Hungary’s 14th Constitutional Amendment: Cementing the Incremental Political Takeover of Judicial Power

Editor's Note: Current as of 4 March 2025. For analysis of the 15th constitutional amendment, see Renáta Uitz, ‘The 15th Amendment of the Hungarian Fundamental Law: Advancing Illiberal Christian Democracy’ on ConstitutionNet.

As Hungary passes a controversial 14th constitutional amendment that further undermines the already fragile independence of its judiciary, dissent has erupted among judges and court staff. Key provisions of the amendment include opening the Prosecutor General post to political appointees by removing career requirements, easing the path for government loyalists to enter the judiciary through tailored eligibility rules, and allowing judges to extend their tenure past retirement age—changes widely seen as consolidating political control over Hungary’s justice system. While the Venice Commission has been asked to issue an opinion on the amendment, critics fear this could be just the beginning, with more stringent restrictions yet to come – writes Erika Farkas

Introduction

The fourteenth year of the Fundamental Law of Hungary ushered in the adoption of a 14th Amendment, carrying all the trademarks of Hungary’s unique brand of illiberal constitutionalism. As with several earlier amendments, it was swiftly rushed through the Parliament via a behind-the-scenes maneuver between the government and ruling party members of Parliament, circumventing all obligations to consult with the public, and most notably, the very judges who will be most affected. As with most other amendments to the Fundamental Law, it aims to further undermine and erode the few remaining safeguards of independent institutions that can still exert meaningful control over the executive. This time, the judiciary is once again in the crosshairs, despite managing to stand its ground over a decade of systemic attacks. The new constitutional-level legislation fundamentally reshapes the already strained legal framework in both a highly technical yet very aggressive manner, another trademark of illiberal lawmaking. Unsurprisingly, it incited an unprecedented wave of protest among Hungarian judges and court staff, culminating in a powerful public march with several thousand demonstrators. The changes introduced are merely the tip of the iceberg, and the broader plan has yet to fully unfold.

The renewed executive strategy to control the judiciary

The adopted amendments outline a new, heavy-handed government strategy to further tighten its grip on the partially captured Hungarian justice system. While the 14th Amendment paves the way for additional, still unrevealed reforms, one aim is already clear: the step-by-step creation of a solid ground for the direct conversion from political power into judicial power. Speeding up the otherwise slowly evolving process of court capture through new legislation has become “essential” as the 2026 elections grow closer. For the first time in over a decade, the governing Fidesz majority faces an increasingly popular new opposition party that is capable of posing a real challenge to the incumbents. By funneling government loyalists into the Hungarian judicial system, the ruling party may be better shielded from painful legal defeats in the election year and protect its members against democratic accountability in case of an actual shift in the political landscape.

[…] it is not surprising that the 14th Amendment was treated as a matter of urgency, and that the Hungarian government did not shy away from applying a whole range of unlawful tools to adopt it.

Against this background, it is not surprising that the 14th Amendment was treated as a matter of urgency, and that the Hungarian government did not shy away from applying a whole range of unlawful tools to adopt it. First, the ruling majority exerted undue financial pressure on the judiciary by keeping judicial salaries low, despite extremely high inflation. After pushing it to the brink of inoperability, the judiciary was browbeaten by the government into granting blanket consent for the adoption of wide-ranging reforms in exchange for unguaranteed promises of a long-overdue salary raise. The Hungarian government not only ignored clear voices of dissent from judges and court staff but also disrespected its obligation to consult the National Judicial Council on the reforms, absurdly claiming that the Fundamental Law itself cannot be considered a “law” under provisions obliging consultation for pending legislation.

Nearly one thousand judges and hundreds of court staff expressed their dissent against linking judicial salaries to largely unspecified judicial reforms.

