From Term Limits to No Limits: El Salvador’s Constitutional Reform on Presidential Re-election

On 31 July 2025, El Salvador’s Legislative Assembly approved a constitutional amendment allowing indefinite presidential re-election. In this article, Daniel Olmedo examines the legal and political processes behind the reform and explores how these changes dismantle longstanding safeguards on presidential alternation, violate constitutional “eternity clauses,” and raise concerns under international human rights law. With the reform set to take effect in the 2027 presidential elections, El Salvador faces profound challenges to institutional checks, democratic norms, and the long-term resilience of its constitutional order.

Introduction

On 31 July 2025, the Legislative Assembly of El Salvador approved a constitutional amendment allowing indefinite presidential re-election with 57 votes in favour and three opposed. The reform paves the way for incumbent President Nayib Bukele to run for a third term. According to the ruling party, the reform is meant to “reduce election costs” and bring “greater stability” to the country.

But is this a legitimate constitutional change that strengthens democracy, or a breakdown of the constitutional order that heightens the risk of authoritarianism?

But is this a legitimate constitutional change that strengthens democracy, or a breakdown of the constitutional order that heightens the risk of authoritarianism? This article examines the constitutional reform by providing an overview of El Salvador’s constitutional tradition, outlining the political process that led to the amendment, and finally offering an analysis of the reform.

Presidential Re-election in El Salvador’s Constitution

Presidential re-election has been a recurring issue in Salvadoran constitutionalism since the 19th century. The 1841 Constitution prohibited re-election. The constitutions of 1871, 1872, and 1880 allowed it, but banned consecutive terms. The 1886 Constitution maintained the ban on consecutive re-election and, crucially, entrenched it as an unamendable constitutional clause. This constitution became the longest-lasting in Salvadoran history.

In 1939, under the dictatorship of Maximiliano Hernández Martínez, a new constitution was enacted. Although Article 94 preserved the ban on consecutive presidential re-election, Article 91 granted Hernández Martínez an exception, allowing the Legislative Assembly to extend his mandate “on this one occasion only”. However, in 1944, he amended the constitution again to permit another re-election. That same year, his regime collapsed, and the 1886 Constitution was reinstated.

A new constitution was adopted in 1950, which, together with the following one adopted in 1962, established an absolute prohibition on presidential re-election.

The 1983 Constitution, still in force today, reinforced this prohibition with six separate provisions:

1. Under Article 75, citizens who promoted or supported re-election lost their citizenship rights.

2. Under Article 88, presidential alternation was deemed essential to the maintenance of the established form of government and political system, and ‘violation of this rule compels insurrection’.

3. According to Article 131, the Legislative Assembly must refuse to recognize any President who remains in office after their term has ended.

4. Article 152 stated that anyone who has held the presidency in the immediately preceding term was ineligible to run again.

5. Article 154 established that the presidential term is five years, and that no president may remain in office “even for one more day” (a phrase dating back to the 1841 Constitution).

6. Finally, Article 248 provides that clauses concerning presidential alternation cannot be amended.

In 2014, the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice confirmed that immediate re-election was prohibited and ruled that, although non-consecutive re-election was technically permitted, a president must wait two full terms before running again. In 2020, the Court reaffirmed this interpretation adding that, under Article 248, this waiting period could not be amended.

From a Ban on Consecutive Re-election to Indefinite Re-election (2021–2025)

On 1 May 2021, the Legislative Assembly removed all magistrates of the Constitutional Chamber and, on the same day, appointed new ones without following the selection procedure set out in Article 186 of the Constitution.

Four months later, on 3 September 2021, the newly appointed judges ruled that consecutive re-election was permitted, despite six constitutional provisions expressly prohibiting it. They argued that the ban on re-election only applied to the previous president, not to the sitting one. Scholars such as Brewer Carías, Scherlis, and Uprimny criticized this decision, deemed to run against the Constitution. The United States Department of State also condemned the ruling as unconstitutional.

At the time, President Nayib Bukele—elected in 2019 for a term due to end in 2024—was the direct beneficiary of this ruling. He ran again in the next election and was controversially re-elected, starting a new term on 1 June 2024. While the new constitutional rules devised by the Constitutional Chamber enabled Bukele’s consecutive re-election, it still barred him from seeking a third consecutive term. That restriction, however, was soon lifted with another set of constitutional changes.

Under Article 248 of the Constitution, constitutional amendments originally required the approval of two successive legislatures: one to adopt the amendment, and the next to ratify it. On 29 April 2024, the outgoing legislature amended this article to allow a single legislature to amend the Constitution. On 29 January 2025, the newly elected legislature ratified the amendment. From that point onwards, the Constitution could be amended by a single legislature. Crucially, however, the new text maintained the prohibition on altering provisions regarding presidential re-election.

(...) [I]n a process that lasted three hours and forty-seven minutes, [the Legislative Assembly] approved and ratified changes to four constitutional articles concerning presidential re-election.

Despite this safeguard, on 31 July 2025, the Legislative Assembly invoked the new constitutional amendment process and, in a process that lasted three hours and forty-seven minutes, approved and ratified changes to four constitutional articles concerning presidential re-election:

1. The ground for promotion or support for presidential re-election was removed as a cause for loss of citizenship rights under Article 75.

2. The second round of presidential elections under Article 80 was abolished, and presidential candidates with the most votes are automatically elected regardless of whether they hold a 50% majority.

