Nepal’s Gen Z Movement and Constitutional Crisis
In September 2025, Nepal’s youth-led “Gen Z movement” erupted in response to a nationwide social media ban, escalating into violent clashes that toppled the government. Bipin Adhikari examines how the protests exposed deep structural flaws in the 2015 Constitution, prompted the appointment of an interim prime minister outside normal parliamentary procedures, and set in motion a constitutional review process. This analysis considers the movement’s causes, the interim government’s challenges, and the prospects for meaningful reform amid political instability and public demands for accountability.
Nepal’s “Gen Z movement” is a digitally driven youth uprising led by students and urban youths. It was triggered by the government’s decision on 4 September 2025 to ban 26 major social media platforms—including Facebook, YouTube, WhatsApp, X, Instagram and Signal—for failing to register in Nepal with local representatives under newly imposed digital regulations. For many young Nepalis, this move was more than a bureaucratic step: it represented a direct assault on freedom of expression, digital connectivity, and modern ways of living. Coupled with years of perceived nepotism, elite capture, economic stagnation, and limited job prospects, the ban provided a unifying grievance. The process escalated when the police killed 19 protesters on 8 September 2025, including a 12-year-old child.
The scale of the violence, the collapse of the government, and the subsequent appointment of an interim administration outside the normal parliamentary process transformed the protests into a broader constitutional reckoning, reviving long-standing debates about accountability, representation, and reform. As the country moves toward establishing a constitutional amendment recommendation commission, this piece will explore the dynamics of Nepal's Gen Z movement, examining its causes, impacts, and the broader constitutional and political challenges it highlights, while considering the potential for future constitutional reforms and the deepening political crisis.
Context
Despite eliciting mixed reactions from stakeholders across Nepal’s diverse society, the 2015 Constitution of Nepal is the most progressive constitutions the country has had. While it kept many features from previous constitutions like the basic fundamental rights of the citizens, the parliamentary system of government, the bicameral parliament, and the principle of independence of judiciary, it also introduced new features such as a federal system composed of three levels of government—federal, provincial, and local—additional economic, social and cultural rights, a mixed system of first-past-the-post, proportional and inclusive elections to the legislatures at all levels, and a fundamental right to proportional inclusion in state structures.
Despite it being progressive, there has been consistent public pressure in the country for effective implementation of the Constitution to address what critics point out as structural flaws. In fact, some stakeholders consider that ethnic and regional fault lines remain unresolved in the text: internal boundaries for provinces do not always align with the country’s rich linguistic, ethnic, and cultural diversity, and many marginalized communities continue to feel excluded. Moreover, political instability has been a recurring feature of Nepal’s post-monarchy era. Since the abolition of the monarchy in 2008, Nepal has seen more than a dozen governments, including 14 prime ministers—often the same individuals—representing short-lived, and often fragile (and unprincipled) coalitions. Frequent cabinet reshuffles, shifting alliances, and failure to deliver durable solutions to persistent problems such as corruption, unemployment, and underdevelopment have gradually eroded public trust.
In this context of structural uncertainty, unfulfilled promises, and deepening economic frustration—especially among younger Nepalis—the Gen Z movement, which had no apparent political affiliation, erupted in September 2025 to demand an end to corruption and censorship, and a guarantee for good governance.
From Social-Media Ban to the “Gen Z Movement”: The Spark and the Explosion
The Gen Z movement was peaceful, not claimed by any organization, lacked declared rules, regulations, or a manifesto, and showed no desire to engage in politics or participate in the governance process. However, what began as a largely peaceful protest on the morning of 8 September quickly escalated. The Gen Z protesters were joined by many other individuals, and the growing crowd started to become aggressive. Security forces responded with water cannons, tear gas, rubber bullets, and eventually live ammunitions.
By the end of September, following excessive use of force by the police, at least 75 civilians died and more than 2,000 were injured nationwide.
The first police firing on 8 September marked one of the deadliest single days of violence against civilians in Nepal’s modern democratic history. By the end of September, following excessive use of force by the police, at least 75 civilians died and more than 2,000 were injured nationwide. Simultaneously, the protests expanded beyond Kathmandu, as young people across the country joined in. In an extraordinary turn of events, on 9 September, some protesters (Gen Z or others) stormed the federal parliament, large government buildings, police posts and the residences of political leaders. Arson and looting followed and major state institutions including the legislative, executive, and parts of the judiciary buildings were damaged. More than $586 million in losses to Nepal's $42 billion economy were recorded by the government panel report on damage from the September Gen Z movement. In the meantime, some Gen Z demonstrators continued to remind fellow protesters that they did not associate with these activities and that such actions were not the objective of their movement.
