Out of Illiberal Christian Democracy: Hungary’s Prospects for Constitutional Resettlement
Following TISZA’s landslide victory in the 2026 Hungarian elections, the new government of Péter Magyar has begun dismantling key elements of Viktor Orbán’s illiberal constitutional system while opening the prospect of broader constitutional reform. Amid negotiations to unfreeze EU funds and growing expectations for democratic recovery, Hungary may be entering a constitutional moment with implications far beyond its borders — writes Renáta Uitz
On 12 May 2026, the government of Péter Magyar was sworn in, ending the 16-year rule of Prime Minister Viktor Orbán of the FIDESZ party, a self-proclaimed illiberal Christian democrat who has become a central figure in Hungary’s transnational illiberal politics. During the April 2026 national election, Magyar’s TISZA Party (‘Respect and Freedom Party’)—a new center-right, pro-European conservative political formation—won a comfortable two-thirds constitution-making majority in Parliament (141 out of 199 seats) with the support of 53% of Hungarian voters. TISZA ran a robust campaign promising sweeping political regime changes as well as anti-corruption and accountability measures, without advocating for constitutional reform. Magyar raised the prospect of constitutional change during the closing rally of the TISZA campaign.
On 20 May 2026, the first set of bills were introduced in the new Parliament, including the Sixteenth Amendment to the Fundamental Law comprising highly symbolic and potentially consequential measures such as the establishment of an 8-year term limit on the office of the Prime Minister. This constitutional amendment proposal sits within a broader political effort to expose the 2024 presidential pardon scandal and establish five parliamentary committees of inquiry to address the most controversial abuses of power during the Orbán era. It may be the precursor to a comprehensive constitutional reform that Magyar anticipates being a longer process requiring careful preparation and adoption via referendum.
Hungary’s Fundamental Law, adopted by the Orbán government in 2011, has come to symbolize the hubris of illiberal constitutionalism. Comprehensive constitutional reform would demonstrate the Magyar government’s commitment to the founding values of the European Union (EU) and may also facilitate the removal of potential constitutional veto players. In more consequential terms, the Magyar government has an unprecedented opportunity to launch a constitutional resettlement process that could set a broader international benchmark for post-illiberal constitutional repair with equally high stakes for illiberal mischief and foul play.
A constitutional moment in the making?
Diverse political forces appear to inspire constitutional adjustments in the country, potentially building a constitutional moment. TISZA’s April 2026 victory provided the incoming Magyar government with a constitutional majority in Parliament, an advantage that President Biden in the United States post-“Trump I” (2021), President Lula in Brazil post-Bolsonaro (2023) or Prime Minister Tusk in Poland post-PiS (2023) did not secure.
As the Magyar government’s first legislative package demonstrates, delivering on TISZA’s key election promises will require adjustments to the Fundamental Law.
As the Magyar government’s first legislative package demonstrates, delivering on TISZA’s key election promises will require adjustments to the Fundamental Law. In addition to the 8-year term-limit on the premiership, the Sixteenth Amendment proposes abolishing the Sovereignty Protection Office (repealing Article R(4)) and removing the possibility of transferring ‘public interest asset management foundations’ to public ownership and government management (amending Article 38 on public assets).
The Sovereignty Protection Office was established in 2025 to counter foreign influence in public life, and immediately prompted criticism as a departure from European constitutional standards and an infringement action currently pending before the CJEU (Case C-829/24). Curiously, the proposed amendment would also remove the provision according to which the “protection of the constitutional identity and Christian culture of Hungary shall be an obligation of every organ of the State.” If intentional, this might indicate the Magyar government’s commitment to undoing the constitutional script of illiberal Christian democracy.
The public interest asset management foundations were introduced in 2020 through the Ninth Amendment to the Fundamental Law. These were used to abolish the autonomy of state universities and to transfer assets to pro-FIDESZ institutions (like the Mathias Corvinus Collegium, a Christian-conservative think tank and intellectual hub) and other allies. The measure has long been a point of contention between Hungary and the European Commission, and resulted in the exclusion of Hungarian universities funded by such formats from the Erasmus scheme, which had already triggered cosmetic changes to the arrangement in 2024.
