Amending Article 33 of the Cambodian Constitution: Loyalty, Nationalism and Citizenship Stripping

Earlier this week, the Cambodian People’s Party (CPP) passed a constitutional amendment removing a long-standing prohibition on citizenship revocation. Presented by officials as a move to strengthen patriotism and national unity, the amendment has drawn concern over its potential misuse. In the context of rising nationalist rhetoric, limited judicial independence, and a history of politically motivated legal reforms, the change raises serious questions about the extent to which the current and future governments will be able to render political opponents and civil society critics stateless. In this piece, Benjamin Lawrence examines the drivers behind the amendment and its broader significance for citizenship, dissent, and constitutional governance in Cambodia.

On Monday, the Cambodian People’s Party (CPP) passed a constitutional amendment removing a long-standing prohibition on the revocation of citizenship. The amendment, which has been framed in overtly patriotic terms, removes language from Article 33 that prohibited the deprivation of citizenship, replacing it with a more permissive and vague commitment that “the revocation of Cambodian citizenship shall be determined by law.” By doing so, it paves the way for legislative changes that will enable the revocation of citizenship from Cambodian nationals.

(...) [T]he changes appear likely to apply to any Cambodian national (...) raising concerns that they could enable the government to effectively render stateless a range of domestic opponents and critics (...).

While not explicit in the wording of the amendment, public statements by Prime Minister Hun Manet suggest the amendment will be used by the government to target those who, in his words, “oppose the interest of the country,” “conspire with foreign powers” or “plot to destroy the country.” Hence, the changes appear likely to apply to any Cambodian national—not only naturalised or dual citizens—raising concerns that they could enable the government to effectively render stateless a range of domestic opponents and critics, against whom such accusations have frequently been weaponised in recent years. This article will discuss the origins, content, and implications of the constitutional amendment, situating it within Cambodia’s broader trajectory of authoritarian legal reform and the growing use of constitutional tools to entrench political control.

Rewriting Article 33: Opening the Door to Citizenship Revocation

The Constitution of Cambodia was promulgated in 1993, at the end of a peace-building process heavily influenced by international actors that wound-down (but did not immediately or completely end) a painfully protracted civil war. Many of those involved in the drafting process had themselves lived in exile for more than a decade prior (while retaining Cambodia’s seat at the United Nations, at the expense of former Prime Minister Hun Sen’s de facto government). Hence, it is unsurprising that the new constitution included specific guarantees protecting national citizenship. As such, since 1993, Article 33 of the Constitution has read as follows:

“Khmer citizens shall not be deprived of their nationality, exiled, or arrested to be extradited to a foreign country, except when there is a mutual agreement.

Khmer citizens residing abroad are under the protection of the State.

The acquisition of Khmer nationality shall be determined by law.”

By comparison, pursuant to the recent changes, Article 33 now states:

“Khmer citizens shall not be exiled or arrested to be extradited to a foreign country, except when there is a mutual agreement.

Khmer citizens residing abroad are under the protection of the State.

The acquisition and loss of Khmer nationality, including the revocation of Khmer citizenship, shall be determined by law.”

The amendment passed the National Assembly on the morning of Friday 12th July, receiving support from all 125 members of the CPP-dominated lower house. It was then unanimously approved by the Senate, of which Hun Sen is now President, on Monday 14th July. Unsurprisingly, the amendment had already received a green light from the Constitutional Council on 2nd July. As I have noted previously, the Council, which has powers of a priori review of constitutional amendments and organic laws (as well as both a priori and a posteriori review of legislation), has yet to reject a constitutional amendment or legislative provision as unconstitutional since being established in 1998.

While details on the legislation to give effect to the amendment are unknown, Justice Minister Koeut Rith has already stated that such legislation will be forthcoming. According to him, the amendment “aims to purify patriotism and loyalty of the Khmer people,” and “the law could exist soon, as the Justice Ministry has been working with the Interior Ministry since we studied the amendment of the Constitution.”