In the face of mounting violence, and with protesters furious over civilian deaths, Nepal’s Prime Minister K. P. Sharma Oli, a dominant figure in Nepali politics, submitted his resignation on 9 September under military persuasion. In his resignation letter to the President, Oli described the situation as “extraordinary,” conceding that his stepping down was necessary to allow a political resolution within the constitutional bounds. The government quickly moved to lift the social media ban, but the damage had been done—to the lives of adolescents and youths, and to essential infrastructure and property.
Legal and Constitutional Fallout: Dissolution of Parliament and Interim Government
With the fall of the government, which was mainly composed of a strong coalition of the Communist Party of Nepal (Unified Marxist–Leninist) and the Nepali Congress, the question turned to: what happens next? The security situation was still grave, as both civil and armed police left the scene, leaving the national army alone on to police the roads and vital infrastructures. The President of Nepal, Ram Chandra Poudel, was unable to initiate the process of forming a new government from within the parliament which had already become widely unpopular. The major political parties lacked both the courage and the legal basis to claim they had sufficient political strength to form a new government. The immediate legitimacy crisis in politics became clear.
In this difficult context, the President sought advice on how to proceed from the Nepal Army, political leaders and constitutional experts. The Nepal Army maintained that the security situation would not improve unless a new government were established outside the constitutional process, arguing that this would give hope to the public by signalling a change in leadership and the possibility of accountability for those responsible for the excessive use of force and the deaths of innocent citizens. That was also a clear indication that even the National Army would not be able to restore normalcy if the major political actors remained in power, whether in the government or in the House of Representatives.
On 12 September 2025, following the Gen Z’s advice and the National Army’s cooperation, the President appointed Sushila Karki—a former Chief Justice—as interim prime minister charged with leading the country until early elections could be held. The House of Representatives was subsequently formally dissolved on her recommendation. She became both the first woman to hold the post of prime minister, and a figure symbolizing a temporary neutral-technocratic reset.
However, the Constitution does not allow the President to form a government outside the parliamentary process or under the leadership of a former chief justice, nor does it give power to the prime minister to recommend the dissolution of the House of Representatives until it has the potential to form an alternative government under Article 76(7) of the Constitution. In this case, the President’s decision did not rest on explicit constitutional authorization, but was rather a response to a serious crisis. The new prime minister was appointed only for an interim period, had taken an oath to defend the Constitution, while assuring that elections for the House of Representatives would be held within the legally prescribed timeframe—thereby paving the way for a newly elected government with a fresh mandate.
Stakeholders, Perspectives and Polarizations
Following the establishment of the interim arrangements, there was a notable improvement in the country’s overall situation. The Gen Z movement was never against the Constitution, and did not want the Army to play any role in Nepal’s governance. The protesters therefore left the streets and started engaging with the government. However, the success of this movement also led to the proliferation of new Gen Z groups with separate identities and agendas. Political parties’ youth wings also actively created spaces for themselves.
For many young Nepalis, what happened in September 2025 was more than a protest, it was a reckoning. The movement, often involving a multiplicity of leaders or no leader at all, organized via online platforms, became a surprising display of civic power and political anger long simmering among the youth. Yet, the movement is not monolithic. Analysts note that while many young people call for systemic reform, they lack agreed leadership, ideology, or structured programmes for governance. Some, speaking in the name of Gen Z, have called for changes that reflect both the movement’s diversity and its internal contradictions. These include calls for reforming the Constitution through amendments (currently impossible without a functioning House of Representatives), scrapping the Constitution altogether and initiating a new constitution writing process, restoring the monarchy abolished in 2008, and dismantling Nepal’s federal system. Others have sought deeper constitutional reforms to address the unmet demands of the deprived and marginalized ethnic groups and regions.
Political Establishment: Traditional Parties, Elites, and Former Rulers
The country is in a political crisis. The sudden collapse of the government is a blow to established political elites, including leaders of major parties prior to the crisis. Traditional parties—long accustomed to business-as-usual politics, coalition manoeuvring, and internal deals—have been exposed as vulnerable to popular anger. The fact that none of the three main party chairs resigned in face of the uprising signals their reluctance to cede power to a new generation. Even though both leading parties, the Nepali Congress and the Communist Party of Nepal (Unified Marxist–Leninist), are in the process of general convention, the determination to handover leadership to the new faces is not visible.
The legitimacy of the appointment of the prime minister outside the constitutional process and the ensuing dissolution of the House of Representatives has already been challenged by different petitioners in front of the Supreme Court.
Some senior party leaders and sympathetic commentators have warned that dissolving the parliament and bypassing existing institutions, as the President did this time, risks setting a dangerous precedent, in effect rewarding mob action with political legitimacy. The legitimacy of the appointment of the prime minister outside the constitutional process and the ensuing dissolution of the House of Representatives has already been challenged by different petitioners in front of the Supreme Court. These cases are being processed.
