Maltese Government Advances Narrow Reform While Broader Constitutional Package Collapses

In May 2025, the Maltese government introduced a constitutional reform bill aimed at addressing judicial inefficiencies amid the impending retirement of five senior judges. While the bill proposed several significant changes—including expanding the Constitutional Court, extending the retirement age for judges, and classifying undue delays as misconduct—most provisions failed due to lack of bipartisan support, which is required for constitutional amendments. Only one measure passed: the creation of a Commissioner for the Standards of the Judiciary. In this article, Victor Paul Borg examines the political standoff that stalled broader reform, outlines the limited impact of the newly established Commissioner, and explores the deeper structural issues afflicting Malta’s overstretched court system.

Introduction

Despite increased spending on justice in recent years—Malta now ranks among the EU’s highest in per capita expenditure on justice—the country paradoxically sits among those with the fewest judges per capita and some of the worst case backlogs in the EU. In administrative cases, the delays are particularly severe, with proceedings taking close to four years on average to be decided. Sources also report increasing pressure and workload in the Constitutional Court. Various reasons account for this situation, including the failure of successive governments to carry out holistic reforms, instead resorting to patching-up exercises.

The constitutional reform bill tabled in Parliament at the end of May is one such example, and included the following four key proposals to reform the judiciary:

1. Increasing the number of sections in the Constitutional Court to three, each presided over by the Chief Justice and composed of two additional judges—requiring a total of seven judges;

2. Extending the retirement age of judges, ensuring continuity until new appointments are made;

3. Classifying delays a judicial misconduct; and

4. Establishing a Commissioner for the Standards of the Judiciary to streamline the complaint process and take on the preliminary work in judicial disciplinary cases—currently handled by sitting judges.

Maltese courts are facing an ever-increasing workload, and the retirement of senior, experienced judges could exacerbate the delays (...).

It is understood in legal circles that the bill was prompted by the upcoming retirement of five senior judges—one of whom has already stepped down. Maltese courts are facing an ever-increasing workload, and the retirement of senior, experienced judges could exacerbate the delays, particularly at a time when expanding the Constitutional Court, which currently operates with only one section handling all cases, is necessary.

Only one of these proposals—the establishment of a Commissioner for the Standards of the Judiciary—successfully passed as it was the only measure requiring a simple majority vote. This article will discuss the political standoff that stalled broader reform, outline the limited impact of the newly established Commissioner, and explore the deeper structural issues afflicting Malta’s overstretched court system.

Opposition Holding out for Wider Changes?

When parliamentary debate on the bill started, the opposition attempted to force the government into introducing wider constitutional changes in return for its vote. Irrespective of the opposition’s motivations, the need for a broader constitutional reform has been sorely felt for many years. The government itself has repeatedly promised to convene a Constitutional Convention to strengthen the independence of key institutions and, as such, bolster Malta’s democracy and rule of law. These promises have been made not only domestically but also to the European Commission and the Council of Europe’s Venice Commission over several years.

Yet, progress has stalled. In fact, before stepping down, Malta’s former president stated in his final address that he “was prevented from continuing the process of convening a Convention”, in reference to the long-promised Constitutional Convention.  

This creates a media environment where news and current affairs programming tend to be cautious, uninspiring, and aligned with the government’s perspective.

The opposition was reportedly particularly interested in pushing through reforms to enhance the independence of key state institutions, with a particular emphasis on public broadcasting. In fact, although public broadcasting is in theory independent, the government retains significant influence over appointments and Malta’s public broadcasting is widely assumed to be controlled by the government of the day. As a result, top officials of Malta’s Public Broadcasting Services (PBS) often come from, or are sympathetic to, the political ranks of the governing party. This creates a media environment where news and current affairs programming tend to be cautious, uninspiring, and aligned with the government’s perspective. Since a significant section of Malta’s population still gets its news almost solely from PBS, this situation amounts to a democracy deficit, as a healthy democracy depends on a free, independent and pluralistic media.

Government Ploughing Ahead

In past instances of constitutional amendments requiring the two-thirds majority, the government—particularly when under pressure from the European Commission and the Council of Europe—sought consensus with the opposition to ensure successful passage of the reforms.

(...) [T]he government proceeded to put the entire bill to vote—resulting in only that one provision passing.

This time, however, the government took a different approach. Rather than negotiating a cross-party agreement, it presented a motion arguing that not all the proposed amendments required a qualified majority. According to Article 66 of the Constitution of Malta, only some constitutional provisions require such a majority—defined as at least two-thirds of all members of Parliament. Given that only two parties are represented in the legislature, this effectively necessitates bipartisan support. Of all the bill’s proposals, only the creation of the Commissioner for the Standards of the Judiciary did not fall under this requirement. Since it involved introducing a new article to the Constitution instead of amending an existing one, it only required a simple majority to pass. On that basis, the government proceeded to put the entire bill to vote—resulting in only that one provision passing.

Commissioner Reform Fails to Empower the Public

The newly established Commissioner for Standards of the Judiciary—who must be a retired judge or a senior retired lawyer—will be tasked with three main responsibilities: conducting preliminary investigations into complaints against members of the judiciary; inquiring into delays by specific members of the judiciary or courts; and scrutinising the assets of members of the judiciary.

While scrutiny of assets and inquiries into judicial delays are intended to enhance transparency and accountability, both measures suffer from a lack of clarity (...).

While scrutiny of assets and inquiries into judicial delays are intended to enhance transparency and accountability, both measures suffer from a lack of clarity in terms of scope and operational procedure. For example, will judicial asset declarations be published? The bill mentions that the Commissioner can or shall probe such declarations or assets but does not specify whether this would occur regularly or only in reaction to particular triggers or concerns.