Unfreezing EU funds: Hard conditionality
TISZA’s landslide victory happened on a historic day: thirteen years before, on 12 April 2003, 84% of Hungarian voters approved joining the EU in a referendum. Magyar insisted that his government be sworn in on 9 May, Europe Day. This is in sharp contrast with the outlook Orbán offered to Hungarian voters. By election day, he was engaged in an unprecedented standoff with the EU , blocking efforts to extend a EUR 90 billion loan to Ukraine, while the EU was simultaneously withholding an estimated EUR 35 billion in funds from Hungary due to serious rule of law and corruption concerns.
Normalization of relations with the EU is high on Magyar’s agenda, starting with ‘bringing EU funds home,’ including a EUR 10 billion pandemic recovery fund expected to expire at the end of August, over EUR 7 billion regular EU funds and an additional EUR 17 billion in defence loans. Negotiations started almost immediately following the elections: the European Commission’s delegation visited Budapest to commence technical negotiations before the new government had even been formed. As a first step, the issue of Hungary’s veto over the EU’s loan package for Ukraine was untied from the issue concerning the frozen funds. Shortly afterwards, Orbán—still serving as the outgoing Prime Minister—unexpectedly agreed to lift Hungary’s veto on the EU’s wartime assistance loan to Ukraine.
Currently, negotiations focus on the release of the frozen [EU] funds, which depends on the Hungarian government meeting a set of conditions under different conditionality schemes.
Currently, negotiations focus on the release of the frozen funds, which depends on the Hungarian government meeting a set of conditions under different conditionality schemes. These include the implementation of robust anti-corruption measures, the restoration of judicial independence, and ensuring public participation in law-making. These requirements take the form of “27 super-milestones” to be met by August 2026 alongside additional conditions which, according to analyses by civil society organizations, the Hungarian government has so far refused to meet. The conditions for accessing EU funds do not call for constitutional amendment per se, and arguably can be met via statutory changes pending the signature of the President of the Republic, Tamás Sulyok (who is also the former president of the Constitutional Court and was elected by a FIDESZ-dominated Parliament in 2024 for a 5-year term). Shortly after his electoral victory, Magyar has repeatedly called on President Sulyok to resign by 31 May before he is removed, a call FIDESZ loyalists rushed to call unconstitutional and President Sulyok appears to resist.
The European Commission is supportive of the Magyar government’s efforts, yet cautious. It is well-aware that presidential veto could become an obstacle in the way of delivering on the conditionality milestones. When, in 2023, the freshly elected pro-European Polish government of Donald Tusk sought access to EU funds withheld under the same conditionality mechanism, the Commission agreed to release the funds based on an ambitious action plan. However, the activation of this plan ultimately failed due to the veto plays of President Duda. To this day, the Tusk government is still manoeuvring around these presidential vetoes. Thanks to the Polish experience, European institutions have a better understanding of the complexities of constitutional recovery in the shadow of veto plays that are supported by robust transnational illiberal political networks. While the Commission’s support for alternative solutions mitigates the impact of presidential veto plays, its approach inspires concerns about the legality of the Commission’s decisions in operating the conditionality mechanism.
Beyond hard conditionality: Building good will in Europe
Shortly after the elections, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) provided the new Hungarian government with an excellent opportunity to show its commitment to European values beyond complying with hard conditionality milestones. On 21 April 2026, the CJEU delivered its long-awaited judgement in the infringement case against the 2021 Hungarian law that introduced a Russian-style ban on the propaganda of homosexuality in defence of children’s rights (C-769/22, Commission v Hungary).
In its ruling, the CJEU confirmed the legally binding nature of the Union’s founding values (including respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law, and human rights) set out in Article 2 of the Treaty of the European Union (TEU) together with the judicial enforceability of Article 2 TEU. The CJEU reiterated that “Article 2 TEU is not merely a statement of policy guidelines or intentions but contains values which are an integral part of the very identity of the European Union as a common legal order, values which are given concrete expression in principles containing legally binding obligations for the Member States”. The CJEU based this finding on the principle of mutual trust, which was cemented through the original political commitment underlying the obligations assumed by Member States at the time of EU accession.
Implementing the CJEU judgment without delay would therefore demonstrate the Magyar government’s commitment to complying with international obligations.
The repeal of the 2021 law is one of the conditions listed in the EU hard conditionality list (among the horizontal conditions enabling the effective application and implementation of the Charter of Fundamental Rights). Implementing the CJEU judgment without delay would therefore demonstrate the Magyar government’s commitment to complying with international obligations. Full compliance would require not only repealing the 2021 law, but also the underlying provisions of the Fundamental Law introduced by the Fifteenth Amendment in 2025 (i.e. the exact same technical skills demonstrated by the recently tabled Sixteenth Amendment).
