Executive Ambitions Meet Parliamentary Pushback: Senegal’s Failed Constitutional Amendments

In Senegal, President Bassirou Diomaye Faye’s attempt to abolish two constitutional bodies was blocked by a parliamentary majority aligned with his predecessor, former President Macky Sall. By dismissing the heads of these bodies and dissolving the parliament, the President has set the stage for a critical period that will test the government's ability to balance reform ambitions with democratic principles, institutional integrity, and public sentiment – writes Professor Abdou Khadre Diop

Introduction

Since President Bassirou Diomaye Faye assumed office on 24 March 2024, relations between the executive and the legislature — still dominated by a majority aligned with the coalition of former President Macky Sall — have been tense. President Faye has had to navigate a hostile parliamentary majority, at least until September 2024, when he dissolved the parliament. The tension was evident in several key actions: Prime Minister Ousmane Sonko’s refusal to deliver a general policy statement before the National Assembly, the Assembly's refusal to receive the Minister of Finance and Budget for the budget orientation debate, and the looming threat of a no-confidence motion aimed at toppling Sonko’s government. The latest development, which this piece seeks to analyze, is Parliament’s rejection of the constitutional reform proposal put forward by President Faye and his government.

Invoking Article 63 of the Constitution, President Faye transmitted a decree to the President of the National Assembly on 26 August, convening an extraordinary session for 29 August to examine the government’s proposed constitutional amendment. The reform proposal sought to abolish both the High Council of Territorial Collectivities (HCCT) and the Economic, Social, and Environmental Council (CESE). The CESE is a consultative body comprised of 80 members representing various economic, social, and environmental sectors, appointed for five-year terms. Similarly, the HCCT is a consultative institution that plays a role in supporting territorial development by issuing opinions that reflect the concerns of local populations.

This piece examines the constitutional implications and significance of the recent rejection of President Bassirou Diomaye Faye's proposed constitutional reforms in Senegal. This analysis highlights how the rejection of the reform not only reflects a deepening rift between the government and the parliamentary majority but also raises critical questions about the legitimacy of political institutions in Senegal and the potential for executive overreach in the pursuit of reform, underscoring the broader significance of these developments in the context of Senegal's democratic framework.

Rationale for the Reform Proposal

The key reasons advanced by the President's party for introducing this constitutional reform are twofold: fulfilling a campaign promise and streamlining public expenditures. The two consultative constitutional bodies have long been perceived as financial burdens, often seen as avenues for political patronage rather than institutions with tangible benefits for citizens. Such bodies have frequently been criticized for their ineffectiveness and high costs, which have led to their abolishment in other countries, as was recently the case in Burkina Faso. With this understanding, opposition parties frequently advocate their dissolution as a means to rationalize public spending. According to the Initial Finance Law (LFI) adopted on 15 December 2023, the combined budget of the HCCT and CESE for 2024 exceeds 15 billion CFA francs (approximately 22.8 million euro). Specifically, the HCCT was allocated 7.81 billion CFA francs, while the CESE received 7.54 billion CFA francs. It is argued that abolishing these bodies would allow the state to save these substantial sums, which could then be redirected towards social policies with more direct and meaningful impacts on the population, thereby increasing the efficiency and effectiveness of public resource allocation.

Beyond the officially stated reasons, this constitutional reform project could also be seen as a strategic political move aimed at justifying a potential dissolution of the National Assembly.

Beyond the officially stated reasons, this constitutional reform project could also be seen as a strategic political move aimed at justifying a potential dissolution of the National Assembly. The timing of such an initiative raises questions. Initially, the government's constitutional reform agenda was much broader than the mere abolition of these two consultative institutions. It included proposals for rebalancing state powers, strengthening judicial independence, and establishing a Constitutional Court to replace the current Constitutional Council. Why, then, did the government choose to focus only on abolishing the HCCT and CESE? These institutions are largely led and composed of dignitaries from the former ruling party, which still holds a majority in the National Assembly. It was clear that this majority would oppose a reform targeting institutions they control and continue to support.

The government’s decision to present this reform knowing it lacked parliamentary backing suggests a deliberate choice, which can be interpreted as a strategy to create a political confrontation between the executive — reflecting the recent will of the people who voted for change — and a Parliament elected three years ago and still aligned with the previous regime. Such a confrontation, while not legally necessary, could be used politically to justify dissolving the National Assembly, with the argument that the legislative body no longer reflects the popular mandate of the President elected just months before.

