July Charter and Constitutional Reforms in Bangladesh
Following Bangladesh’s July–August 2024 mass uprising and the collapse of Sheikh Hasina’s government, the interim administration under Professor Muhammad Yunus initiated an ambitious constitutional reform agenda. This process led to the July Charter of 2025, a politically negotiated document endorsed by 24 parties that consolidates over 80 reform proposals, nearly half of them constitutional, yet marked by significant dissent. With key changes now tied to a February 2026 referendum, this piece explores the central areas of agreement and contestation shaping Bangladesh’s uncertain constitutional transition.
Following the July-August 2024 mass uprising which led to the fall of former Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina’s authoritarian government, the interim government of Bangladesh, led by Professor Dr. Muhammad Yunus, sought to reform the state machinery. A number of reform commissions were established, including on a Constitution Reform Commission (CRC) which, in January 2025, submitted recommendations for a new constitution for Bangladesh. In 2025, the Chairs of the main six reform commissions came together to form a National Consensus Commission (NCC) tasked with “initiating and facilitating dialogue with political parties and forces in order to build consensus around the adoption of reform proposals concerning the constitution, electoral system, judiciary, public administration, police, and anti-corruption frameworks particularly in preparation for the upcoming election.”
This process culminated in the July Charter (JC), a consolidation of the recommendations for which consensus was achieved. Signed on 17 October 2025 by the NCC and 24 political parties amid intense national debate, the Charter contains over 80 proposals for reform, including almost 50 of constitutional nature. However, in numerous important instances, parties have noted dissent, leaving the success of the document uncertain. In this context, this piece highlights the main proposals outlined in the JC, explaining key differences from the CRC recommendations and describing some of the areas of contention among the main political parties.
Bill of Rights
The CRC recommended both the inclusion of some modern rights and the unification of Part 2 and Part 3 of the Constitution, which contain, respectively, economic, social and cultural rights in the form of non-enforceable principles of state policy, and enforceable civil and political rights, into a single enforceable Bill of Rights titled “Fundamental Rights and Freedoms”. The JC, however, includes only a broadly worded recommendation for the state to take certain measures to expand, protect and implement citizen’s fundamental rights. The vagueness of this provision and the discretion it grants the state leaves it open to uncertainty and, despite this idea of expansion, leaves economic, social and cultural rights unenforceable, hence defeating the human rights-based governance intended by the CRC. Further missing from the JC recommendations is the CRC proposal of a single, general limitation clause that would require a proportionality test to ensure that any limitation on fundamental rights by the state is only imposed when necessary, reasonable, and balanced against the purpose it seeks to achieve.
Legislature
The CRC recommended amending the parliament’s unicameral structure into a bicameral form, with the upper house selected based on the proportion of votes received in the election for the lower house. While the JC adopted this proposal, the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) dissented on the mode of composition, proposing instead that the upper house be composed based on the proportion of seats in the lower house, rather than the proportion of votes. The upper house would not have a veto on legislation, but its assent would be required for constitutional amendments—a proposal which also received a note of dissent for the BNP—and accession to international treaties. This new arrangement will bring more voices into national politics—as smaller parties will be able to gain representation in the upper house—and should also provide some protection against self-serving amendments of the Constitution.
Regarding parliamentary composition, the JC maintains the current system of 50 reserved seats for women selected by the parties elected to the lower house. It also adds a candidate quota increasing in percentage each election until the final number of women reaches 100 seats (out of a total of 400).
Further, an important change relates to the strict anti-defection provision for members of Parliament in the current Constitution, which provides that they are to lose their seat if they vote against their own party. The CRC proposed that this provision be amended to allow members to vote against their nominating party except for money-related bills, and the JC adopted this recommendation adding votes of confidence as another exception. This will be a significant change in the dynamics of party politics within the legislature.
Judiciary
As for the judiciary, in-line with the CRC proposals, the JC has adopted a measure according to which the senior-most Judge of the Appellate Division shall be appointed Chief Justice (CJ) and the Constitution shall provide for an independent Judicial Appointments Commission (JAC), led by the CJ, for appointments of Judges to the Supreme Court. This will bring about much greater independence for the judiciary, as the current Constitution gives undue influence over judicial appointments to the executive.
Executive Powers of the Prime Minister
Given Bangladesh’s history of long-serving Prime Ministers, the CRC recommended that there be a two-term limit on the Prime Minister, and that there be a bar on simultaneously holding the positions of Prime Minister, party chief and Leader of the House. The JC slightly deviated from this proposal, setting a 10-year cap on any individual serving as Prime Minister and specifying that an individual may simultaneously hold the positions of Prime Minister and Leader of the House, but not of party chief.
Further, powers of the Prime Minister over independent bodies of the state are proposed to be significantly curtailed with a number of bespoke selection committees established for organs such as the Ombudsperson, Public Service Commission, Comptroller, Auditor General and Anti-Corruption Commission. The BNP, along with a few other parties, dissented, however, proposing instead that the appointment procedures for these bodies be established by ordinary legislation.