Similar ambiguity surrounds the Commissioner’s role in investigating judicial delays. Would such enquiries be regular, or in response to reports or complaints? This lack of clarity is further complicated by the fact that the Commission for the Administration of Justice, already responsible for judicial appointment, discipline and court efficiency, technically retains the power to scrutinise delays. This raises the possibility of overlapping or duplicated responsibilities. In addition, existing legislation requires that any judge with cases pending for more than five years must report and explain the delays to the Commission. However, this provision appears to be rarely, if ever, enforced. When the author sought official clarification, no response was provided, and the Commission continues to operate in secrecy, including in matters of judicial accountability.

The newly established Commissioner, too, will operate in secrecy when conducting investigations. The law allows members of the public to file complaints directly with the Commissioner, who would then conduct a preliminary investigation in secret. If prima facie evidence of misconduct is found, the Commissioner must submit a report to both the Chief Justice and the Minister for Justice. Either of these officials may then choose to refer the complaint to the Committee for Judges and Magistrates. Crucially, however, both the Chief Justice and the Minister have full discretion to ignore the Commissioner’s findings. In this sense, the Commissioner’s role is primarily that of an intermediary, rather than a decision-maker.

As far as the complainant is concerned, the procedure is still opaque and secret, with no access to the proceedings or information regarding the outcome of the investigation.

As far as the complainant is concerned, the procedure is still opaque and secret, with no access to the proceedings or information regarding the outcome of the investigation. In fact, the only meaningful change from the pre-existing framework—in place since 2016, when the right of members of the public to participate directly in disciplinary proceedings was removed—is that the Commissioner must now give reasons if a decision is made not to investigate a complaint. However, even this decision cannot be appealed. Thus, a complainant has no possibility of appealing a refusal to investigate, and if an investigation does proceed, does not have any visibility on its outcome. This stands in contrast with best practices outlined by the Consultative Council of European Judges, which state that complainants should be able to submit complaints to a body or person empowered to investigate and take disciplinary action.

Another issue is the limited scope of the current Code of Ethics, which narrows down the kind of complaints that can be made. There is a need to expand it to include all standards and details of conduct of judges contained in the UN Bangalore Principles of Judicial Conduct.

For the public, justice is not seen—and not seen to be done—due to the secrecy that continues to shroud the proceedings and decisions of the Committee for Judges and Magistrates.   

Finally, a broader problem remains: a lack of transparency. For the public, justice is not seen—and not seen to be done—due to the secrecy that continues to shroud the proceedings and decisions of the Committee for Judges and Magistrates.   

Important Proposals Remain in Limbo

As mentioned, all other provisions in the bill failed to pass because they involved amendments to existing constitutional articles or the addition of sub-articles—both of which require a two-thirds majority in Parliament. Among the failed measures was a key proposal to classify unreasonable delays by individual members of the judiciary as judicial misconduct. Another was the proposal to raise the retirement age for judges from 68 to 70. The failure to pass this measure will result in the retirement of five senior judges in less than a year. One of those judges—Toni Abela—has already retired.  

The simultaneous retirement of these judges, together with the failure to pass the provision that would have expanded the Constitutional Court into three sections, is expected to exert further pressure on the already burdened court system.

The simultaneous retirement of these judges, together with the failure to pass the provision that would have expanded the Constitutional Court into three sections, is expected to exert further pressure on the already burdened court system. This creates an immediate predicament: ensuring that there is a sufficient number of qualified and experienced judges available to sit in the Constitutional Court.

Another issue is the chronic understaffing and lack of adequately trained court personnel.

Beyond this immediate concern lies a broader set of structural issues, including serious limitations in both human resources and physical infrastructure. Malta’s two existing courts—the main court in Valletta and the regional court in Gozo—are already too small to handle the current volume of cases, judges, courtrooms, and administrative offices, let alone the additional space required for expanded sections of the Constitutional Court. Another issue is the chronic understaffing and lack of adequately trained court personnel. This deficiency contributes to the delays, inefficiencies, and judicial errors that in turn generate further work and compound the court backlog.

Likewise, according to legal sources, the mounting pressure on members of the judiciary to issue decisions expeditiously—especially in lower court—often leads to hasty decisions. These often generate more appeals to second instance courts and more human rights cases, contributing to further clogs in the justice system and undermining public trust in its fairness and effectiveness.

Conclusion

The failure of the political parties to converge over constitutional reforms that are, in principle, widely acknowledged as necessary reflects badly on Malta’s political system—one in which parties often put partisan interest over national or public interest. While both sides share responsibilities, the government bears the greater share of the blame. Even if one assumes that the opposition acted out of narrow political calculation, wider constitutional changes are, from the public’s perspective, essential to addressing flaws in Maltese democracy.

The failure of most provisions of the bill leaves the public in the lurch, forced to endure an inefficient court system where delays are chronic, disheartening and costly.

The failure of most provisions of the bill leaves the public in the lurch, forced to endure an inefficient court system where delays are chronic, disheartening and costly. At the same time, fixing Malta’s broken court system requires more than the passage of the bill presented in Parliament. It requires a holistic reform strategy and the adoption of wide-ranging measures, and the responsibility to lead and deliver such reform lies primarily with the government.

Victor Paul Borg is a Maltese journalist whose work has been published around the world. His published investigative reporting and analyses are featured at https://victorborg.com/ 

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Suggested citation: Victor Paul Borg, ‘Maltese Government Advances Narrow Reform While Broader Constitutional Package Collapses’, ConstitutionNet, International IDEA, 17 July 2025, https://constitutionnet.org/news/voices/maltese-government-advances-narrow-reform-while-broader-constitutional-package-collapses

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