Immediately after the first news on the envisaged reforms appeared, judicial dissent burst out in the form of written statements published on the websites of two Hungarian judicial associations. Nearly one thousand judges and hundreds of court staff expressed their dissent against linking judicial salaries to largely unspecified judicial reforms. Nevertheless, the changes were adopted within a couple of days, with an extraordinary parliamentary session convened to secure the “earliest possible” adoption.

Key provisions of the 14th Amendment

The amendments will enter into force step-by-step, introducing remarkable changes affecting both the prosecution service and the judiciary.

Opening the Door from Political Posts to Top Prosecutorial Positions

The first change opens the door to purely political appointments to the top of the prosecution service. While the Prosecutor General is nominated by the President and elected via a two-thirds majority in parliament, beginning 1 January 2025, the requirement that the Prosecutor General be selected from among career prosecutors has been removed. This dramatically widens the pool of potential candidates for the position, removing an important safeguard of what remains of the independence of the prosecution service. In fact, this effectively permits the election of a ruling party politician or member of the government to head this rigidly hierarchical institution for a nine-year period.

The amendment is yet another example of lawmaking directed toward certain individuals, a tool widely used by the current governing majority to weaken the justice system.

The amendment is yet another example of lawmaking directed toward certain individuals, a tool widely used by the current governing majority to weaken the justice system. Examples include the removal of Judge András Baka as President of the Supreme Court through ad hominem legislation of constitutional rank—laws that can only be amended with a two-thirds parliamentary majority. Other instances include the appointment of a government loyalist as Vice-President of the Kúria—Hungary’s Supreme Court—and several legislative modifications designed to install current Chief Justice András Zs. Varga as President of the Kúria.

Officially, the government maintains that the latest amendment merely aligns the law with previous practice, noting that since the regime change, two of the three people who held the Prosecutor General’s post were not prosecutors at the time of their initial appointment. Regardless, the position has been filled by the same person since 2010, and his mandate expires in 2028. The upcoming elections significantly raise the stakes of a future personnel change. As with the other apparently unjustifiable modifications, the amendment is widely believed to be a pre-emptive move to guarantee a loyal successor, rather than having to reach a consensus on the person to be elected in 2028 when the incumbent party may not have a required two-thirds majority to elect the Prosecutor General, or a majority at all.

Facilitating the Transfer of Loyalists into the Judiciary

The second change widens the possibility of transfers from the executive to the judiciary. From 1 March 2025, the minimum age for becoming a judge will be raised from 30 to 35 years with a simultaneous change in the practice requirements for judicial posts that overtly encourage young lawyers to start their careers outside the judiciary. This is part of a three-pronged strategy that chips away the impartiality of Hungarian judges who deal with politically sensitive cases.

- The first component is the distorted points system for the assessment of judicial applicants, in force since 2017, which gives preference to candidates from the executive branch over candidates from within the judiciary. A judicial reform passed in 2023 granted the National Judicial Council the power to give a binding opinion on modifications of the points system for assessing applicants, but did not provide a timeline for reviewing and updating the (much-criticized) ministerial decree regulating the points system. The government has therefore kept up the distorted points system, leaving the judicial reform meaningless in this respect.

- The second component, also in force since 2017, is the lack of guarantees for judicial impartiality in politically sensitive cases. Administrative judges are currently not required to request recusal from proceedings implicating a state authority or a governmental office even where one of the parties is their former employer. This looms large over cases affecting fundamental rights related to elections, policing, asylum, or the exercise of the right to peaceful assembly, as well as issues with significant economic impacts: disputes over taxation and customs, media, public procurement, construction and building permits, cases of land and forest ownership, or even market competition.

- The 14th Amendment has created a very important third component in this strategy by introducing new requirements for becoming a judge. Besides raising the age limit to 35 years, new practice requirements give preference to those who gain relevant experience outside the courts, as they become eligible even in the absence of any professional experience within the court system. At the same time, those who gain professional experience only in courts will not be eligible for judicial posts unless they practice law for an additional two years outside the judiciary.

These rules are detrimental to the whole court system and especially problematic in the higher-level courts where judges transferred directly from the executive deliver final and binding judgments.