Language
Currently, the Constitution only recognizes Bangla as the state language. The CRC recommended expanding linguistic recognition by acknowledging the mother tongues of different peoples as languages in use in Bangladesh, which the JC adopted.
Citizenship
Article 6(2) of the Constitution identifies all citizens of Bangladesh as “Bangalees,” effectively defining national identity in ethnic terms. The CRC recommended replacing this clause with a more inclusive formulation so that citizens of Bangladesh shall be known simply as “Bangladeshi,” emphasizing civic rather than ethnic identity. The JC adopted this recommendation.
Further, the CRC suggested a provision, affirming that “Bangladesh is a plural, multi-ethnic, multi-religious, multi-lingual and multi-cultural country where the coexistence and due dignity of all communities shall be ensured”, which was also adopted by the JC excluding the term ‘plural.’
Amendment Procedure
Currently, amendments to the Constitution of Bangladesh require the support of two-thirds of the total membership of Parliament, with no provision for a referendum, allowing ruling majorities to alter the Constitution unilaterally. The CRC proposed replacing this system with one that requires two-thirds approval in both Houses of Parliament and a national referendum to ensure that constitutional change reflects public consent. The JC refined this by suggesting that amendments require two-thirds support in the lower house and a simple majority in the upper house, with referendums being required only for amendments to specific articles.
Caretaker Government and Election
In 1996, the 13th amendment to the Constitution introduced the institutionalization of an interim, non-partisan government, headed by a Chief Advisor, which would be responsible for running the country during a period of national elections and would be headed by the most recently retired Chief Justice. The appointment process for the Chief Advisor led to some controversy, and in 2011 the Awami League used its constitutional majority to pass the 15th amendment, abolishing the caretaker government.
Following the fall of Hasina’s regime, the High Court Division of the Supreme Court of Bangladesh declared parts of the 15th amendment illegal and restored the caretaker government and the provision for referendums for constitutional amendments. In its report, the CRC had recommended that the Chief Adviser be jointly selected by a nonpartisan National Constitutional Council and the President, and the JC proposed doing so via constitutional amendment, establishing a selection mechanism managed by a five-member Parliamentary Selection Committee together with a series of steps designed to manage any deadlock. The BNP dissented on the selection mechanism, proposing instead that if the Committee cannot reach an agreement, the parliamentary majority shall select the Chief Advisor.
What Now?
On 13 November 2025, on the basis of ‘the sovereign will of the people expressed through the July–August 2024 student-people’s uprising,’ the President, acting on the advice of the Interim Government, issued the July National Charter (Constitution Reform) Implementation Order 2025, in order to give the Charter legal force.
The Order provides that a referendum will be held on the same day as the next general elections (scheduled for February 2026). On that day, citizens will cast a single Yes/No vote on a question covering four issues: whether to implement the Charter proposals pertaining to the caretaker government, the Election Commission and the constitutional bodies; whether to implement the Charter proposal of a bicameral parliament comprising of a 100-member proportionally elected upper house whose majority is required to approve constitutional amendments; whether the implementation of the 30 agreed reform proposals on representation, checks and balances, rights and local government should be binding on political parties; and whether parties should implement all other Charter reforms according to their commitments.
Importantly, the Order drops the earlier option for “automatic incorporation” and instead provides that, if the outcome of the referendum is positive, the next Parliament will also simultaneously function as a Constitutional Reform Council, mandated to implement the required constitutional reforms within a maximum of 180 days.
By making some of its articles immediately effective, the Order instantly activates the entire legal framework for the referendum process—including its subject matter, ballot question, scheduling, and enabling legislation—while also establishing authoritative definitions and formally requiring the government to begin incorporating the Charter into the Constitution. At the same time, Article 15 of the Order empowers the government to issue any necessary directives right away, allowing the Interim Government and the Election Commission to start preparations for the upcoming referendum and elections without delay. This ensures legal continuity and operational readiness even before the referendum result is determined, while leaving the substantive constitutional amendments dependent on a future “Yes” vote. On 25 November 2025, the President proclaimed an ordinance containing the details of the referendum to be held under the Order.
Conclusion
Given the notes of dissent by political parties in the July Charter and given the very mixed reaction among parties regarding the Implementation Order, it is clear that much political negotiation remains in order for consensus on constitutional reforms to be reached. And regardless of constitutional amendments or revolutions, meaningful change requires long-term political, constitutional and behavioural reforms, and thus the July Charter is only one step in a long journey still to travel.
Muhammad Ekramul Haque is a member of the Constitution Reform Commission of Bangladesh and Professor and Dean of the Faculty of Law at the University of Dhaka (email: ekram.haque@duc.ac.bd).
Sumit Bisarya is Head of International IDEA’s Constitutional Governance and Rule of Law Programme.
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Suggested citation: Muhammad Ekramul Haque and Sumit Bisarya, ‘July Charter and Constitutional Reforms in Bangladesh’, ConstitutionNet, International IDEA, 1 December 2025, https://constitutionnet.org/news/voices/july-charter-and-constitutional-reforms-bangladesh
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