group of Political Actors Consultation critically stated: “There is no longer any difference between the MPs and the Republic.”

Given the current context of political repression, overwhelming parliamentary dominance, and the perception of regime entrenchment, the likelihood of protest or political crisis increases in the absence of effective institutional channels for opposition.

These swift constitutional revisions also reveal two major realities. On the one hand, they indicate that Mahamat Idriss Déby Itno’s regime has become self-sufficient. On the other hand, the space for plural expression has been drastically reduced. Consequently, the risks of internal tensions are high. Given the current context of political repression, overwhelming parliamentary dominance, and the perception of regime entrenchment, the likelihood of protest or political crisis increases in the absence of effective institutional channels for opposition. This scenario echoes that of 2005, where constitutional changes and political exclusion sparked major rebel uprisings and triggered one of Chad’s most dangerous rebel movements. At that time, former President Idriss Déby Itno had amended the Constitution to remove term limits, allowing him to run indefinitely. His nephews, Timan and Tom Erdimi—one of whom was then Chief of Staff at the Presidency—defected and launched a rebel coalition known as the United Front for Change (FUC), which besieged N'Djamena for two days in 2008. This historical parallel suggests that Chad’s current trajectory may once again sow the seeds of violent contestation if avenues for political inclusion remain closed.

Conclusion

The constitutional reform profoundly alters Chad’s power structure, creating a constitutional framework that favors presidential longevity over peaceful alternation of power and checks and balances. The process of change maneuvered a constitutional design defect that sought to make a distinction between “substantive” and “technical” changes. The failure to make term limit provisions unamendable, as is the case in several francophone African countries also made it easy to cloth the changes under the veer of technical legality. Moreover, the changes occurred in a context of opposition silencing and growing concern over the future of checks and balances and civil liberties. Adopted and promulgated in haste amid heightened political tensions, the new Constitution undermines the spirit of national renewal and reconciliation once promised, casting a long shadow over the country’s future.

Nathan Leubnoudji Tah is the Publishing Director of Le Mirador newspaper, Vice-President of the Union of Chadian Journalists, and Executive Secretary of the Chadian Journalist Reporters Network.

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Suggested citation: Nathan Leubnoudji Tah, ‘A New Constitution for Chad: Sowing the Seeds of a Personalised and Dynastic Political Regime’, ConstitutionNet, International IDEA, 4 November 2025, https://constitutionnet.org/news/voices/new-constitution-chad-sowing-seeds-personalised-and-dynastic-political-regime

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