Shifting the Scales: How Pakistan’s 27th Amendment Undermines Judicial Independence and Cements Executive Dominance
In November, Pakistan adopted its 27th Constitutional Amendment through one of the fastest and most contentious processes in its recent history. By creating a Federal Constitutional Court, expanding executive’s control over judicial appointments, granting lifelong immunity to the President and military leadership, and strengthening the army’s influence, the amendment represents the most significant restructuring of Pakistan’s judicial and executive powers under its 1973 Constitution. Amid growing public protests, ongoing legal challenges, and mounting pressure on its democratic institutions, Pakistan is facing a pivotal moment—writes Zainab Malik.
The 27th Amendment, passed in November 2025, represents the most significant restructuring of Pakistan’s judicial structure and military command since the adoption of the 1973 Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan. The amendment has been presented by the government as necessary to address key governance challenges facing the country, including by streamlining constitutional adjudication and reducing the burden placed on the higher courts.
Opposition parties have conversely termed it an “attack on democracy and civilian authority”, arguing that it grants sweeping immunities from criminal prosecution to top military leaders, reduces the mandate of the Supreme Court and extends executive control over judicial appointments. Since its passage, two Supreme Court justices, Syed Mansoor Ali Shah and Athar Minallah, and a Lahore High Court judge rendered their resignations in protest, while a group of over 200 lawyers, academics and members of the public signed a petition challenging the amendment.
Legal and Political Context
The 27th constitutional amendment comes at a time of significant political turmoil in the country marked by widespread protests stemming from contested election results, alongside serious security and economic challenges. The 2024 elections that brought the current government into power were marred by claims of vote rigging and tampering, casting a dark shadow on its legitimacy.
Since taking office, the ruling coalition has been accused of systematically consolidating executive power, while undermining the authority and independence of the judiciary.
Since taking office, the ruling coalition has been accused of systematically consolidating executive power, while undermining the authority and independence of the judiciary. This includes the enactment of the 26th Constitutional Amendment in 2024, which increased executive and parliamentary control over the appointment and tenure of Supreme Court and High Court judges. The 27th Constitutional Amendment represents a further escalation of this trend.
The Amendment was passed in accordance with Article 239 of Pakistan’s Constitution, which requires a two-thirds majority in both houses of Parliament. Critics argue that the government rushed this process without following established democratic procedures, such as consulting the opposition, engaging the public, or allowing in-depth debate on its provisions. Many parliamentarians reported not even having access to the full draft before it was tabled.
In fact, the amendment was moved through Parliament at remarkable speed. Law Minister Tarar introduced the bill in the Senate on 8 November (Saturday), the same day it received federal cabinet approval. Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif, then in Baku for an official visit, joined the cabinet meeting virtually before returning to Islamabad the next day. Following internal coalition consultations, a revised draft was circulated in the Senate on 10 November and passed that very evening, with some independent and defecting opposition senators joining the ruling coalition to provide the two-thirds majority needed. The Senate session was marked by uproar: opposition senators tore up copies of the bill, chanted slogans against the government, and ultimately staged a walkout, denouncing the process as an attempt to force through a far-reaching restructuring of Pakistan’s judicial and military command arrangements without national consensus.
The bill was then transmitted to the National Assembly, where the ruling coalition enjoys a comfortable two-thirds majority, on 11 November, one day after Senate approval. On the following day, the Assembly passed all 59 clauses of the amendment during a clause-by-clause vote that was boycotted by the opposition. President Asif Ali Zardari signed the amendment into law on 13 November, marking one of the fastest and most contentious constitutional amendment processes in Pakistan's recent history.
The establishment of the Federal Constitutional Court
At the core of the Amendment lies the creation of the Federal Constitutional Court (FCC), a new body that now sits at the apex of Pakistan’s judicial hierarchy. The FCC assumes exclusive jurisdiction over constitutional interpretation, federal–provincial disputes, and enforcement of fundamental rights, functions historically vested in the Supreme Court. The FCC will also hear appeals as provided by any act of Parliament, as well as appeals from the High Courts involving a substantial question of law related to the interpretation of the Constitution of Pakistan. Any cases or petitions pending before any other court that fall under the FCC’s jurisdiction stand transferred to the FCC. As a result, the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction is now effectively confined to non-constitutional, appellate matters.
Proponents argue that reducing the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction is a necessary measure to tackle the significant case backlog, which stood at 56,169 cases in October 2025. The FCC, as a dedicated, specialized body, can focus exclusively on constitutional matters, thereby freeing the Supreme Court to concentrate on its appellate function. However, critics contend that the bulk of the judicial backlog lies in the lower courts, where delays and resource limitations have resulted in an estimated 2.3 million cases pending. The proposed reform, therefore, risks merely shifting, rather than resolving, the systemic burdens within the judiciary.
Executive Control over Judicial Appointments
The amendment grants the executive a high degree of influence over the FCC’s leadership. The first Chief Justice and inaugural judges are appointed by the President on the Prime Minister’s advice, with no objective selection criteria established. This “founding cohort” is poised to shape the character of the court indefinitely, raising concerns that its jurisprudence may align closely with the executive’s political preferences.