Putting together the three-piece puzzle, under the newly introduced rules, candidates moving directly from the executive to the courts face less stringent requirements for professional practice, garner more points during the application process, and have to comply with more lenient guarantees of impartiality once they become judges in charge of politically sensitive cases. These rules are detrimental to the whole court system and especially problematic in the higher-level courts where judges transferred directly from the executive deliver final and binding judgments.

Besides facilitating the transfer of loyalists into the judiciary on a systemic level, this amendment also serves to legitimize ex-post one of the most flagrant violations committed by loyalist Chief Justice András Zs. Varga: the unlawful judicial appointment of Barnabás Hajas, a former state secretary to the Kúria without any prior judicial experience. The appointment was criticized by the National Judicial Council for breaching applicable rules, and incited the first complaint before the Constitutional Court of Hungary challenging the lawfulness of the appointment of a judge.

Prolonging Judicial Service Beyond the Current Retirement Age

The third change permits judges, on an individual basis, to remain on the bench until age 70, instead of facing mandatory retirement at 65, currently in effect. The detailed regulation is yet to come, but whatever conditions the new legislation sets out, individual assessment of compliance for extension of judicial service will necessarily allow for a hand-picked selection of judges and create an atmosphere of pressure for judges to adapt to perceived or real expectations as they approach the general retirement age.

Considering the above, the outcry of Hungarian judges and court staff against the 14th Amendment and further upcoming reforms is understandable. The first wave of protest was followed by a mass demonstration at the Ministry of Justice, where thousands represented the Hungarian judiciary’s commitment to exercising their freedom of expression. This right was upheld in the European Court of Human Rights landmark case of Baka v. Hungary, which found that the dismissal of a Supreme Court president for expressing views on judicial independence violated that very right. The demonstration was also a powerful answer to threats from Chief Justice András Zs. Varga, who publicly accused vocal judges of conducting political activities and implied detrimental consequences. He also targeted Hungary’s service courts (independent bodies responsible for disciplinary procedures, among others), which have supported judges’ freedom of speech. In this situation, many fear that new legislation could be passed to undermine the internal independence of service courts.

In a landscape where nearly all other independent institutions are captured or neutralized, the Hungarian judiciary has remained the last bulwark exerting meaningful control over the executive and providing hope for restoration of the rule of law.

In a landscape where nearly all other independent institutions are captured or neutralized, the Hungarian judiciary has remained the last bulwark exerting meaningful control over the executive and providing hope for restoration of the rule of law. Chief Justice András Zs. Varga plays a key role in this process, acting as a transmission belt between the executive and the judiciary in all his key positions: as administrative leader of the Kúria, as a member of the National Judicial Council and as head of the uniformity panels.

The 14th Amendment again sidestepped the implementation of the Baka v. Hungary judgment. Implementation has been pending for over eight years now, forcing the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe to remind the Hungarian authorities of their obligation to comply with the judgment and provide guarantees for judicial freedom of expression. An opinion on the 14th Amendment was requested by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe from the Venice Commission, the draft of which is scheduled to be adopted. By relaxing the rules of impartiality and independence of Hungarian judges, the ruling majority strives to find easier paths to encroach on human rights and civil liberties. Yet these changes have not only faced a judiciary that is publicly standing up for its own independence, but also a wider society that is ready to stand in solidarity with the third branch of power when needed.

Erika Farkas is Legal Officer at the Rule of Law Programme of the Hungarian Helsinki Committee, a leading independent human rights watchdog organization defending human rights, democratic values and the rule of law in Hungary.

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Suggested citation: Erika Farkas, ‘Hungary’s 14th Constitutional Amendment: Cementing the Incremental Political Takeover of Judicial Power’, ConstitutionNet, International IDEA, 30 April 2025, https://constitutionnet.org/news/voices/hungarys-14th-constitutional-amendment-cementing-incremental-political-takeover-judicial-power

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