Domestic and Regional Triggers of the Reform

The changes come at a time when Cambodia’s relatively new Prime Minister—in post since 2023—and his father Hun Sen—who was himself Prime Minister from 1985-2023—have been championing their nationalist credentials as tensions with Thailand over ancient territorial disputes have resurfaced. Although the two countries were still cooperating as recently as November last year—including on the deportation of Cambodian political activists who had sought refuge in Thailand—conflict along the two countries’ land border reignited suddenly in May, culminating in the deadly shooting of a Cambodian soldier.

The shooting was followed by tit-for-tat escalations. Most notably, the details of a phone call between Hun Sen and Thai Prime Minister Thaksin Paetongtarn, initially arranged to diffuse tensions, have resulted in political turmoil in Thailand. During that call, which Hun Sen personally recorded and leaked, Paetongtarn repeatedly referred to her Cambodian counterpart as “uncle,” and described a Thai army commander as an “opponent.” In response, the second-largest member of Paetongtarn’s coalition withdrew from the government, and Thailand’s Supreme Court suspended her from duty pending an investigation.

As tensions escalated between Cambodia and Thailand, one of Cambodia’s leading (self-)exiled opposition figures, Sam Rainsy, repeatedly took to social media to criticise the ruling CPP and its handling of the situation.

While the trigger for the new amendments to the Cambodian Constitution appears to be somewhat more domestic in nature, it is equally familiar. As tensions escalated between Cambodia and Thailand, one of Cambodia’s leading (self-)exiled opposition figures, Sam Rainsy, repeatedly took to social media to criticise the ruling CPP and its handling of the situation. In one statement posted on Facebook, for instance, he suggested that the CPP’s “anti-Thai rhetoric” was merely a “smokescreen,” while the party’s real worry was “Thailand’s concerted effort to dismantle Chinese-run cyber-scam operations based in border areas” which he suggested have become “a vital source of illicit funding.” Concurrently, Hun Sen announced that “there may be a need to amend the constitution again” if his opponents fail to “learn about the law” and instead continue to “conspire with foreigners to destroy Cambodia.” He went on to call on his Justice Minister “to study the possible amendment of the Constitution regarding the revocation of citizenship.”

(...) [T]he amendment can be understood as the latest episode in a series of authoritarian constitutional amendments in Cambodia.

As will be discussed below, the amendment can be understood as the latest episode in a series of authoritarian constitutional amendments in Cambodia. Though apparently formulated as an impulsive response to the provocative Facebook posts of an already-sidelined political foe, it may have far-reaching implications for political opponents, government critics, and Cambodian civil society more generally.

Reform in Practice: Reactions and Potential Implications

As the draft amendment passed the National Assembly, Amnesty International described it as a “heinous” violation of international law (...).

As the draft amendment passed the National Assembly, Amnesty International described it as a “heinous” violation of international law, stating that “given the power to strip people of their citizenship” the Cambodian government “will misuse it to crackdown on its critics and make them stateless.” Meanwhile, domestic voices have also expressed concern. Lawyer and Professor Kang Rithkiry, for example, was quoted by a local news outlet as stating that “[a] state cannot use its constitution to override the UN Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, or core principles of international law.”

For their part, the CPP has adamantly defended the amendment, and the rationale for forthcoming legislative changes. In the Senate, for instance, Hun Sen echoed arguments put forward by the Justice Minister during the reading of the amendment in the National Assembly, pointing out how prevalent citizenship-stripping laws are worldwide. “I propose we ask the more than 150 countries around the world that have citizenship revocation laws: do they not respect human rights? (...) Why is it acceptable for others, but not for Cambodia?”

While uncomfortable, Hun Sen’s question is undoubtedly valid on a formalistic level. As a report by the Institute on Statelessness and Inclusion and the Global Citizenship Observatory noted in 2022, 79% of the 190 counties studied possessed laws allowing for the deprivation of citizenship on national security grounds, with two-thirds of those allowing for citizenship stripping on the ground of “disloyalty.” While the majority of such laws pertain only to naturalised citizens (and thus typically protect citizens against statelessness), high-profile cases and a recent letter from 5 U.N. experts demonstrates the extent to which similarly problematic laws do exist in countries such as the United Kingdom, for example.