Parliamentary Rejection of the Constitutional Amendment

As expected, the draft constitutional amendment introduced by President Faye was rejected first by the National Assembly’s Law Commission on 31 August 2024, with a vote of 16 to 14, and second, in plenary session, where 83 deputies voted against and 80 in favor. The government needed a qualified majority of 99 votes for the reform to pass, as stipulated in Article 103 of the Constitution.

The parliamentary majority justified their rejection on two main grounds. Firstly, during the debates, they defended the importance of these consultative constitutional institutions and their democratic role. Secondly, they argued that the priority for rationalizing public expenditures should focus on eliminating the special funds allocated to the President of the Republic, which they criticized for being managed in a non-transparent manner. They emphasized that the abolition of these secret funds was a key campaign promise, suggesting that addressing this issue should come first. This rationale underpinned the majority's decision to reject the reform proposal, which prompted a reaction from the executive branch.

Response from the Executive Branch

The executive's response was immediate. The day after the constitutional reform project was rejected, the President of the Republic issued a statement acknowledging Parliament's decision not to support the proposed amendments. He stated, 'The rejection of the bill to amend the Constitution aimed at dissolving the HCCT and the CESE clearly indicates a profound disconnect between the parliament majority and the popular aspirations expressed overwhelmingly during the presidential election on 24 March 2024.' This highlighted the gap between public sentiment and the current parliamentary composition, implying that the President should take significant actions in light of this disjunction.

The parliamentary majority condemned the President's dismissal of the presidents of the HCCT and the CESE as "political vengeance", and a clear violation of the Constitution.

Following this written response, the President took decisive action. On 4 September 2024, he dismissed the Presidents of the HCCT and CESE by decree. By removing these leaders — who are primarily affiliated with the former regime — without immediate replacements, the executive aimed to obstruct the functioning of these institutions, potentially awaiting a change in parliamentary majority to reconsider their dissolution. The parliamentary majority condemned this action as "political vengeance", and a clear violation of the Constitution.

As the guarantor of the functioning of institutions according to Article 42 of the Constitution, the President appeared to be paralyzing bodies whose representatives had rejected their dissolution. While this action may garner public support due to its alignment with a campaign promise, its constitutionality is questionable since it seeks to obstruct the functioning of two constitutional bodies. Nevertheless, it seems unlikely that this decree could be challenged. The Constitutional Council cannot review executive decisions unless they concern the organization of elections (Decision 1/C/2024 of 15 February 2024), and the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence excludes its competence over "acts of government," which refers to actions taken by the President in the context of his relations with other constitutional institutions.

The second significant action was the dissolution of the National Assembly on 12 September, following a message to the nation from President Faye. In his address, he explained, ‘Unfortunately, the parliamentary majority has chosen to go against the will of the Senegalese people, by rejecting the constitutional amendment aimed at fulfilling my promise to abolish the HCCT and the CESE, while the state of public finances urgently requires the rationalization of public expenditures.’ Thus, according to Article 87 of the Constitution and the advisory opinion by the Constitutional Council issued on 10 July 2024, the President decided to dissolve the Parliament and organize legislative elections on 17 November 2024.

Conclusion and Perspectives on Future Constitutional Reforms

The current political climate in Senegal sets the stage for a transformative period following the upcoming legislative elections on 17 November 2024. President Faye's strategic focus on securing a parliamentary majority could provide him with the necessary leverage to fulfill his campaign promises, including the dissolution of the HCCT and CESE and broader constitutional reforms, such as the creation of a Constitutional Court to replace the Constitutional Council, with increased powers and more members. Additionally, the reforms would make the membership of the High Council of the Judiciary more inclusive, in line with the conclusions of the national conference on justice convened in 2024. Another key objective is the rebalancing of powers between the President and the Prime Minister, as announced during their electoral campaign.

However, the success of this agenda will depend not only on electoral outcomes but also on the government's ability to maintain public support and navigate the complexities of the political landscape. Balancing reform ambitions with institutional integrity and public sentiment will be critical in shaping Senegal's democratic trajectory in the months to come. The unfolding dynamics will require careful attention to ensure that the process of reform not only addresses immediate political goals but also reinforces the foundations of democratic governance in Senegal.

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Suggested citation: Abdou Khadre Diop, 'Executive Ambitions meet Parliamentary Pushback: Senegal’s Failed Constitutional Amendments', ConstitutionNet, International IDEA, 1 October 2024, https://constitutionnet.org/news/voices/executive-ambitions-meet-parliamentary-pushback-senegals-failed-constitutional-amendments

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