3. The prohibition on candidacy for anyone who had held the presidency in the immediately preceding term under Article 152 was removed.

4. The presidential term under Article 154 was extended from five to six years, with the addition that the prohibition on remaining in office “even for one more day” would not apply in cases of consecutive presidential re-election.

Through these reforms, President Bukele will be able to seek re-election indefinitely.

The approval of these amendments took place at a time when 67.3% of the Salvadoran population reported having a lot or some confidence in the President. At the same time, however, 57.9% believed it was somewhat or very likely that they could face negative consequences for expressing critical opinions about the President or the government. So far, no survey has been published on public acceptance of the recent constitutional amendment.

In the international arena, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights issued a statement expressing concern over the constitutional amendment. The United States, the European Union and other Latin American states have not released any official position on the matter. However, citing unidentified spokespersons, international media have reported that the United States supported the decision, while the European Union merely took note of it.

Analysis of the Reform

At least five major constitutional concerns arise from the amendment permitting indefinite presidential re-election.

1. The Constitution expressly prohibited consecutive presidential re-election

As noted, six articles of the 1983 Constitution explicitly prohibited consecutive presidential re-election. This ban was the result of a long-standing constitutional tradition: since 1841, every Salvadoran constitution had banned consecutive presidential re-election.

While one might debate whether some constitutional provisions should prevail over others, the principle of presidential alternation holds a special and fundamental role in the Constitution, enjoying strong safeguards, as described above.

2. The Constitution expressly prohibits amending the provisions on re-election

As Richard Albert states, ‘no part of a constitution is more important than the rules that govern its amendment.’ The 2024 reform to Article 248, allowing a single legislature to approve amendments, was what enabled the July 2025 changes to be adopted in just under four hours.

(...) [T]he reform allowing indefinite presidential re-election violates the constitutional amendments limits that the very same regime kept effective when it established a faster amendment process.

However, the amendment to Article 248 failed to remove the eternity clause prohibiting changes to presidential alternation. Therefore, it can be argued that the reform allowing indefinite presidential re-election violates the constitutional amendments limits that the very same regime kept effective when it established a faster amendment process.

3. The constitutional amendment is the culmination of an invalid and illegitimate process

As mentioned earlier, the dismantling of the principle of presidential alternation began with the 2021 decision of the Constitutional Chamber. The root problem with that decision lies in the questionable validity and legitimacy of the court that issued it.

The composition of that Constitutional Chamber was the result of the removal of all its sitting judges and the immediate appointment of new ones by the Legislative Assembly. This process failed to grant prior hearing to the dismissed judges, and the new appointments were made without following the selection procedure set out in the Constitution itself (Article 186).

A similar process reconfiguring the composition of the Constitutional Court took place in Honduras in 2012. In 2023, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights ruled that such removals of constitutional judges violated due process guarantees and the principle of legality under the American Convention on Human Rights.

Using a constitutional court controlled by the executive to authorize presidential re-election in defiance of the Constitution is a strategy seen elsewhere.

Using a constitutional court controlled by the executive to authorize presidential re-election in defiance of the Constitution is a strategy seen elsewhere. In April 2015, the Constitutional Chamber of Honduras did so, and in October 2009, Nicaragua’s Constitutional Chamber allowed the re-election of Daniel Ortega, who has remained in power since 2007.

4. Violation of the American Convention on Human Rights

In 2021, in (non-binding) Advisory Opinion OC-28/21, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights argued that ‘enabling indefinite presidential re-election is contrary to the principles of a representative democracy and, therefore, to the obligations established in the American Convention and the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man’. In particular, it held that such measures violate Articles 1.1, 13, 16, and 23 of the American Convention on Human Rights, which El Salvador ratified in 1978.

Following the swift approval of El Salvador’s constitutional amendment, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights invoked this advisory opinion to express its concern over the Salvadoran case.

Conclusion

The constitutional amendment allowing indefinite presidential re-election, scheduled to apply in the 2027 presidential elections, severely disrupts El Salvador’s constitutional order and breaches its international obligations. With this reform, El Salvador firmly positions itself among a series of Latin American cases in which the fundamental pillars of constitutional democracy have been dismantled from within the very institutions meant to uphold them.

In the absence of an independent constitutional court, it will be impossible to rely on domestic mechanisms to correct this distortion.

In the absence of an independent constitutional court, it will be impossible to rely on domestic mechanisms to correct this distortion. The only remaining institutional mechanism to restore constitutional order is the activation of Articles 19 and 20 of the Inter-American Democratic Charter. The decision to do so lies with the Organization of American States, particularly its Secretary General and the Member States of its General Assembly.

This reality poses a challenge to the international community: if such a constitutional breakdown is consolidated without consequence, the risk of further constitutional implosions may knock more forcefully on the doors of other countries in the region.

Daniel Olmedo is a Salvadoran constitutional lawyer based in the Netherlands. He holds a Master’s degree in Fundamental Rights from Universidad Carlos III de Madrid, and a Master’s degree in International and European Law with a specialization in Human Rights and Migration from Radboud University.

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Suggested citation: Daniel Olmedo, ‘From Term Limits to No Limits: El Salvador’s Constitutional Reform on Presidential Re-election’, ConstitutionNet, International IDEA, 26 August 2025, https://constitutionnet.org/news/voices/term-limits-no-limits-el-salvadors-constitutional-reform-presidential-re-election

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