(...) [T]here are few safeguards against any new powers being misused for political purposes now or in the future.

Yet, Cambodia’s latest constitutional amendment must be understood within its national political and constitutional context. As Amnesty International also noted, a lack of judicial independence in Cambodia has “enabled the government’s authoritarian practices to continue unchecked.” Cambodia sits second-from-bottom of the World Justice Project’s Rule of Law Index for 2024, scoring particularly badly on indicators such as “Corruption,” “Open Government” and “Civil Justice.” As such, despite the assurances Hun Sen offered his Senate colleagues this week that citizenship revocation would only be used against those who flee the country to escape conspiracy charges, there are few safeguards against any new powers being misused for political purposes now or in the future.

Hence, while the amendment appears to target Sam Rainsy first and foremost, the threat it poses extends much more broadly. Most ominously, last year, 10 members of the environmental group Mother Nature were convicted of conspiracy against the state for attempting to investigate and expose pollution in the Tonle Sap river. In theory, such convictions would presumably now be sufficient to justify revoking their citizenship. Meanwhile, Kem Sokha, the former co-President of the now-dissolved Cambodian National Rescue Party (CNRP), is already serving a 27-year sentence under house arrest, having been convicted of treason in 2023. Likewise, while local non-governmental organization (NGO) Licadho estimates that there are some 62 “prisoners of interest” in Cambodia, there are a large number of politicians, activists, and Buddhist monks living in exile to evade criminal convictions. Finally, it is worth noting that, as part of its crackdown before the 2018 national elections, the CPP frequently sought to portray local NGOs and journalists as participating in the “colour revolution” that the CNRP was ultimately found guilty of instigating, showing just how far accusations of disloyalty can be cast by the Cambodian government.

Constitutional Authoritarianism: A Pattern of Political Exclusion

In explaining the amendment before the National Assembly the Minister of Justice explicitly cited the need to align Article 33 with the wording of Article 49 of the Constitution, which states that “Khmer citizens shall place the interests of the nation first and shall not conduct directly or indirectly any activity affecting the interest of the Kingdom of Cambodia and Cambodian citizens.” The language of Article 49 was itself introduced via a constitutional amendment in 2018. Those changes, in turn, were designed to legitimate (ex post facto) the 2017 dissolution of the CNRP—then co-led by Sam Rainsy and Kem Sokha—by the Supreme Court, and to justify the Court-conferred ban on political activity that prevented 118 of its members from participating in pivotal national elections later that year.

As I have explained previously, this was followed in 2021 by an amendment that prevented dual-citizens from holding key positions in government (namely, the positions of Prime Minister, President of either the National Assembly or Senate, and President of the Constitutional Council), effectively sidelining key opposition leaders, many of whom hold dual citizenship.

(...) [A]mendments aimed at coalition and consensus building in the immediate post-conflict period have given way to changes consolidating the regime and excluding opponents.

As such, the current amendments are best understood as the continuation of a trend, which I have also elaborated elsewhere, wherein amendments aimed at coalition and consensus building in the immediate post-conflict period have given way to changes consolidating the regime and excluding opponents. The current reform, in turn, appears to extend that trend beyond excluding political opponents from the political process or from positions of high/public office, to granting the government additional powers to effectively remove political opponents and outspoken civil society critics from the country altogether by revoking their citizenship.

As implementing legislation is expected in the coming months, the practical effect of the amendment—and the scope of its application—will serve as a key test for Cambodia’s political and constitutional trajectory.

Ben Lawrence is a Career Development Fellow at Durham Law School. His forthcoming book, titled ‘In the Shadow of the Constitution: The Micropolitics of Constitutional Contestation in Cambodia’ will be published by Cambridge University Press in November 2025.

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Suggested citation: Ben Lawrence, ‘Amending Article 33 of the Cambodian Constitution: Loyalty, Nationalism and Citizenship Stripping’, ConstitutionNet, International IDEA, 18 July 2025, https://constitutionnet.org/news/voices/amending-article-33-cambodian-constitution-loyalty-nationalism-and-citizenship-stripping

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