Subsequent appointments to the FCC will be made through the Judicial Commission of Pakistan (JCP). The membership of the JCP was recently reconstituted through the 26th Constitutional Amendment, which ended judicial control over appointment by introducing political and executive members, who now form the majority of the Commission. Of its thirteen members, only five are from the judiciary. In addition, the amendment raises the retirement age from 65 for Supreme Court judges to 68 for FCC judges, effectively enabling the executive’s preferred judges to enjoy longer tenures. International legal observers, such as the International Commission of Jurists (ICJ), have flagged these appointment procedures as falling short of global norms for the independence of constitutional courts.
Moreover, the new Article 200 of the Constitution allows the transfer of High Court judges across provinces without their consent. Refusal to accept such a transfer, which is to follow recommendations from the executive-dominated JCP, can be treated as a de facto retirement and may trigger disciplinary procedures. Historically, judicial consent to transfer was a safeguard against political pressure and arbitrary reshuffling. Under the new regime, this protection is removed, a development critics describe as an institutional lever that could be used to punish or intimidate judges who issue rulings not favorable to the executive.
Executive Consolidation and Military Entrenchment
The 27th Amendment marks a significant consolidation of executive power. By revising Article 248 of the Constitution, the amendment grants the President lifetime immunity from criminal prosecution, arrest, and civil proceedings, privileges previously limited to the presidential term. This move strengthens the executive at a time when judicial independence and other institutional checks are weakening.
The 27th Constitutional amendment also introduces significant changes to the country’s civil–military balance. Since Pakistan’s independence in 1947, the military, particularly the army, has been the nation's most dominant institution. This influence has been cemented by four coups and decades of direct and indirect rule, making the army chief arguably the country's most powerful figure. The current army chief was promoted to five-star rank in May 2025, following Pakistan’s four day conflict with India. Under the new Article 243(7), all military officers elevated to five-star rank will enjoy lifetime rank, uniform and privileges. In addition, the new Article 243(9) grants the President, Field Marshal, Fleet Admiral, and Air Force Marshal lifetime immunity from arrest and criminal and civil proceedings, and the revised Article 243 creates a new apex military post, the Chief of Defence Forces, which will automatically be held by the sitting Army Chief. This effectively cements the Army's dominance over the entire military command.
This alignment of military, executive, and constitutional power risks insulating the highest state institutions from effective accountability and civil oversight.
Critics comment that the 27th Amendment formalizes the military’s dominance over constitutional institutions, a power it has already wielded in practice. In effect, the combined reforms embed military influence within Pakistan’s constitutional framework precisely at a historical moment when judicial independence is being curtailed and executive control strengthened. This alignment of military, executive, and constitutional power risks insulating the highest state institutions from effective accountability and civil oversight.
Legal challenges
Since its enactment, the 27th Constitutional Amendment has faced immediate legal challenges. Judges of the Islamabad High Court filed a petition challenging the transfer of their intra-court appeal to the newly created FCC. The four petitioning judges argued that the transfer relied on the 27th Amendment itself, which they contend is inconsistent with the Constitution of Pakistan and therefore of questionable validity. Court officials, however, refused to accept the petition, maintaining that the FCC is now the proper forum for such matters.
Similar challenges have emerged elsewhere. On 19 November 2025, the Lahore High Court scheduled a hearing to consider multiple petitions contesting the amendment. These petitions—naming the Prime Minister and the National Assembly speaker as respondents—argue that the reform effectively strips the Supreme Court of Pakistan of its original jurisdiction, thereby undermining the judiciary’s constitutional architecture.
Concluding Remarks
The 27th Constitutional Amendment in Pakistan represents a significant alteration of the country's institutional framework. By centralizing constitutional interpretation under the FCC, expanding the executive's role in judicial appointments, granting absolute immunity to the President and military leadership, and solidifying the army's influence, the amendment fundamentally shifts the power dynamic among the executive, judiciary, and military.
With rising public protests, ongoing legal battles, and mounting pressure on its democratic institutions, Pakistan is facing a pivotal moment.
This amendment serves as a clear example of how legal and constitutional mechanisms can be utilized to reconfigure power structures. Its implications go beyond immediate institutional efficiency, indicating a deep, potentially lasting transformation in Pakistan's political and legal landscape. This new order entrenches centralized authority, seemingly at the expense of traditional checks and balances. With rising public protests, ongoing legal battles, and mounting pressure on its democratic institutions, Pakistan is facing a pivotal moment. The coming months will determine if the courts, the opposition, and civil society can successfully challenge what many perceive as a fundamental attack on the nation's constitutional integrity.
Zainab Malik is a lawyer and development professional with over 15 years of experience in international human rights advocacy, advancing people-centred justice, and criminal justice reform in South Asia, MENA and Africa.
♦ ♦ ♦
Suggested citation: Zainab Malik, ‘Shifting the Scales: How Pakistan’s 27th Amendment Undermines Judicial Independence and Cements Executive Dominance’, ConstitutionNet, International IDEA, 28 November 2025, https://constitutionnet.org/news/voices/shifting-scales-how-pakistans-27th-amendment-undermines-judicial-independence
Click here for updates on constitutional developments in Pakistan.
If you are interested in contributing a Voices from the Field piece on constitutional change in your country, please contact us at constitutionnet@idea.int.