In a letter dated 30 April, then-sitting Prime Minister Viktor Orbán declared that Hungary would not enforce the CJEU judgment as it represents a call for repealing (what he sees as) child protection measures. In response, President Sulyok stated that it was for the incoming Parliament to develop a legal solution that “maintains a high level of child protection while ensuring a proper harmony between EU law, the constitutional requirements of the Fundamental Law and relevant international legal norms, in order to achieve a fair balance.” This response appears to echo the CJEU’s reasoning on mutual trust, while not ruling out the use of presidential veto grounded in constitutional doubts. Statesmanship would favour the former approach, while Polish President Nawrocki has recently provided a prominent example of the latter.
Expectations and prospects
Adopting a new constitution may be the most conventional, convincing and cost-effective way for the Magyar government to mark a historic break with illiberal rule and demonstrate its commitment to returning Hungary to the path of European constitutional democracy. To set it apart from the Fundamental Law—and the political, social, and intellectual context in which it emerged—a new constitution would need to be embedded within a broader constitutional resettlement process, aimed at building a new social contract in a polarized political community. Amendments to the Fundamental Law signal the Magyar government’s openness to consider constitutional reform. Although the recently proposed 8-year term limit on the premiership is largely seen as a measure to prevent Orbán from returning to power, it is as much a message of self-constraint and can be considered a gesture of pre-commitment to resettling constitutional democracy after illiberal rule.
At the same time, this landslide victory also made TISZA (and Péter Magyar specifically) a target of illiberal efforts that seek to undermine constitutional democratic repair and recovery. Labelling Magyar and TISZA as ‘liberal’ serves to position them as legitimate targets of illiberal challenges on a transnational scale. As Orbán decided not to join Parliament as the leader of the opposition, he has ample time—and an unmatched global network—to mobilize the resources of illiberal culture change. This global infrastructure includes not only political actors in the government and opposition but also think tanks and online platforms in Hungary, Europe and the United States. Following the 2024 European Parliament elections, FIDESZ founded the ‘Patriots for Europe’ party, uniting right-wing and far-right sovereigntist and euro-sceptic forces in what now constitutes the European Parliament’s third largest political group. The Patriots have been actively challenging the European Parliament’s cordon sanitaire and remain vocal about their rule of law objections.
The prospect of a participatory constitutional reform process, including the use of a referendum, signals a departure from the amendment procedure under the Fundamental Law currently in force.
The prospect of a participatory constitutional reform process, including the use of a referendum, signals a departure from the amendment procedure under the Fundamental Law currently in force. That framework provides a predominantly parliamentary process concluded by a presidential promulgation for constitutional change. It remains to be seen whether these participatory elements are meant to be consultative and complement the current amendment formula or rather represent a constitutional restart. The new Parliament is to have a dedicated standing committee for public participation. In the spirit of breaking with the past, this new Parliament may well decide to call a constitutional convention, which would free up the Parliament’s finite resources for delivering on TISZA’s election manifesto, allowing it to focus on meeting the conditions for accessing the frozen EU funds. A constitutional convention, such as public participation in any kind of law-making, certainly carries the risk of disruption and obstruction by illiberal forces. At the same time, it also offers possibilities for constitutional resettlement, opening an opportunity to engage TISZA’s active political movement as well as the supporters of other political forces.
During the past years of democratic backsliding in the country, Hungarian civil society and academia have accumulated ample knowledge and professional networks that will serve as an invaluable resource in supporting constitutional resettlement. They can mobilize insight for designing and conducting a credible constitution-making process involving European constitutional actors and international stakeholders, which may help in identifying blind spots and avoiding (at least some) traps and missteps along the way.
About the Author
Renáta Uitz is professor of law and government at Royal Holloway, University of London, and a senior research fellow at the Central European University’s Democracy Institute in Budapest.
Suggested Citation
Renáta Uitz, ‘Out of Illiberal Christian Democracy: Hungary’s Prospects for Constitutional Resettlement', ConstitutionNet, International IDEA, 26 May 2026, https://constitutionnet.org/news/voices/out-illiberal-christian-democracy-hungarys-prospects-constitutional-resettlement