There is also a concern that overturning a democratically elected government under duress could embolden future unrest, destabilize constitutional governance, and erode institutional checks and balances. At the same time, many ask how long the country should be expected to endure and tolerate a failing status quo. This question is no less important. Furthermore, many unsatisfied and underserved segments of the population have been stirred and view the ongoing turmoil as evidence of the current republic’s failures. For some, the crisis validates calls for a systemic overhaul that includes restoring monarchy and reforming the check and balances that no longer work under the present Constitution. They see the Gen Z movement as a window of opportunity for re-thinking. Ultimately, only concerted action can meaningfully address these issues.
Interim Government & Judiciary: Neutral Stability vs. Constitutional Legitimacy
The appointment of Sushila Karki, who is sympathetic to the Gen Zs and holds an anti-corruption record and perceived institutional integrity, was likely aimed at restoring minimal governance capacity and reassuring both the populace and international observers. For many civil society actors and external commentators, Karki’s interim premiership offers a window of opportunity: if she can oversee impartial investigations into the September excessive use of force and pervasive corruption, and deliver credible preparations for early elections, she may help to restore—or at least symbolically reset—democratic legitimacy.
At the same time, the prime minister herself is deeply aware that she does not have constitutional legitimacy, and cannot, as an interim prime minister, decide on the force of popular accountability. Some royalist Gen Z groups have even urged the President to sack the interim government. Some others concede that the interim government continues to face widespread public anger, deep mistrust, fears of more violence, and uncertainty about whether old power structures will relent or simply survive in a different configuration after the elections.
As the Gen Zs lack strong organizational structures, a physical presence outside the urban areas, and the clout to influence mass voting behaviour, their impact in the next elections may not be very significant. What is more, some youths who have been organizing themselves to contest elections seem to have underestimated the challenges of being active in politics, such as socio-political acceptability among voters, political acumen, and the need for campaign financing, while others have not been able to identify their relevance in influencing the selection of candidates across all traditional parties. On top of this, the old guard’s trivialization of the Gen Z movement continues.
[T]he agreement sets out a commitment to establish a high-level constitutional amendment recommendation commission to review the Constitution, conduct inclusive public consultations, and propose improvements to the Constitution (...).
On 10 December 2025, the Government and the mainstream Gen Z leaders, who had been regularly engaging with the government ever since the September demonstrations, signed a 10-point agreement articulating a roadmap for reform on key issues identified by the Gen Z, including initiatives to address corruption and governance failures, reform Nepal’s electoral and constitutional frameworks, and provide justice for victims of state violence. Importantly, the agreement sets out a commitment to establish a high-level constitutional amendment recommendation commission to review the Constitution, conduct inclusive public consultations, and propose improvements to the Constitution, with its work set to begin within three months. While the agreement stops short of detailing constitutional reforms, it signals an intention to initiate the reform process.
Key Challenges and Structural Constraints
There is a growing perception among the Nepalese people that the country is not in safe hands. This perception does not provide a conducive political environment to go through a reform process. To change the perspective of the Nepalese people, good governance, an end to corruption, and the effective implementation of the Constitution will be needed. A free, fair, and impartial election would certainly give citizens the opportunity to choose new representatives and provide a government with a fresh mandate; however, ensuring these basic minimum conditions should remain on the agenda of the new government as well.
This alone will help reinforce the 2015 Constitution, which can always be amended to reflect a new national understanding should one be agreed upon. The March election provides both new and established parties with an opportunity to articulate their manifestos and seek public support for fresh programmes, particularly in the area of constitutional reform. In doing so, their positions on key issues of public concern will soon be clearly placed before the electorate.
Even if these issues are clarified, the question remains how to ensure stability amid weak, short-lived cabinets and frequent governance vacuums. The Gen Z movement has triggered changes and realignments among political parties, including new alliances and party formations in response to the protest’s impact on traditional party politics. Without internal reforms in political parties, including internal democracy, social inclusion in decision-making structures, financial transparency and federalization of political parties, it will be difficult to ensure renewed efforts to address structural grievances. Democratic accountability must be achieved. In a country located in a complex geopolitical hotbed, creating a genuine national perspective in constitutional reform involving the political community and national institutions will be very important.
About the Author
Bipin Adhikari is a professor of law at Kathmandu University.
Suggested Citation
Bipin Adhikari, ‘Nepal’s Gen Z Movement and Constitutional Crisis’, ConstitutionNet, International IDEA, 21 January 2026, https://constitutionnet.org/news/voices/nepals-gen-z-movement-and-constitutional-crisis
Further Reading
- Updates on constitutional developments in Nepal.
- Alexandra Oancea, A Year in Constitution-Building: What 2025 Revealed, What 2026 May Bring.
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